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THE ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICS OF TOKYO

A SURVEY AND OPINIONS

By CHARLES A. BEARD

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THE ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICS OF TOKYO

A SURVEY AND OPINIONS

BY

CHARLES A. BEARD

FORMERLY DIRECTOR OF THE NEW YORK BUREAU
OF MUNICIPAL RESEARCH

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PUBLISHER'S FOREWORD

THE Japanese cabinet was in process of reorganisation when the earthquake and fire laid in ruins the nation's capital and its most important seaport, destroyed important government buildings, and thrust upon the Imperial Government unparalleled tasks of relief and reconstruction. In this crisis Viscount Goto, "the Roosevelt of Japan," was made Minister of Home Affairs, and was thus placed in charge of that branch of the government especially responsible for the work of rebuilding and rehabilitation. While the fires were still burning in Tokyo and Yokohama, the new government set about its task.

On the receipt of the first news of the Japanese disaster, the New York Bureau of Municipal Research, through its chairman, Mr. R. Fulton Cutting, cabled to Viscount Goto offering to place freely at his disposal the services of the Bureau's staff wherever they might be of use in connection with reconstruction.

On September 7th, six days after the earthquake, Dr. Charles A. Beard, a former director of the Bureau of Municipal Research, received the following delayed cable: "Earthquake and fire destroyed the greater part of Tokyo. Thoroughgoing reconstruction needed. Please come immediately if possible, even for a short stay. Viscount Goto." This cable is said to be the first official news despatched from Japan with regard to the disaster. Under the circumstances the Bureau of Municipal Research asked Dr. Beard to undertake as its representative

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the special mission to Japan outlined by Viscount Goto. This he accepted, and sailed immediately.

The unusual honour and opportunity for international service that came to Dr. Beard and to the Bureau of Municipal Research was the direct outgrowth of Dr. Beard's work in Tokyo in the winter and spring immediately preceding the earthquake. In this work he applied to Japanese conditions the governmental research methods and the administrative principles developed during the past fifteen years by the Bureau of Municipal Research. This study of Japanese municipal government was undertaken at the request of Viscount Goto, who was then Mayor of Tokyo. It was therefore natural for Viscount Goto to turn to Dr. Beard and to the New York Bureau of Municipal Research in this crisis.

This survey of Tokyo was in the hands of the publisher at the time of the Japanese disaster. Before sailing Dr. Beard ordered to have publication held up in the thought that the usefulness of the report was at an end because of changed conditions. Requests for copies of this survey from official sources in Japan indicate that those in a position to know feel differently. Americans interested in municipal government and public administration will share this view. Dr. Beard's survey is therefore published now in his absence without those changes which he himself would make were he here. Slight editorial changes have been made, but the work itself is as it was left before the great disaster.

The earthquake and fire destroyed many of the physical features of Tokyo described in the following pages. The disaster has wiped out as well many of the physical obstacles which have stood in the way of the realisation of the plans for city betterment. It is destined also to clear the field of old prejudices and entrenched practices

and to make room for a new city government properly organised for its new tasks, endowed with adequate powers, administered in accordance with tested principles, manned by able and honest public officials, and supported by intelligent citizenship. The practical steps leading to such a New Tokyo outlined in Dr. Beard's survey give this volume its peculiar value in this period of Japanese reconstruction.

New York City,
October, 1923.

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THE ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICS OF TOKYO

A SURVEY AND OPINIONS

INTRODUCTION

On February 24th, 1922, the Institute for Municipal Research was established in Tokyo to promote public improvements in that city. The institution was made possible by a bequest of ¥3,500,000 contained in the will of the late Mr. Z. Yasuda, supplemented by large gifts from two other Japanese gentlemen. The execution of the trust was vested in Viscount (then Baron) Goto, who was at that time Mayor of Tokyo. Immediately after the inauguration of the Institute, Viscount Goto, its President, honoured me with an invitation to visit Tokyo to co-operate with him and his colleagues in developing their programme of municipal work.

On my arrival in Japan on September 14th, 1922, the Viscount laid before me four definite tasks. First of all, he wished help in arousing a deeper interest in municipal government and public administration among college and university students and among the citizens of the leading Japanese cities. In the second place, he asked me to present to him summaries of American experience in dealing with a number of concrete municipal problems, such as taxation, assessments and transportation. Thirdly, he wanted me to assist the Institute in organising its programme library, and research methods. Finally, Viscount Goto asked me to imagine myself mayor of the city for the time being and to make a report to the citizens on the problems of the municipality, expressing my opinion "freely and without reserve." This volume is the record of my attempt to participate in the interesting and sig-

nificant enterprise on which the Mayor of Tokyo, Viscount Goto, had embarked.

The prophet is not without honour, save in his own country. The people of Japan do not differ from those of other lands in this capacity for giving attention to foreigners rather than to their own countrymen! There were many Japanese students of municipal affairs who could have spoken with more knowledge and more eloquence on every theme which I discussed in my tour through various parts of the Empire, but, owing to the perversity of human nature, their discourses would not have received one-half of the attention which was bestowed upon my efforts!

It is not for me to say whether I succeeded or failed in the discharge of the first duty entrusted to me, but I spared neither pains nor labour to accomplish the undertaking. As evidence of my endeavours to awaken deeper interest among the citizens of Japan in municipal government, the following bare statement about my lectures and addresses is submitted:

September 16th. Address before Imperial and city officials, including Viscount Goto, as Chairman, and Premier Kato.

September 21st. Address before Trustees and Directors of the Tokyo Institute for Municipal Research.

September 22nd. Address before the Councillors and officials of the City of Tokyo. Subject: "Special Assessments."

October 1st. Public address at the Y. M. C. A. Hall in Tokyo on the occasion of the anniversary of the granting of self-government to Tokyo. Subject: "The Place of the City in Modern Industrial Civilisation."

October 14th. Address before the National Conference of Social Workers in Tokyo. Subject: "Social Work in an Industrial Society."

October 21st. Lecture at the Imperial University of Tokyo.
October 23rd. Lecture at Waseda University.
October 24th. Lecture, Imperial University.
October 25th. Lecture, Keio University, 1-2 P. M. Waseda University, 3-4.
October 26th. Lecture, Imperial University.
October 27th. Lecture, Waseda University.
October 28th. Lecture, Waseda University.
November 1st. Lecture, American School in Japan (morning). Tokyo Women's College (afternoon).
November 3rd. Lecture, University of Commerce, 1-2 P. M. Japan Women's University, 2-4. Meiji University, 4.10-5.30.
November 9th. Lecture, Imperial University of Kyoto.
November 10th. Address before city authorities and citizens of Kyoto.
November 11th. Address before city authorities and citizens of Kobe.
November 14th. Address before city authorities of Osaka on "Taxation and Special Assessments."
November 15th. Address before Economic Association of Osaka on "The Economic Aspects of City Government."
November 18th. Address in the Auditorium of the Osaka *Asahi* on "The Battle for Efficient City Government in America." The address was printed in full in the *Asahi,* and in the Osaka *Mainichi* (English edition).
November 19th. Address before the city authorities and citizens of Nagoya on "City Planning and Municipal Finances."
November 25th. Address before the first City Planning Conference of Japan on "The Struggle for City Planning in America."
January 15th, 17th and 19th. Conferences at the Institute for Municipal Research with a small group of students and instructors from Tokyo Imperial University and Waseda University.
February 21st, 22nd, 23rd, 24th, 26th, 27th. Six lectures

on "Technical Problems of Municipal Government" before a selected group of city officials from Tokyo, Kyoto, Osaka, Kobe, Nagoya and Yokohama, officials from the Home Department, and representatives from the leading Universities.

On the occasion of many lectures and addresses, especially during my trip into the South-West, I was fortunate in having with me Viscount Goto who usually spoke, sometimes at length and sometimes briefly, but always adding the great weight of his influence to every plea which I made in the interest of municipal improvement. If my efforts failed, the same cannot be said of the Viscount's labours. So whatever may have been the value of the above addresses, it must be admitted that my visit was the occasion for drawing Viscount Goto again into the national arena as an advocate of progressive municipal administration.

In all, approximately ten thousand different individuals attended these meetings. In nearly every case the public address was printed in full or in part in the Japanese newspapers and thus given a circulation reaching into the millions. Several of the addresses were printed in full in magazines and technical journals. Through the tireless and skilful labours of my former student, Dr. Seigo Takahashi, of Waseda University, my speeches were given a correct Japanese form for publication. His mastery of technical terms made smooth the way for me. On some occasions, Dr. Takahashi also translated my addresses directly to the audience. At other times this arduous task was ably performed by the Assistant Mayor, Mr. Maeda. During my journey into the South-West, Mr. Yusuke Tsurumi, one of the leaders of young Japan, assumed the heavy burden of translation, and discharged

it with a skill and a finish which abundantly atoned for the shortcomings of the original.

The lectures and addresses on municipal government were translated into Japanese under the title of "Collected Addresses," and published by the Institute for Municipal Research. Viscount Goto added a brief preface. Copies were sent by the Institute to important officials in the chief cities of Japan and widely distributed to the general public. The lecture on "Special Assessments" before the authorities of the city of Osaka was also separately published as an introduction to a translation of "Special Assessments as a Means of Financing Municipal Improvements," the Supplement to the "National Municipal Review" for February, 1922.

It seems fair to say, therefore, that nothing humanly possible was neglected in the effort to carry out Viscount Goto's plan for arousing in Japan a deeper public interest in the subject of municipal improvement.

As for my second task, that of giving to city officials information on American experience, from time to time, it is difficult to compile a record of my activities. Sometimes the request came in the form of a general invitation to report on some such topic as the nature of the traction problem in New York City and its meaning for the city of Tokyo. Sometimes the request was a personal one—the desire of the mayor or one of the city officers for data relative to some special point, such as the system of budget hearings or land assessments methods in New York.

In discharging my obligations under this head, I sought to avoid wasting the time of the city authorities by first making a general survey of the ground. Two or three weeks at the city hall and in the public institutions of Tokyo revealed the fact that the leaders in the city were

fully alive to the great problems of modern municipal government and had prepared comprehensive and enlightened measures for meeting those problems.

This fact should be made a matter of record here, because so many American visitors, during a hurried sojourn in Tokyo, get entirely false notions about the local situation. Most of them, seeing great thoroughfares unpaved, high-class residential sections without sewers, and new suburban areas growing up along narrow and crooked streets exclaim: "I would like to tell the city officials how we do things in the United States." As the visitor is generally a well-to-do person who lives in a high-grade hotel or a fine residential district at home, he often assumes, without thinking, that all American citizens are as well served by modern conveniences as he is himself. As a matter of fact, in nine cases out of ten, he knows little or nothing about the history of sanitation and city planning in the United States. He would be amazed to learn how recently Baltimore and New Orleans have completed their sewer systems, how many people in Pittsburgh had no sewer service in 1912, or how high the death rate was in Washington that year.[1]

For the benefit of foreign visitors to Tokyo during the next few years and of Western students of Oriental affairs, I deem it an obligation therefore to call attention to the quality of some of the men who are charged with important responsibilities in the city. I ought to add also that the list might be enlarged indefinitely.

At the head of the city stands Viscount Goto who is regarded by all Japanese as one of the ablest men in the Empire. He is a Samurai of the North, born in 1857. He chose medicine for his career and carried on his

[1] According to the Russell Sage Foundation Report on Springfield, Illinois, two-thirds of the homes in that city were not connected with sewer or water mains in 1910.

advanced studies in Germany where he took the degree of Doctor of Medicine in 1893. He began his official life as a physician in the Aichi prefectural hospital. His skill as a practical administrator made his map of public life plain. He served twice as director of the bureau of health in the Home Department; as civil governor of Formosa, president of the South Manchurian Railway, and adviser to the government of Kwantung; twice as Minister of Communications; three times as head of the Imperial Government Railways; as president of the colonial bureau; as Minister of Home Affairs; and as Minister of Foreign Affairs. He has written many articles and has published a volume on *The Self-Government of Yedo*. He has travelled widely in the Western world and is familiar with the governments, science and leaders of the West. His knowledge of the facts, theories, movements, and practices of the Western world is broad and deep. He crowns it all with a fine sense of humour and proportion. Giving him advice on administrative affairs is like carrying coals to Newcastle!

The first assistant mayor is Mr. Hidejiro Nagata, member of the House of Peers, who has seen long service in the prefectural and Imperial Governments. He was for some time attached to the Home Department in the capacity of one of the secretaries and then as chief of the bureau of police.

The second assistant mayor is Mr. Hiroshi Ikeda, a graduate of the Imperial University of Kyoto, whose official career has been extensive and varied. He was the Chief of the Bureau of Social Welfare in the Home Department when he was called to his present office. Mr. Ikeda reads English, French, and German, and has made careful studies of foreign municipal problems and methods. He has published three works on city government

which indicate the range of his interest and knowledge: *The Needs of the Modern City* (1917), *The Principles of City Planning Legislation* (1912), and *Municipal Management* (1922).

The third assistant mayor, Mr. Tamon Maeda, is a graduate of the Imperial University of Tokyo and like his associates has spent his life in official service, coming to his present responsibilities from the post of director of the city planning section of the Home Department. He speaks English with accuracy and fluency. He has travelled extensively abroad and has a first hand knowledge of Western theory and practice in city administration.

In charge of the great water works extension as consulting engineer is Dr. Eiji Nakajima, a graduate of the Engineering School of the Tokyo Imperial University in 1883. Dr. Nakajima spent several years in Europe and America, studying, travelling and observing Western engineering practice and obtaining first hand experience in actual construction work. He has served in an engineering capacity in the prefectural, municipal, and Imperial governments, and is now a Professor Emeritus of Engineering in the Imperial University of Tokyo. He speaks English with ease and keeps in constant touch with the scientific literature of the world.

One of the best known and most interesting figures of the city administration is Viscount Shibusawa who for fifty years has been the unpaid head of the bureau of charities and juvenile correction. He was born in 1840 of a Samurai family and for many years was in the service of the Imperial Government. On retiring from that service he became one of the captains of finance and industry in Japan and contributed powerfully to the development of Japanese economic life. On his with-

drawal from the business world in 1916 he devoted his entire energies to social work and to the promotion of good-will among nations. He has many times visited Europe and America and is well known to every foreigner who enters the hospitable gates of Japan. Though more than eighty years old, he gives a great amount of personal attention to the details and principles of administration. No matter is too small or too large for his careful thought. The upbuilding of the department is mainly due to his personal efforts and he assumes responsibility for raising nearly all the funds expended in his work. Under his thoughtful and patient administration more than 2,000 aged poor, homeless people, orphans, and delinquents, are daily provided for. He is as eager for new ideas to-day as he was half a century ago. What American city can show a parallel?

The leaders in Tokyo are not only experienced administrators acquainted with Western as well as Japanese theory and practice. They take especial pains to keep abreast the currents of modern thinking in municipal affairs. In the various libraries in the city there is available an extensive literature on city government in all foreign tongues. The higher officials in Japan as a rule read two or three languages besides their own and they are zealously at work enlarging their knowledge. It would be difficult to find any live theme of municipal government in the West with which Japanese specialists are not familiar. One of the first questions asked me by Dr. Mizuno, Minister of Home Affairs, was: "How is the city manager plan working in America?" I think it safe to say that Viscount Goto is more deeply interested in important municipal events in New York City than any American mayor west of the Alleghenies.

It was not often therefore that I enjoyed the privilege

of bringing wholly novel ideas to the attention of the authorities of the city of Tokyo. In a few instances, it is true I could point out technical work in Tokyo which did not come up to the best Western specifications. In such case I ventured to suggest that engineers of long experience in Western practice should be employed to co-operate in local construction work.

This technical weakness, of course, is not surprising. In the Western world, theories of engineering have grown up with practice; theories and practice have evolved together. In Japan, on the other hand, the broad outlines of the science of engineering have been studied first, theory has preceded actual operation. Now a mastery of practice is not a thing to be acquired in three or five years of study, travel, and observation in Western countries. It comes from what Americans call "contact with the dirt"; that is, from long and often costly experience in the actual work of construction and operation. No one can give the Japanese that contact which underlies practice. In some novel fields in which they do not already have it, they will get it for themselves naturally in the course of time.

Accordingly, the foreign visitor is wholly wrong when he imagines that the city authorities of Tokyo have not heard of sewers, side-walks, subways, city planning, special assessments, fire prevention, municipal research, and other Western ideas and devices. When his error is pointed out to him, however, he quickly puts the next question: "Why then do the city officials not act at once and modernise the city within two or three years?" The answer to that question is not simple but perhaps some light will be shed upon it in Chapter VIII of this report. The aforesaid visitor will get some insight into the difficulties of the situation if he will ask himself these

questions: "Why does not the city of New York put an end to the primitive freight system on the West Side? Why does not Chicago solve the street railway problem? Why does it take so long to consolidate the administrative areas of Greater Boston? Why did San Francisco fail to carry out a grand city plan after the earthquake?" One who thinks over the questions will be in a better condition to appreciate the forces against which the leaders in Japan must battle.

At the end of six months' hard work I became convinced that the difficulties of Tokyo do not lie in any lack of knowledge about local needs or about modern methods of meeting those needs. The difficulties do lie in the lack of adequate financial and legal powers, occasionally in the lack of actual experience in putting technical theories into practice, and fundamentally, here as elsewhere in the absence of an adequate public spirit to support intelligent and enthusiastic municipal leaders.

The third task which I assumed was that of co-operating with the Institute for Municipal Research in perfecting its organization and research methods. My work in this connection took the form of conferences with the directors and members of the staff and the preparation of memoranda on specific matters. It is gratifying to report that the Tokyo Institute has the intelligent leadership and dynamic spirit necessary for great achievements. During the coming years it will render splendid services to the cities of Japan.

As indicated above, the fourth task assigned to me was that of making a report at the close of my labours. The nature of this report was left entirely to my own judgment, with only one provision: namely, that I should write "freely and without reserve." Therefore it was necessary for me, at the very outset, to make an important

decision. Should I make a minute study of one or more phases of Tokyo government, such as assessments or taxation in which I might deal fully with the whole subject? Or should I make the study more general in character? The former course was naturally the easier to pursue. It also involved less moral danger! The data for assessment methods, for instance, were readily available and I was somewhat familiar with American experience. On the other hand, in attempting to cover a wide field, I could deal with each subject only in the most general way. Thus I incurred the risk of being superficial and, at the same time, the risk of failing to give concrete and helpful information to specialists. In spite of the difficulties in the way it was decided after mature consideration that I should choose the more perilous of the two courses and write a general report on the city of Tokyo.

The reasons for this general treatise seemed impelling. The Japanese specialist, as I have said, is able to advance by his own efforts and is already well equipped. The most pressing need in Japan, as far as municipal affairs are concerned, is a wider public interest in the subject of city government and a deeper appreciation of its significance. There are no special courses on municipal government in the Imperial Universities of Tokyo and Kyoto, for example, and there are only a few general treatises in Japanese on the science of municipal administration. Lack of public concern about civic matters is due in part, no doubt, to neglect of this kind in the educational sphere. Accordingly it seemed that a general study of the practical problems of a great Japanese city might be of some service in keeping alive the interest aroused by the lectures and mass-meetings. Hence this report was prepared in the form of a brief summary of

the municipal problems of Tokyo, as I see them, and is intended as an introductory guide for students in all the cities of Japan.[1]

Leaders in municipal affairs, such as Viscount Goto, Mr. Nagata, Mr. Ikeda, Mr. Maeda, and many others, will find nothing new in these pages. It would be difficult indeed to discover any municipal problem or theory with which such gentlemen are not already familiar. Behind the public servant however must stand an enlightened and forceful public opinion if any great results are to be achieved. This volume consequently is dedicated to the citizens of Tokyo who sincerely desire to make their city a model and to the young students who will be the leaders in Japan to-morrow. If I have shown them that the science of municipal administration is a subject worthy of the highest talents and have given them even a slight clue to its significant branches, my labours will be well rewarded.

One word as to the means by which this report was assembled. In the intervals between the various lectures and addresses, I visited the institutions, public works, and offices of the city government. The visits began promptly on the afternoon of Monday, September 17th, following my arrival on the 14th, with a trip to the Municipal Exhibit at Ueno Park. There I found models, charts, diagrams, and graphs showing in concise and effective form the leading activities of the city administration. In ingenuity and execution, this exhibit compared favourably with similar exhibits in American cities. In the course of my tours, I visited the sewage disposal plant at Mikawashima, the City Hospital, the Almshouse, the employment exchange, the model city tenements, the water pipe testing station, the waste disposal yards at the water front,

[1] In the Japanese edition of this report the official documents supporting the text are cited for the benefit of students.

the water reservoir in construction at Murayama, the intake at Hamura, the filter beds, pumping station, etc., the public library, public schools, the municipal lodging house, the worst sections of the city, the social agencies, etc. I also made similar tours in the cities of the South-West. In the case of each visit, I usually made preparations in advance, with the aid of city officials, so that I might the more easily appreciate the character of the work already done and that in process of being done. This information I supplemented with materials collected at the points visited which were promptly translated for me by assistants at the Institute for Municipal Research.

Information from these sources was then increased by the questionnaire method. Immediately after my arrival, I prepared an extensive outline containing classified questions on all the leading points of city administration. Responsible municipal officials prepared replies and assembled data according to the scheme set forth in the questionnaire. Meanwhile these replies were checked up for me by assistants in the Institute for Municipal Research and additional data were collected on each point by men intimately acquainted with the city administration. In this connection I am especially indebted to Mr. Kitoh and Mr. Yuge of the Institute staff. At the same time I had the constant aid of Dr. Takahashi who is very familiar with the history and practices of American politics and with the research methods of the New York Bureau of Municipal Research. With his help and that of Mr. Tanabe, a former city official and now a member of the staff of the Tokyo Institute for Municipal Research, the outlines of this survey were prepared. During this process I enjoyed the advantage of a long conference with Mr. Ozaki, for nine years mayor of Tokyo, who gave me the benefit of his knowledge and experience.

After the materials had been collected from various sources, I prepared a draft of the report and discussed the important points of each section with city officials, independent citizens, and informed students of municipal affairs. I am especially indebted to Mr. Ikeda, assistant mayor, Mr. Maeda, assistant mayor, and Mr. Matsuki, managing director of the Institute for Municipal Research, for taking the trouble to examine with great care my statement of facts. Owing to their wide knowledge of public affairs I was able to avoid many errors. The final draft of the report was subject to a painstaking examination by Dr. Takahashi and Mr. Tanabe, who checked up the facts and figures against authentic sources which will be cited in the Japanese translation. My debt to these gentlemen is so great that I cannot pay it by any words in a preface. At all times I was given complete freedom by the mayor of Tokyo and the directors of the Institute. They asked me for my "unvarnished opinion," and here it is. The conclusions are my own. None of the gentlemen associated with me should be held responsible for them.

In publishing this report in English,[1] I must confess that I have had in mind Western as well as Oriental students. Japanese works on law and government are closed to nearly all persons interested in municipal administration in the West. At all events Americans have little or no first hand information on Japanese municipal affairs. This study therefore may help in creating new intellectual ties between Japan and the Western world. Such at least is my sincere wish. Having access to the municipal institutions, offices, records, and papers in Tokyo and having the guidance and counsel of able Japanese officials and students, I have enjoyed an opportunity that does

[1] A brief digest of this Report was given to the press by the Institute for Municipal Research in March, 1923.

not often come to a foreign visitor in Japan. I have felt consequently that I owe a certain debt to the West and I have endeavoured to discharge it in this record. I hope therefore that fragmentary as this work is, Western students of municipal government will welcome it as a contribution to their stock of information about Oriental cities.

Would that I could pay adequate tribute here to the courage and faithfulness of a city official who exclaimed during a trip through the slums of Tokyo: "We show you our worst. This is a challenge to us!" Perhaps therefore the main use of this survey will be to give independent support to the leaders of Tokyo in the execution of plans they have already made. Where my suggestions are at variance with these plans, they may still be of some service in arousing a wider public discussion and in evoking a new consideration of the problems in question.

Finally I must express my appreciation of the privilege conferred upon me by the invitation to participate in the opening work of the Tokyo Institute for Municipal Research.[1]

[1] Note.—Since this report was prepared Viscount Goto has resigned his position as mayor and has been succeeded by the first assistant mayor, Mr. Nagata. Subsequently Viscount Goto entered the cabinet as Minister of Home Affairs.

CHARLES A. BEARD.

Tokyo,
March, 1923.

THE ADMINISTRATION AND POLITICS OF TOKYO

A Survey and Opinions

CHAPTER I.

THE CRITERIA AND SCHEME OF MUNICIPAL SCIENCE

WHOEVER undertakes the criticism of any particular administrative system, public or private, is under obligation to state the principles upon which he bases his criticism; in other words, to present the criteria upon which his judgments are founded. If he has in mind some ideal system evolved by a priori reasoning from an abstract concept, he is bound to state what that concept is. If, on the other hand, his approach is practical and pragmatic, he must indicate clearly the sources of his critical opinions.

This report represents no attempt to apply an abstract concept of an ideal to the city of Tokyo. It may be that all existing forms of city government are in fact more or less successful attempts to realise an ideal of some kind. Indeed there does seem to be a certain approximation to the ideal prevailing in all municipal organisations. For example, we do not find the treasury department of any city government located in the bureau charged with the supervision of veterinary surgeons, or the prevention of epidemics vested in a private association like the Chamber of Commerce. Even at the worst, there is a certain reasoned adaptation of administration to the ends to be served. Perhaps by the process of trial and error, mankind is slowly disentangling an ideal scheme from the primitive chaos. Actual operations, pragmatic assumptions from practice, as well as abstract concepts, are at

work carrying us onward toward a more perfect adaptation of administrative efforts to ideal ends.

The Sources of the Criteria

However the following pages are not philosophical. They deal with concrete forces and concrete operations. Broadly speaking they represent criteria derived from four important sources all of which may be exploited in judging the organization and administrative methods of any particular city government.

First of all there are the criteria derived from a study of comparative administrative law. One may go to Europe and examine the organization of French, German, English and other cities and, from a survey of their practices, devise a theoretical plan of municipal administration based on one's preferences; or one may select phases of each and make a new scheme of municipal administration out of the patchwork. Undoubtedly the study of foreign legal models is useful and it has already had a deep influence on municipal science in America and Japan. Nevertheless, there are dangers in using this method exclusively. Chief among them is the failure to recognise that any particular system is probably the result of long historical associations; that it has sprung out of a more or less specialised social and economic environment. Any one organization is likely to have embedded in it ancient vested interests which are preserved on account of the necessity of compromising with those interests and not on account of their actual utility. It is for this reason that the study of comparative administrative law, a matter of the highest value in the development of jurisprudence, does not produce adequate data for the development of an administrative science or even

safe guidance in the construction of a new system of administration.

A second source of criteria is the study of technical and practical devices actually employed by various cities in dealing with specific problems. It so happens that scientific talent is not concentrated in any country or locality. It appears sporadically, sometimes in the most obscure places. For that reason travel and observation —voyages of discovery—are essential to the development of the kind of knowledge which is useful in forming critical judgments with regard to detailed practices in administration. Here again however one must always be on one's guard against failing to take into account the local conditions which form the environment for the successful operation of a given practice.

A third source of criteria is experimentation. To give a concrete example, the streets of a city are cleaned by a given organization equipped by certain mechanical devices. An administrative officer endowed with talent for critical work, will observe those methods carefully and ascertain the results in units, such as the number of square yards of a given type of pavement swept in one hour. He will then try various forms of organization and various devices; by a process of trial and error he may arrive at improved methods of street cleaning. Any great administrative system that does not provide for experimentation is crippled at the outset. In the course of time it will fall into the hands of the routineer and fail to keep pace in productive efficiency.

The fourth source of criteria for judging a city administration is the methods employed by private corporations in organizing and directing their administrative forces. Although private corporations are formed for profit, not for service alone, their profits depend, in the

absence of monopolistic elements, upon the efficiency of their productive labours. They are not usually hampered by tradition or vested political interests. Their methods are simple and specific, directed to the accomplishment of practical results in the form of the production of material goods. In the accomplishment of their purposes, private corporations face most of the problems which a city administration must face. They employ technicians and labourers of many grades; they buy materials and supplies; they operate mechanical equipment; they aim at practical results which can be measured in units. They have a larger freedom than a city government in that they are not so closely restricted by laws and official supervision. For that very reason their methods are liable to be more effectively directed to the accomplishment of their particular ends. Where they are restricted by law and political supervision, their very aim of securing material results forces them to concentrate their attention on the elimination of waste and that fact itself produces a high degree of efficiency in their operations.

The study of corporate practices was first employed in connection with municipal administration in the United States by the New York Bureau of Municipal Research and it is having an increasing influence on the advancement of the science of public administration in general. This method must of course be used with care. It requires a trained and discriminating mind to discover the differences between the conditions surrounding economic corporations and political corporations. Still, in the hands of a careful student the method cannot fail to produce the most helpful results.

In the course of its experience, the New York Bureau of Municipal Research came to the conclusion that all the sources mentioned above must be exploited in the develop-

ment of standards for measuring the organization and operation of any particular administrative system. By the intensive study of law, actual municipal organisations, tendencies, practices, and technical methods, by experimentation, and by inquiries into private corporate management, the Bureau formulated criteria to be applied in the surveying of any particular city government. By continuous studies it made constant rectifications in its standards in order to perfect the technique and avoid hardened dogmas. It is the criteria of the New York Bureau which are used in this survey of Tokyo.

The Organization of the Criteria for Application

In the search for criteria amid the concrete facts of administrative life a certain organic structure for the ordering or classification of the standards inevitably emerges. Critical analysis and constructive hypothesis evolve together.

Conceivably one might have thousands of criteria arranged in alphabetical order and apply them in that order to the minutiæ of a municipal system, treating each ultimate subdivision of work, such as accounts or hygiene, as an independent unit in itself. In fact, however, a city as a whole presents a certain unity. Its branches of administration are interrelated in their bearing upon the ends or purposes of the administration in its entirety.

For this reason, the New York Bureau of Municipal Research in applying the criteria of municipal science to a particular city, evolved a general scheme or organization of standards. Although by no means rigid in character, this scheme usually embraces the following elements in one form or another:

1. A city government serves the people of a given

urban district. For efficient functioning within that area, it should have legal jurisdiction over the entire urban district and within practical limits control the growth of the city.

2. By the nature of circumstances, certain responsibilities are imposed upon a city government, and its powers should be commensurate with its responsibilities.

3. The structure of a municipal administration should be determined by the number and variety of functions entrusted to it, all related functions being vested in the same department.

4. The city must carry on large financial transactions. These are closely related, therefore, the criteria for judgment as to appropriations, taxation, borrowing, accounting control, and reporting form an *ensemble*.

5. The city in the discharge of its functions must purchase, store, distribute, and use an immense quantity and variety of material objects. The methods should conform to established standards.

6. The city must employ a large number and variety of persons ranging from skilled technicians to casual labourers. The standards of modern personnel administration should be applied.

7. The city must undertake functions which call for scientific methods and mechanical equipment. The technique should conform to the highest tested standards.

8. A city government is not an end in itself but an agent designed to serve the purposes of the community or certain groups in the community. Hence the scientific investigator is inevitably led into the examination of (a) the "social heritage" of the community, (b) the ways in which new characteristics are acquired, (c) the methods by which the agents of government are chosen and held responsible, and (d) the processes by which

the community or the effective groups in the community arrive at purposes, formulate them, and secure their execution through the agency of the municipal government.

9. Modern civilisation is industrial; industries are in the cities; the government of each city bears a vital relation to the efficiency of the community viewed as a productive organism in an economic sense. The government should discharge the functions imposed by that relation.

Here then is the general scheme for the arrangement of data and the application of critical judgment. It is unnecessary to say that no person in the world has or can have the knowledge required to make a complete survey of a great city. In carrying out such an enterprise at least ten or fifteen different specialists are required. Each should assemble his own data and apply his own criteria, and then the whole should be integrated according to some such scheme of thinking as above outlined. Out of this process the coming science of municipal administration will be constructed.

As for this particular volume, all that can be said for it is this: It is an attempt to make a contribution through trial and error to synthetic thinking about municipal affairs.

CHAPTER II

THE URBAN AREA AND THE CITY GOVERNMENT

In approaching the problem of the efficient management of a given city the first question which arises is this: "Does the jurisdiction or authority of the city government extend over the entire urban area which it serves?" In other words, do the legal limits of the municipality correspond to the immediate economic limits of the city?

This question is fundamental for several reasons. No doubt a relative efficiency may be attained by a city administration within a small part of an urban area, but efficiency in the highest sense of the word cannot be reached if the city authorities do not control the suburbs as well as the heart of the metropolis. This is true because the municipal problems of a densely populated region must be treated as a unit. The functions of supplying gas, electric light, transportation, sewer, water, and other services call for treatment as a whole in order to prevent duplication and waste. If the city does not have jurisdiction over the suburban area it cannot relieve congestion at the centre or prevent the growth of new areas of congestion on the periphery. If the city does not have any authority over its suburbs, then it cannot compel those who use its streets, transact business in its offices and shops, wear out its pavements, and enjoy the benefits of its many services at the centre to pay their just share of the cost of those services. These are commonplaces well

known to students of municipal affairs in Japan as well as the Western world. They were taken into account in England when the London county council was created to deal with Greater London, in America when Greater New York was established, and in Germany more recently when Greater Berlin was created by the constitutional assembly of Prussia.

As regards the city of Tokyo, the above question can be quickly answered. Technicians have already made a careful study of the problem and the Tokyo Metropolitan City Planning Commission has agreed that the urban area in fact embraces 169,075,141 tsubo [1] whereas the jurisdiction of the municipal government of Tokyo extends over but one-seventh of the urban district, namely 24,738,294 tsubo. Here then is a vast and growing metropolitan region, six-sevenths of which is in the hands of town and village authorities, subject to the restraints of prefectural officers representing in part rural regions lying to the west (Tama district). Each town and village is jealous of its own prerogatives and is desirous of pursuing its own course within the limits of Imperial laws and ordinances such as the building code. Into these suburban towns and villages new inhabitants are pouring daily; new building sections are being laid out in a haphazard fashion without reference to the transportation and housing problems of the metropolitan area as a whole. All the evils of congestion and irregular streets which have cursed the older part of the city are being daily, hourly reproduced on the edges of the city. Students of municipal government know this, leaders in the Tokyo city government know it, men of affairs know it, but as yet no Imperial statesman has attempted to solve the problem in the only way in which it can be

[1] A tsubo is 3.95 sq. yds.

solved; namely, by the consolidation of the entire metropolitan area under one government endowed with large and independent powers.

Leaders in the city of Tokyo are thoroughly conversant with the facts in the case and with the history of consolidation movements in the Western World. Indeed, in 1922, Mr. Ikeda, as a director and investigator of the Institute for Municipal Research, prepared a complete programme for extending the boundaries of the city and granting larger powers to the consolidated municipality. This programme based on a study of Western experience was presented to Viscount Goto, the president of the Institute for Municipal Research in November, 1922, and after discussion by the Institute it was submitted to the city government, the prefect and the Home Minister. The project provided for the abolition of the prefecture of Tokyo, the extension of the boundaries of the city to the limits known as Greater Tokyo, and the annexation of the remaining portion of the prefecture to the adjoining prefecture of Kanagawa. By this process the Greater City would be created and prefectural interference with municipal affairs would be swept away. The new municipal government would stand in direct relation to the Imperial Government. The metropolitan area would thus be made an autonomous municipality subject to the direct supervision of the Imperial authorities.

In the early spring of the same year, the Local Government Bureau in the Home Office prepared a tentative plan for dealing with the relations between the city government and the suburban area. Recognising the waste and duplication involved in the dual government of the city and the prefecture, the authors of this project provided for the creation of an autonomous Tokyo, entirely emancipated from prefectural control. Besides eliminat-

ing prefectural authorities from the boundaries of the present city, the Home Office plan also recognised the special problems that arise from the relations of the city government to the outlying urban areas and villages. It did not, however, contemplate the incorporation of those areas within the city. On the contrary, it proposed to transform the remaining portion of the old prefecture of Tokyo into a new prefecture called Musashi. In order to adjust the relations between Tokyo City and the outlying urban area, the authors of this project proposed a co-operative system. They suggested the creation of a Union Council composed of fifteen members from the municipal council of Tokyo and fifteen from the Musashi prefectural council, empowered to deal with certain common matters, such as roads and rivers.

It is apparent from the general features of its programme that the Home Office was striving to effect a compromise which would do two things: (1) grant larger autonomy to the city; and (2) provide for co-operation between the prefecture and the municipality. It requires no very profound insight to discover that this is only a partial solution of the problem. It would relieve the municipal officers of the necessity of transacting their business with the Imperial Government through the prefect and it would put an end to prefectural interference in municipal affairs.

But this plan would leave the city without power to control the rapidly growing suburbs in the interest of a comprehensive plan. That is even a more vital matter than the abolition of prefectural supremacy over Tokyo. Indeed it is open to question whether the Home Office plan would not make still more difficult the control of the suburbs. It would place them under the jurisdiction of an independent and competing agency, the prefecture,

whereas at present both the city and the suburbs are under the same agency. Nor is there much promise in the Home Office plan for dealing with matters common to the city and the proposed new prefecture. It contemplates, as pointed out, a Union Council composed of an equal number of members from the municipal and prefectural councils. That Union Council, under the plan, would have power to elect a president and make requisitions upon the two treasuries for common projects.

Unless all experience fails, the conflicts between the city and prefecture would be numerous, long, and violent. The agency created to settle them would only accentuate them. The Union Council would soon be characterized by petty politics and futility, and the suburban problem of Tokyo would become more acute than ever. If this compromise is the best than can be effected, then it would be wiser to let the prefectural system stand and merely attempt a closer delimitation of prefectural authority within the city itself.

If the prefectural government were entirely abolished within the city and the present boundaries of the city left unchanged, then the difficulties of planning for the entire metropolitan area would be increased, not diminished.

The reasons for the failure to extend the jurisdiction of the municipality of Tokyo over the entire metropolitan area are in some respects similar to the reasons for the failure of many American cities to obtain control over suburban areas by ousting county and village authorities. In America there is in every county a body of officers who feel a vested interest in their employments and their salaries. Such officers are usually politicians in a small way and form an important part of national party machines. These officers resent any interference with their rights and privileges as a personal insult, as a seizure

of their private property. Secondly, there is a great duplication of work by city and county officers. Each one of them is eager to magnify his importance, to enlarge his functions, and to increase his expenditures. The result is a great waste of money in duplicate undertakings. Thirdly, it often happens that political parties, struggling for advantage, oppose or advocate the consolidation of urban areas, according as it affects their special interests. Country districts on many occasions have opposed consolidation plans which threaten to deprive them of the prestige and economic advantages arising from connections with a great urban area. Finally, state authorities sometimes look with alarm upon the creation of a great autonomous municipality.

Analogous conditions account for the delay in enlarging the jurisdiction of the city of Tokyo to cover the entire urban area. The city of Tokyo is located in the prefecture of Tokyo which embraces 594,304,128 tsubo of land, an area about three times the size of the proposed Greater Tokyo. In many respects the prefecture is like an American county, but the analogy is not exact in all particulars. The prefecture has a chief executive or prefect, but he is chosen by the Imperial Government. There is a prefectural council of seventy-four members, forty-seven of whom are from the city of Tokyo itself. There is in addition a large body of prefectural officials. The total annual budget of the prefecture of Tokyo is Y38,767,623 (1922-3). Of this amount Y26,423,860 is paid by the people within the present corporate limits of Tokyo City. Of the total expenditure of the prefecture, it is estimated that Y22,317,280 is spent in the city proper and the balance of Y16,450,343 is spent in the outlying regions. In other words, the city pays Y26,000,000 into the prefectural treasury and receives Y22,000,000 in

return. Here then are some good reasons why it is difficult to consolidate the urban areas of Greater Tokyo and separate them from the prefecture. Citizens of Tokyo are familiar with the remaining reasons.

Still the problem of consolidation confronts the city and the Imperial Government. Recognition of the importance of co-ordinating control over the urban and suburban areas appeared in the Imperial City Planning Law which went into effect on January 1, 1920. This established a city planning commission for each of the six premier cities of Japan. The jurisdiction of the commission extends over the metropolitan area in which the city is located.

The city planning commission for the metropolitan area of Tokyo was instituted in the autumn of 1920, with the Vice-Minister of Home Affairs as chairman under the Imperial ordinance. Among the members, as provided by the same ordinance, were the Mayor of Tokyo, the Police Commissioner, the Prefect, fourteen city councillors, three prefectural councillors, certain officers from the city and the Imperial Government (representing departments concerned), ten experts, and some temporary appointees for specific work.

The Tokyo commission is mainly a deliberative body. It has a small sum of money at its disposal (in 1922-3 Y189,000, in 1923-4 about Y300,000) and a small staff of specialists at its command. Its chief function is not to prepare plans. Nearly all plans are prepared by the Home Office—in practice, with the assistance of the authorities concerned—and the plans are submitted to the metropolitan commission for its consideration. After a plan has been considered by the Tokyo commission, it is transmitted to the Home Minister. If the Home Minister decides in favour of the plan, and secures the

sanction of the Prime Minister, then the mayor or other authorities concerned must carry the said plan into execution.

In the discharge of his city planning obligations, the Home Minister has the aid of his special bureau for city planning. In fact, this bureau prepares plans for the Home Minister, to be submitted to the local commissions for consideration. In addition to his special bureau, the Home Minister has the assistance of a central city planning commission of not more than twenty-eight specialists and high officers of departments concerned. To this commission the Minister refers important matters for review after consideration by the metropolitan commission.

The following are therefore the important points in the case. First, the Tokyo city planning commission is not a powerful body fully endowed with authority to make decisions and create agencies to carry those decisions into effect. It is, for example, unlike the Kansas City park commission which was given power to lay out streets, avenues, and a park system, to carry its plans into effect, and then collect eighty-five per cent of the cost from the property owners benefited. The Tokyo commission has no such magisterial authority. It does not even have the powers given to some of the futile planning agencies which have set up in American cities since 1907, for those agencies at least have the power to initiate grand designs and make blue prints. The Tokyo commission does not have any initiative of its own. It does not have ample funds or the research staff necessary for independent inquiry.

In the second place, the power to make plans and the power to carry them into effect are vested in different hands. The Home Minister decides everything. According to the law, within the area of the city, the mayor must

carry out plans which he does not make—plans which he may oppose or regard as unwise.

The reasons for the passage of this law in its present form are not a matter of public record, but an examination of the local situation and the text of the law itself would seem to show the following facts. First, there are, as pointed out below, many conflicting agencies and authorities in the city of Tokyo; departments of the central government exercise important powers within the city limits and private utility corporations enjoy large privileges granted by superior authorities and are independent of the city. Therefore an attempt has been made to bring the departments of the Imperial Government concerned into co-operation in city planning affecting their respective rights and activities. At the same time the law makers have avoided the necessity of conferring generous powers over public utilities upon the city government. This shows a tenderness for vested rights, private and official, which might be expected in a country like the United States where constitutional provisions protects such rights against legislation. It may be expedient in Japan, but it is not necessary.

Secondly, and far more significant, is the fact that the law makers evidently shrink from entrusting large powers of city planning to the city government. They do not trust the city government or they wish to keep all important powers in the hands of the central government. In their dilemma they have fallen between two stools. They are not prepared to vest the necessary city planning powers in the hands of Imperial authorities or municipal authorities; so they divide the powers and render the central and local agencies alike incompetent to handle the great task of city planning. Hence it must be said that if American experience is any guide, it will

not be wise to expect very much from the new Imperial City Planning law of 1920. The Tokyo commission will not hasten the realization of plans for Greater Tokyo. The law divides authority and responsibility. The commission is not an instrument for action. As Napoleon once remarked: "A council of war never fights."

There are, however, two other devices, of a limited character, which are sometimes substituted in the West for direct and simple municipal control over the urban area. If Tokyo's financial resources were sufficient, it could follow the example of progressive German cities and buy large sections of vacant land beyond its boundaries. Two important results might flow from such a policy. The laying out of streets and parks could be to some extent controlled, and the inflation of real estate values could be prevented.

A less radical solution is that offered by American legislation described in Robinson's *City Planning*, p. 447; that is, the city government might be given power to compel the builders of all new structures anywhere in the metropolitan area to conform to a street and park plan prepared with reference to the city's needs.

Nevertheless such expedients are obviously makeshifts and are not adequate to the requirements of the situation.

The general conclusions to be derived from European and American experience bearing upon the point of consolidating the metropolitan area under one government are as follows:

First, such consolidation is difficult to effect on account of the vested official and private interests disturbed by such an action.

Second, it can be accomplished, however, by years of effort on the part of public-spirited citizens and officers.

Third, such consolidation offers the only efficient solu-

tion to the problem of controlling metropolitan growth and co-ordinating the functions and services of metropolitan government with reference to a comprehensive plan.

The Governmental Problem of Greater Tokyo

The exact form which the inevitable consolidation of Greater Tokyo must take and the structure of the government for the new capital are problems of the first magnitude. They are matters on which the careful student of municipal government will hesitate to dogmatize. An examination of the governmental structure of the four greatest cities of the Western world, London, Paris, Berlin, and New York, shows most extraordinary differences in political devices and administrative systems. Each of them is a more or less consolidated complex of older areas and subdivisions, but each of them has a political and administrative system peculiar to itself. From the standpoint of the Tokyo problem, however, the following salient features of each are of significance.

At the head of the great cities stands London. After years of investigation and legislation, London has not solved the problem of consolidation. Strictly speaking, there is no such entity as Greater London.

First, there is what is called Greater London, but it is merely the Metropolitan police district which embraces about 7,500,000 inhabitants. From this point of view, Greater Tokyo includes the entire Tokyo prefecture which is controlled by the Imperial Police commissioner!

Secondly, there is the administrative county of London which embraces a population of about 4,500,000. This portion of London is to some extent consolidated under the jurisdiction of the London County Council. The

Council is in fact the main central authority of London, but there are many matters over which it has no jurisdiction whatever.

Thirdly, London in the narrow sense comprises (a) the ancient city with an area of one square mile and a regular population of about 14,000 and (b) twenty-eight metropolitan boroughs, each with its own mayor, aldermen and councillors.

Fourthly, there is a long list of independent central agencies, each charged with some specific function or functions. For example, there are the Metropolitan Asylums Board, the Metropolitan Water Board, etc.

Except for the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, there is no unity in the government of Greater London. There is a complex of many governments and agencies operating within the area of Greater London.

To this heterogeneous confusion of authorities and agencies, Paris presents an extraordinary contrast, with respect to centralization and the hierarchical form of its administration. Of the three great European capitals, Paris has the least self-government. In fact one may say that it has no self-government. The police affairs of the city are in the hands of the prefect of police, a national officer. The rest of the municipal administration is vested in the prefect of the Seine, also a national officer. There is of course a municipal council elected by popular vote, but its powers are mainly advisory. It may pass ordinances and resolutions, but it cannot enforce them. Strictly speaking, there is no mayor of Paris; the functions of a mayor are divided between the prefect of police and the prefect of the Seine, the latter enjoying the title of mayor. Paris is divided into districts each with its council and officers, but the agencies of these districts have very slight powers.

In fact, Paris is a "conquered province of the French republic." It is deliberately subjected to national authority for the historic reason that it has more than once been the centre of revolution and has more than once imposed its will on the rest of the French nation. Now France has imposed its will on Paris.

The latest and most heroic experiment in consolidation and self-government is offered by Greater Berlin created by a law of April 27, 1920. The following striking features of the Berlin system are of interest to Tokyo:

First, ninety-four urban and suburban districts including old Berlin are consolidated into one municipality, a simple administrative and police district separated from the province of Brandenburg.

Secondly, there is created for the consolidated area a city council of 225 members, elected from fifteen districts by universal suffrage.

Thirdly, the administration of the city, in accordance with former German administrative practices, is vested in the hand of a Magistrat composed of at most thirty members, of whom at least twelve must be unpaid. The Magistrat is chosen by the city council.

Fourthly, the old practice of having an Oberbürgermeister and a Bürgermeister is retained. In other words, Greater Berlin retains the collegiate as opposed to the hierarchical form of municipal administration. The nominal head of the city, the Oberbürgermeister, is not the powerful directing chief of an administrative hierarchy, but the president of an administrative board, the Magistrat, chosen by the city council.

Fifthly, in the interest of local autonomy, Greater Berlin is divided into administrative districts (twenty in number at present). Most of the administrative districts are coterminous with the election districts from which

city councillors are elected. Each administrative district has a council composed in part of city councillors from the district and in part of specially elected members. Each administrative district also has a set of administrative officials, some chosen by the Magistrat and some locally, but its powers are closely limited. Administration in Berlin is centralized, but that centralized administration is subjected to the constant scrutiny and criticism of the twenty district councils.

Here is an attempt to reconcile technical and expert administration with democratic control and local autonomy. This experiment will be watched with the deepest interest by students of metropolitan consolidation.

The city of New York presents still another type of consolidated government. It has attempted to combine hierarchical (as opposed to collegiate) administration with popular control and local or borough autonomy. The chief features which distinguish New York City Government are:

First, a mayor, elected by popular vote and endowed with immense administrative powers, including the power to appoint and dismiss the police commissioner and the heads of all the administrative departments.

Secondly, the centralization of nearly all the administrative work in the hands of a small number of departments each headed by an appointee of the mayor.

Thirdly, the scrutiny of accounts by a comptroller elected by popular vote and endowed with large powers of inquiry and control.

Fourthly, a board of estimate and apportionment composed of three central officers—the mayor, comptroller, and president of the board of aldermen, all elected by popular vote—and five local officers—the presidents of the five great boroughs into which the city is divided, all

elected by popular vote within the boroughs. Central supremacy is maintained by giving the mayor, comptroller and president of the aldermen nine out of the sixteen votes on the board of estimate and apportionment. This board in fact makes the budget and governs the city, subject to certain control by the board of aldermen or city council mentioned below.

Fifthly, a city council of sixty-five members elected from districts by universal suffrage.

Sixthly, local autonomy is secured by the division of the city into five great boroughs. Each borough elects its president who serves on the board of estimate and apportionment mentioned above and at the same time acts as the head of certain local administrative work especially connected with street improvements. This vesting of administrative functions in the borough president is due to the necessity of compromise with old local feelings rather than to reasons pertaining to efficiency in administration.

Such are the four examples of metropolitan government from which Tokyo may seek guidance in attempting the work of consolidation. They present four distinct types utterly at variance with one another. It would be a bold observer who would venture to say that, from the standpoint of successful administration, physical comfort of the inhabitants, and financial economy any one of these four cities is distinctly best. If he should venture such an opinion, still he would find it difficult to prove that such high excellence is due to the particular type of municipal government and administration adopted in that city. In fact until the science of municipal administration is more perfect than at present and until careful comparative surveys have been made of these four cities we can have neither the criteria nor the data for rendering

even an approximately sound judgment on the point of supreme excellence.

What therefore is the lesson of all this for Tokyo? Only persons deeply informed about local conditions can answer, but the following facts have a bearing on the problem. A review of the tendencies in Tokyo government during the past twenty-five years indicates that Tokyo in reality is not moving in the direction of London with its county council, its boroughs and its numerous independent boards and its agencies. Tokyo is not moving in the direction of Berlin with its collegiate administration and its mayor endowed with merely nominal administrative powers. Tokyo is not moving in the direction of Paris where ordinary civil administration as well as police control is vested in national officers and the city is treated as a conquered province.

As a matter of fact, except in police administration Tokyo is tending in the direction of the American system of municipal organisation for great cities, namely, the mayor and council plan. In the early days of self-government, Tokyo tried a German experiment. It had a board of aldermen which was in many respects like the German Magistrat. That board was an executive committee for the city council. It was composed of the mayor, the assistant mayors, and twelve citizens chosen by the council. The mayor was a presiding officer, like the German Bürgermeister. The control of administration was collegiate, not centralised. By long experience, however, it was found that, in all cities of Japan, the system of collegiate administration was unavoidably accompanied by constant bickering among conflicting elements, delays, and waste. Therefore when the new Municipal law was enacted in 1911, the collegiate system was abolished throughout the country. The board of aldermen was

reduced to the position of a deliberative committee of the city council. The mayor was placed at the head of a hierarchical system and given large powers over the administrative system of the city.

Thus it happens that Tokyo is unlike Berlin where the mayor is a titular head. It is unlike London which has no mayor of the Greater City, but a number of mayors. It is unlike Paris where the mayor is an agent of the national government. Tokyo has a mayor who is elected locally by the city council. The administrative powers which are vested by law in the city are centralised in his hands. The mayor of Tokyo not only appoints and dismisses heads of departments; he creates and abolishes departments in the interests of administrative efficiency.

If the above tendency is sound and if American experience is followed in the future, then Greater Tokyo will have something like the following structure:

First, a powerful mayor, elected either by popular vote or by the city council as at present.

Secondly, the centralization of administration under the control of the mayor.

Thirdly, a city council of approximately sixty members elected from sixty election districts.

Fourthly, the borough or ward used merely as an administrative district. In other words the ward would not have large independent administrative powers.

CHAPTER III

THE POWERS OF THE CITY GOVERNMENT AND THE STRUCTURE OF ADMINISTRATION WITHIN TOKYO CITY

NEXT in importance to complete jurisdiction over the entire urban area are adequate powers for the city government and a well-organized administrative system for carrying those powers into effect. Let us examine Tokyo with reference to this subject. Let us get at the heart of the matter by putting two questions: "Does the city government have independent powers equal to its responsibilities? Are the organs of government operating within the city limits constructed and co-ordinated in such a way as to secure united planning and action in discharging the functions of the city?" As structure and function are always closely related, so these two questions have a vital connection with each other and should be considered as a part of a common problem.

THE POWERS OF THE CITY GOVERNMENT AND HIGHER CONTROL OVER THEIR EXERCISE

The first of the above questions calls for no extended treatment; it is readily answered. The government of Tokyo is the creature of the Imperial Government. Unlike some American cities, Tokyo is not older than the nation and does not possess many historic traditions of

self-government. It has none of those rights of which some American lawyers wrongly speak as "the inherent rights of local self-government." Indeed the city government, in a strict sense, is merely one of the organs of government within the municipal area and it is deprived of many of the fundamental powers usually associated with local government in America. For example the city has no jurisdiction over fire fighting, fire prevention, building regulations, police control, and many other matters connected with public safety. These, as we shall see, are vested in the police commissioner, an Imperial officer. The city does not have the power to grant or control the granting of franchises to municipal utility corporations. The city is without independent taxing powers such as American cities enjoy; that is, it cannot tax freely within certain limits; it must rely mainly on surtaxes imposed on Imperial and prefectural taxes.

The city cannot borrow at will as long as it keeps within certain debt limits; every loan, large or small, except for temporary purposes, must be sanctioned by the Imperial Government. So the first of the above questions must be answered in the negative. *The government of Tokyo does not have independent powers equal to its responsibilities.*

Even within the sphere assigned to it, the city government cannot act in any important matter without the approval of superior authorities. In the first instance, the city is supervised by the prefect, an appointee and agent of the Imperial Government. If he disapproves any action of the city, appeal must be taken to the Home Office; the appeal itself goes through the prefect who forwards it to the Minister of Home Affairs with his own opinions attached. Nearly all municipal ordinances "fixing the rights and duties of citizens," that is, all

significant measures, must go to the prefect and Home Minister. If the city wishes to establish or to assume the ownership and management of a municipal utility, it must secure the approval of the Imperial Minister in charge. An increase in street car fare must have the sanction of the prefect, the Home Office, the Minister of Finance, and the Department of Railways. The Minister of Finance has concurrent power with the Home Office in control over bond issues, rates of interest, street car fares, special taxes, water rates, and surtaxes above the limit fixed by law.

In granting or withholding sanction to acts of municipal authorities the higher officials are not limited as to time. They may deliberate indefinitely. It took about seven months for the city to secure the approval of the Finance Minister to a proposal for increasing the water rates charged to private consumers. On August 30, 1921, the mayor of Tokyo submitted to the Home Minister a project, prepared under the terms of the Road Law, providing for the levy of special assessments for road improvements. It was not until September 8, 1922, that the desired consent was obtained. Similar illustrations might be multiplied indefinitely.

The conclusion on the point of powers is therefore clear. The city government of Tokyo has very limited municipal powers—powers more restricted in number and scope than those granted to cities in America. This means that the Tokyo government is deprived of many of the important powers necessary to the efficient management of municipal affairs. Its powers, in short, are not equal to the responsibilities imposed upon it by public opinion and the stern facts of urban life. Finally in the exercise of the powers granted to it, the city government is controlled at every turn by prefectural and Imperial authorities.

The Administrative Structure

Next comes the question of administrative organization: "Are the organs of government within the city constructed and co-ordinated in such a way as to secure united planning and action in carrying on the functions of the municipality?"

No argument is necessary to demonstrate the vital importance of that question. An illustration of its significance will suffice. If two or three independent authorities may place pipes, conduits, and other structures under the streets, or build obstructions in them, how will it be possible to plan, carry out, and administer efficiently any programme of street improvements? If a public agency or a private gas company can tear up a new pavement as soon as it is laid by the city government, how can waste and inconvenience be obviated?

Clearly therefore the problem of correlating functions within the area of a city and establishing unity of control is one of first magnitude. To this matter the New York Bureau of Municipal Research has devoted more than fifteen years of inquiry, observation, and research.

The Criteria of Judgment

Out of its numerous studies of actual administration in cities and industrial corporations, the New York Bureau has evolved criteria for passing judgment upon the efficiency of any particular administrative structure. From among these, those applicable to Tokyo are as follows: There is an essential and inescapable unity in the work of a municipality. A violation of that unity by the creation of administrative organs that are entirely

independent of one another and not adapted to co-operative enterprise makes waste, duplication, and inefficiency[1] inevitable.

The number of departments in a city administration should be determined by the number, variety, and magnitude of the major functions vested in the city government as a whole.

Each department should have as nearly as possible a distinct function or class of functions to perform, if the volume of business warrants this.

All closely related functions should be grouped together in the same department, and the number of bureaus or divisions within the department should be determined by the number, variety, and magnitude of the functions assigned to it.

The power of each department head and each bureau (or division) chief should be commensurate with the responsibilities imposed upon him.

The responsibility for each function and the power to discharge it should be vested in a specific officer, and the lines of responsibility from subordinates to superiors should be definitely fixed.

The head of each large department should have an independent staff or agency to keep him informed as to the performance of his subordinates and as to their positive achievements.

As functions cannot be sharply separated and a certain amount of overlapping is necessary, provision should be made for the close co-operation of related departments.

There should be an accounting control independent of the operating or directing head of each department.

The mayor or chief of the entire administrative struc-

[1] The word "efficiency" is not used here in a vague sense as implying moral values. As employed here, it relates to the accomplishment of a given unit of result with the minimum expenditure of human effort and material goods.

ture should have the power to appoint and discharge his department heads and to direct their work within the limits of the law. He should have a research staff charged with two functions: (1) examining and reporting on the work of departments and (2) searching for new and improved methods of operation.

Judged by these standards, what can be said of the existing organization for carrying on the business of Greater Tokyo?

A Fact Statement on Tokyo

It is impossible to assemble in this volume all the data pertinent to that inquiry, but the fundamental facts, which illustrate the character of minor details as well, are as follows:

There are at least seven different governmental organs which carry on operations of major importance within the territorial limits of the present municipality. They are the city government proper, the prefectural government, the police commissioner, the Minister of Railways, the Minister of Home Affairs, the Minister of Communications, the Minister of Education, and, it seems, any minister of the Imperial Government who desires to erect any kind of a physical structure or building within the city limits.

Finally in this relation mention should be made of the fifteen wards or boroughs (ku) into which the city is divided, each with separate governmental organs and powers.

The functions exercised by Imperial authorities within the capital of the Empire, of course, rest upon a special basis and a discussion of them involves other considerations than those of local government. As a matter of course the Minister of Communications must make use

of the streets and other spaces belonging to the city, and he is merely required to notify the mayor of his intention. He does not have to consider the interests of the city. Other ministers erect buildings and other structures affecting the convenience and beauty of the city without asking the consent or opinion of the city government. For example in the autumn and winter of 1922-23, the Navy Department erected three immense wireless towers without even notifying the city government of its intention. Not until the towers had risen high into the air did the mayor of the city know of the undertaking. Even railway station and terminal facilities are established by the Minister of Railways without asking the consent of the city. Without passing any criticism on the wisdom of the Imperial authorities in any particular case, one may properly ask whether it is possible to have a planned and intelligently directed city as long as four or five powerful agencies can do almost as they please within its limits?

Certain branches of the Imperial Government may not only operate within the limits of the city themselves; they can charter private corporations and empower them to operate within the city. The private Gas Company in Tokyo came into existence under the terms of the Imperial Corporation law without any authorization from the city. It is true that according to a contract later made with the City the Company must file with the city government a record of its substructures within the streets, but in practice it has sometimes been negligent, to say the least. The Bus Company which operates a fleet of busses in the streets of Tokyo derives its power from the police commissioner, an Imperial officer. The Electric Company which plants its poles all over the city owes its franchise to the Department of Communications in the Imperial Government.

If we turn from the agencies of the Imperial Government which are primarily concerned with national affairs to those agencies entrusted with duties which are essentially local in character we find a similar disintegration of functions and dismemberment of administrative organs.

As pointed out above there are four organs of a local nature operating within the limits of present Tokyo; namely, the city government, the police commissioner, the prefectural government and fifteen ward or borough governments. Although the police commissioner and prefectural government also operate throughout the larger area of the province, the major portion of their activities are within the city limits, or at all events within the metropolitan area.

In the establishment of these agencies has there been a careful delimitation of authority? An assignment of all closely related functions to a single agency? A coordination of work in such a way as to secure unity of authority and responsibility? The answers to these questions are matters of fact presented in summary fashion in the table given below. This table was prepared after a detailed analysis of all the functions assigned by existing law to the three authorities above mentioned. It is not exhaustive but it is full enough to be impressive. After the detailed functions of each of the three agencies were tabulated, they were then grouped under broad functions such as Hygiene and Public Health, and under the respective agencies to which they are at present attached, as follows:

HYGIENE AND PUBLIC HEALTH

Police Commissioner—

Supervision of insanitary water ways and rivers

Supervision of structures of markets, shops, warehouses, hospitals, etc.

An entire bureau devoted to Hygiene and Public Health in charge of the following matters: water works and sewers; meat, milk, soft drinks, ice, and other foods and drinks; sanitation of restaurants, barbershops, dairies, establishments manufacturing milk products, ice and soft drinks; storage of ice, fish and meat products; junk stores; supervision of handling of waste and refuse; drug stores and medicine factories; supervision of massage parlours, non-licensed dentists, bone setters, midwives, and nurses; regulation of use of antiseptics, saccharine matters, and poisonous colours in food and drinks; control over poisons and dangerous medicines; supervision of cemeteries, crematoria, and burials; control over sanitation of factories not under factory law; removal of filth; supervision of disinfection. Quarantine and prevention of epidemics; prevention of tuberculosis, trachoma, venereal diseases, and other infectious diseases; vaccination; prevention of diseases among animals; medical inspection and treatment of licensed prostitutes; preparation of vaccines and serums; epidemic hospitals, detached hospitals, public and private hospitals; enforcement of periodical house-cleaning; regulation of surgeons, dentists, pharmacists, and veterinary surgeons; hospitals for insane and confinement of insane persons; medical treatment for policemen and firemen; inspection of persons found dead from unnatural causes; relief of sick and diseased; meat and milk inspection; investigation of cases of poisoning; preservation and dissection of dead bodies; health and hygiene inspection.

Bacteriological work. Editing health statistics.

Prefectural Government—

Reform of living conditions
Medical treatment at cost price
Protection of mothers and children
Hygiene and sanitation
Prevention of epidemics
Editing health statistics
Protection of insane persons

Removal of waste and filth
Prevention of leprosy
Regulation of surgeons, dentists, pharmacists, and midwives
Cemeteries
Free medicine and medical treatment for poor
Protection of abnormal persons
Supervision of persons taken ill in streets
School hygiene
Regulation of veterinary surgeons

City Government—

Editing health statistics
School hygiene
Health department in charge of the following matters: documents and statistics; removal of refuse and garbage and night soil; control over waste disposal station; matters relative to public hygiene; prevention and suppression of epidemics; vaccination; prevention of trachoma; sanitary methods; extermination of rats; control over sanitary associations and other health organisations; epidemic and isolated hospitals; post mortem examinations; prevention of tuberculosis; emergency relief; sanatoria: public health laboratory; public health education; investigation of sanitary conditions; disinfection of infected places.

CARE OF DEFECTIVES, DEPENDENTS, AND DELINQUENTS

Police Commissioner—

Care of parolled and probationary offenders
Control over lunatics and hospitals for the insane persons.

Prefectural Government—

Social reform work
Care of poor children
Care of feeble-minded children

Care of deaf, dumb, blind, and stammering persons
Care of deserted children
Protection of ex-convicts
Lodging house for the poor
Protection of lunatics
Relief of poor
Care of deserted aged
Medical treatment of the poor
Care of abnormal persons
Social work and the support of social work agencies.

City Government—

Bureau of Social Welfare devoted to social work and in charge of the following matters relative to defectives, delinquents, and dependents: relief of the poor; care of lunatics; poor house; charity hospitals; ward organisations; for social work among the poor; child welfare; municipal lodging houses; statistics.

Bureau of the Poor House; management of almshouses, reformatory houses, care of poor children, medical treatment of poor received in houses.

CONTROL AND PROMOTION OF LABOUR INTERESTS

Police Commissioner—

Supervision of social agitation, especially socialistic and labour movements

Supervision of industrial disputes and other industrial affairs

Censorship of press, periodicals, books, etc., with special reference to above matters

Supervision of working conditions in factories and workshops; also labourers and apprentices

Prefectural Government—

Advice on employment and other matters
Social reform work
Living conditions

Problems of unemployment
Public lodging house for the poor
Welfare work for labourers
Encouragement of mutual aid associations among working men and those employed in factories

City Government—
Assembly and arrangement of labour statistics
Labour exchange and employment agency
Relief and prevention of unemployment
Investigation of social conditions and publication of reports
Municipal lodging house
Houses for the working classes

In addition to the above duplications, all three governments—police, prefectural, municipal—have a certain jurisdiction over the following matters, sometimes definite and often vague and general:

Collection, custody, and disbursement of money
Markets
Pawnshops
Streets, roads, bridges and canals
Historic spots and monuments and relics

Between the prefectural and city governments there is a special confusion of jurisdiction over the following matters:

Education
Encouragement of industry
Care of unemployment
Streets, roads, and bridges
Markets
Public Health
Social work in general

As an illustration of the utter disintegration of power within the area of present Tokyo, the following example

as to streets will suffice. In general the duty of paving and repairing streets belongs to the city government. The Police Department, however, has general control over the use of the streets. It regulates traffic in them. It can prevent or permit the obstruction of streets and sidewalks by merchants, owners of factories, and the erectors of buildings. In this regard it permits abuses which are a nuisance and a menace to those who walk or drive in the streets. The Police Department can charter bus lines and fill the streets with busses to wear out the pavements and congest the traffic. The Minister of Communications can erect poles and other obstructions in the streets and sidewalks. To add to the confusion, the prefectural government has jurisdiction over rivers, canals and water fronts. As if this were not enough, the newly created Metropolitan City Planning Committee has an extensive authority over the planning of streets within and without the city.

Now we may take up a detailed examination of the structure of the administrative branch of the city government itself. Are the organs of the city government constructed in such a way as to unite closely related functions under the same head and secure unity of planning and action in carrying on the work of the government? The fundamental facts relevant to this inquiry are as follows:

Using the term generically, there are twenty-two "departments" of the city administration (excluding borough offices). Four of them however are given a position of special dignity and title on account of the nature of the work assigned to them: namely, the bureau of electricity, the bureau of roads, the bureau of social work, and the municipal almshouse (charities and juvenile correction).

The eighteen ordinary departments of the city administration, officially known as "Sections of the General Department," are:

1. The secretariat
2. Documentary and legal
3. Research and city planning
4. General superintendence of administration and accounts
5. Bill drafting and budget making
6. Purchasing
7. Treasury
8. General education
9. Social education
10. Industrial affairs
11. Health and sanitation
12. Water works
13. Water works extension
14. Sewers
15. Parks
16. Rivers and harbours
17. Municipal lands
18. Public buildings construction

An analysis of the work assigned to each of the above bureaus and sections indicates that in its broad outlines the organisation of the municipal administration itself is constructed for efficient functioning. Considering the volume of municipal business in a city the size of Tokyo twenty-two departments are not excessive in number. When it is remembered that public safety—police and fire administration—are assigned to the police commissioner, it will be seen from the above table that all the great functions usually vested in municipal administration are represented by departments, i.e., bureaus or sections. Moreover, the mayor has in the Research Section, a staff agency for carrying on scientific research in municipal affairs.

No doubt the administrative structure might be perfected by some combinations which are suggested below in the plan for re-organisation; but the conclusion under this head must be that the general structure of the city

administration is organised in accordance with sound principles of good management, as outlined above. Time has not permitted, however, a minute study of the work of each section in detail.

The picture of the administrative structure is not completed by a survey of the central divisions of government. It must be remembered that the present city is divided into fifteen boroughs or wards and that in each ward there is a miniature municipal government and administrative system. Each borough has a president or ward master who is appointed by the mayor, usually from among subordinate city officers or retired national officers. The borough presidents are paid salaries ranging from Y2000 to Y5000 according to their age, experience, and term of service, as determined by the mayor within the above limits. Each borough also has a council elected by popular vote in accordance with the two class system described below. The number of members of each council varies, but the total number in the city is 588. They are paid a small sum per meeting and they hold from seven to ten sessions a year to discuss local matters, principally pertaining to the management of primary schools.

The administrative business assigned to the borough falls into four classes:

1. National: the collection of national taxes, and the keeping of records of births, deaths, marriages, and men liable to military service.
2. Prefectural: the collection of prefectural taxes.
3. Municipal: collection of municipal taxes, i.e., the surtaxes on imperial and prefectural taxes; the repair of roads, street sprinkling, street cleaning, snow, garbage, waste removal, and the protection of public health. In the discharge of these duties the borough president employs street sweepers, carters, and other labourers in large numbers.

4. Local: petty affairs especially those pertaining to the erection, heating, and care of primary school buildings. For example, the borough council fixes the salaries of school janitors.

Suggestions and Recommendations

If we apply to the government of Tokyo and the existing administrative structure within the city the principles laid down above with respect to powers and organisation we should have the following results:

First, the enlargement of the powers of the city, especially in matters of taxation, borrowing, and public utility regulation, as indicated in Chapters IV and VII.

Secondly, the abolition of the prefectural system within the city and the transfer of all prefectural functions to the municipality.

Thirdly, the transfer of the police functions to the city government—at all events those not pertaining to the prevention of crime and the apprehension of criminals.

Fourthly, the abolition of the borough system of local administration; the centralisation of the functions now performed by borough presidents, using the borough only as an operating and inspection district. Street repairs, cleaning, snow, and waste removal should be vested in the hands of central departments and should be carried out by uniformed and trained forces under central direction.

Fifthly, the distribution of the consolidated functions, effected by the above transfers and increased by new functions recommended below, among the following departments, each headed by a chief appointed by the mayor:

1. Secretariat: mayor's general staff for research, investigation, city planning, and statistics
2. Finance, combining treasury and budget bureaus and the functions of control and audit

3. Legal and documentary
4. Civil service (personnel functions, *see* below, Chapter VI)
5. Purchasing (below, Chapter V)
6. Public safety—fire and police
7. Public health
8. Public works—street improvements and repairs and sewers, parks, and public lands
9. Street cleaning and waste disposal
10. Water supply
11. Rivers and harbours
12. Building construction
13. Markets
14. Industrial relations, including employment exchange
15. Education, including social education with new bureau of civic education
16. Social welfare (bureau if desired), combining charities, correction, relief, lodging house, remedial loans, almshouse, etc
17. Bureau of electricity
18. Public utilities (*see* below, Chapter VIII)

Sixthly, within each of the departments above enumerated there should be created a number of bureaus or divisions to be determined by the nature and volume of the work. Each of the bureaus or divisions should be headed by a responsible chief. Thus direct lines of responsibility for orders and for work done would be established from the mayor through the department head and the bureau head to the humblest labourer on his job.

The officer actually responsible for any specific performance, who is conversant with the facts, should sign the orders, papers, vouchers, and other documents relative to the work in his charge. In special instances the bureau or division chief and in very special instances, the department head may be required to sign, but in no case

should the signatures of men who are not conversant with the facts and responsible for them be required.

This reform would eliminate an immense amount of red tape in Tokyo. At the present time it is not uncommon for thirty Tokyo city officials to sign or stamp the same document. From ten to twenty stamps or signatures are usually required. This makes for endless delays and great waste in the transaction of business. It is sheer folly to require the signature of any officer not conversant with the facts represented in a document and who is not directly responsible for the facts in question.

Seventhly, the secretariat mentioned above should be a genuine staff agency for the mayor of Tokyo. It should carry on constant inspections and inquiries. It should be an independent agency studying in a scientific manner the actual conduct of the city's business in detail.

There is now a great gulf between the higher officials of the city and the employés at the bottom of the scale who do the detailed work of the city. This gulf is partly due to the bureaucratic system of Japan which recruits higher officials from the higher social and educated classes. It is partly due to the great emphasis on legal training for public officers. Most of the work of city government calls for scientific, engineering, industrial, and business skill which is not furnished by the law.

The mayor's staff should cut right through the upper bureaucracy of the city and maintain constant contact with the lower ranges of municipal employés. Efficiency begins with job analysis and any one afraid of dirty hands has no business assuming responsibility for efficient city government.

CHAPTER IV

THE MANAGEMENT OF MUNICIPAL FINANCES

EVERY large city must plan and carry out financial transactions of great magnitude. It may discharge these duties in the reckless manner of a spendthrift or it may adopt the best practices current in business management. In the financial sphere there is little room for differences of opinion as to soundness of methods.

In fact, at the present time, cities are compelled to be more or less exact in their methods because they are usually heavy borrowers in the money market and in order to maintain their credit they must adopt at least a minimum number of established business practices—certainly as their obligations multiply and their debts increase.

Broadly speaking, the financial transactions of the city fall into three general classes:

The city must make periodical appropriations of money for current expenses, capital outlays, and fixed charges (such as interest on debt). In the purposes for which appropriations are made the policies of the city government are given concrete form—the civilisation of the city is reflected. In the methods employed in making these appropriations, the city demonstrates its business ability, or lack of it.

The city must raise revenues sufficient to meet its appropriations, in large part, by taxation. In laying taxes the municipal government imposes a burden upon the productive forces of the city and raises economic questions of

a controversial character. It is true that the drift of scientific opinion is in the direction of giving the city an independent taxing power within limits and of placing the main burden of taxation upon real property, but still the subject is one on which some difference of opinion exists. On the side of formal procedure, however, namely, methods of assessment, collection, and accounting, a large body of standard technical principles have been worked out and tested by experience. On these there is substantial agreement.

The city usually finances a large part of its operations, especially for important permanent improvements, by borrowing in the money market. Thus it steadily accumulates debts. In this sphere there are two considerations of vital importance. The city's credit, that is, its borrowing power depends fundamentally upon (a) the size of its present debt, (b) its wealth, (c) the purposes for which it borrows money and (d) the provisions which it makes for paying its debts. The amount of the city's net debt incurred for non-revenue producing purposes (such as pavements) determines to a considerable extent its ability to borrow for new improvements as needs arise. Hence there is no branch of municipal affairs more important than the management of the debt.

Under these three general heads, the finances of the city of Tokyo will be briefly considered.

I. The Appropriation System—The Budget

Take first the appropriation methods. By what standards should the budget system of a city be tested? A few years ago, the New York Bureau of Municipal Research, after a long study of budget practice in America and Europe, adopted certain principles by which to meas-

ure or test the soundness of the budget system of a public or a private corporation. These principles, of course, are not absolutely fixed, but are modified from time to time in the light of new inquiries and experiences. Certain of them however are fundamental. Let us apply them to Tokyo as follows:

Is there a budget system? That is, does the city of Tokyo have a consolidated plan of expenditures and revenues prepared in advance of each fiscal year? The answer is clear. It does. When the city government was established in its present general form, carefully designed methods of budget-making and accounting were adopted. These methods with some modifications have been continued until the present time.

Is the budget prepared before the beginning of the fiscal year? Yes. The fiscal year begins on April 1st. The programme of expenditures and revenues must be approved by the city council at least one month before that date. In practice the rule as to one month is not always observed, but at all events the budget is prepared before the date fixed for the opening of the fiscal year.

Is there a regular calendar (always observed) for the preparation, review, discussion, and adoption of the budget? There is. It opens with the preparation of the estimates before October 15th. Usually the process begins in August or September of the year preceding the adoption of the budget.

Is the budget prepared by committees of the city council or by the executive branch of the city government? By the executive branch.

Are the estimates prepared by officers directly in charge of the work programme of the city? Yes. In Tokyo the estimates are prepared by the heads of departments (sections) on or before October 15th of each year.

What is the character of the information given on the estimate returns by the department heads?

The following is a translation of the information given on the blanks used by department heads in reporting their requirements:

	Amount requested	Previous year	Increase or decrease
I. Title (As City Hall, etc.)			
1. Chief classes of expenditures under above title (as Salaries, Office Expenses, etc.) ..			

EXPLANATION

	Amount requested	Previous year	Number of persons or objects	Unit cost
Items or supporting details of each chief class (as Salaries, Office expenses, etc.)				
Mayor				
Assistant mayors...				
Secretaries, engineers, Inspectors, etc.				

Are the estimates from all departments consolidated and reviewed with reference to the general municipal programme of the city administration? Yes.

First, the estimates prepared by each department head are discussed with the assistant mayor who has general

supervision over the affairs of that department. Thus questions of large policy enter early into the preparation of estimates.

Secondly, the estimates go to the chief of the bill-drafting department of the city administration on or before October 15th. The head of each city department (section) must explain to the bill-drafting chief all the increases and decreases which he has made in his tentative estimates.

Thirdly, the chief of the bill-drafting department consolidates the estimates, after reviewing them, and prepares a revenue programme to meet the needs of the expenditure programme.

Fourthly, the three assistant mayors hold a series of conferences on the tentative budget. They hear the arguments of section chiefs and suggest changes in accordance with their ideas of public policy. As each of the assistant mayors has general supervision over a certain part of the city's work, the whole field of administration is represented in these budget conferences.

Fifthly, after the assistant mayors have completed their scrutiny, the tentative budget goes to the mayor for review, criticism, and modification.

Sixthly, at the end of December, or sometime during the first week in January, the mayor lays the budget before the board of aldermen, or upper chamber of the city legislature, composed of the mayor, the three assistant mayors and twelve councillors elected by the city council. The board of aldermen is limited in its powers. It cannot strike out or increase items; it can merely suggest changes and give its opinion on the budget in general and in detail.

Seventhly, usually the budget is laid before the city council during the first or second week in February, so

that the city council has about three weeks to subject the budget to examination.

What is the nature of the budget presented to the city council? It is mainly an act of appropriation with the programme of proposed revenues, to which are added the figures for the preceding year by way of comparison.

Do the mayor, assistant mayors, and departmental heads appear before the city council when the budget is presented to answer questions, explain and defend their budget proposals? Yes.

May the city council increase and add to the items proposed by the executive branch in the tentative budget? The city council may increase the amount of any item proposed in the tentative budget, but it cannot initiate new items.

What is the form of the budget as finally adopted? It consists of the following fundamental parts:

A. A table of the municipal and borough taxes for the coming fiscal year.

B. A consolidated statement of all estimated revenues and expenditures for the coming year.

C. A detailed estimate of revenues to the general account, that is, revenues from fees, taxes, etc., excluding revenues from productive enterprises (such as water works) and from borrowings.

D. A statement of expenditures appropriated from the general account, divided into two parts:

(1) Ordinary expenditures, i.e., for current purposes, such as regular salaries, supplies, etc., for consumption.

(2) Extraordinary expenditures, i.e., for capital outlays and major repairs, which add to the more or less permanent equipment of the city.

Is the budget functional or departmental; that is, are appropriations made to departments of the city adminis-

tration or to the account of specific functions? The budget is in part functional and in part departmental as the following titles or heads of appropriation indicate:

I.	City Hall.
II.	Ward offices.
III.	City aldermen and assembly (council).
IV.	Institute for training city officials.
V.	Teachers' training institute.
VI.	Industrial school.
VII.	Practical higher school for girls.
VIII.	Elementary schools.
IX.	Elementary evening schools.
X.	Miscellaneous expenses for primary school teachers.
XI.	Miscellaneous educational expenses.
XII.	Social educational expenses.
XIII.	Libraries.
XIV.	Expenses for physical education.
XV.	Roads and bridges.
XVI.	Expenses for street advertisements.
XVII.	Rivers.
XVIII.	Sewers.
XIX.	Street cleaning and waste disposal.
XX.	Prevention of infectious diseases.
XXI.	Disinfection.
XXII.	Komagome Hospital.
XXIII.	Tuberculosis Hospital.
XXIV.	Sanitary inspection.
XXV.	Parks.
XXVI.	Cemeteries.
XXVII.	Scenic and historic preservation.
XXVIII.	Industries.
XXIX.	Markets.
XXX.	City Infirmary.
XXXI.	Employment exchange.
XXXII.	District committees (social work).
XXXIII.	Municipal lodging house.
XXXIV.	Day nurseries.
XXXV.	Children's home.

XXXVI. Street lighting.
XXXVII. Maternity home.
XXXVIII. Nursery.
XXXIX. Management of municipal dwellings.
XL. Relief of foundlings.
XLI. Care of city properties.
XLII. Land taxes and fees of prefecture and state
XLIII. Shrines.
XLIV. Collection and custody of public money.
XLV. Pensions and other allowances.
XLVI. Miscellaneous expenses.
XLVII. Unexpected expenses.

Are the items or details of appropriations to each of the above forty-seven titles, heads, or purposes so analysed and classified as to give exact information pertaining to the human services required and materials used? No, they are not. There is a general classification of expenditures with relation to (a) character of expenditures, i.e., current and capital outlays, (b) objects of expenditures, such as personal services, materials, etc. This classification is sufficient to meet the requirements of an act of appropriation but it is not of such a character as to afford adequate information to the mayor or city council about the work programme of the several sections or city departments.

The following illustration showing the classes of appropriations to the Komagome Hospital for 1922-23 is fairly illustrative:

(1) Salaries: (a) director, (b) secretaries and specialists, (c) clerks, physicians, and the head nurse, and (d) employés.
(2) Miscellaneous payments to persons:
Remunerations.
Special allowances.
Travelling expenses.

Wages for office boys and servants.
Wages for laundrymen.
Wages for disinfectors.
Wages for those who look after animals.
Hired men.
Fares.
Emergency messengers.
Loaned policemen.
Divine services.

(3) Office expenses:
Furniture.
Things for consumption.
Printing.
Communication
Medicines.
Animals.
Board of those on night duty.
Provisions for patients.
Clothes.
Gas and electric lights.

(4) Other expenses:
Cremation.
Disposal of garbage.
Advertisements.
Miscellaneous

(5) Repairs:

When it is remembered that all capital outlays are segregated in the budget of "Extraordinary Expenditures," it will be seen that the above classification is commendable. It represents in logic and arrangement a decided advance over the old "lump sum" appropriations which were for many generations common in most American cities and are still to be found in some of the leading cities of the United States. For example, in the 1919 budget of Newark, New Jersey, there were eleven unrestricted lump sum appropriations in excess of $100,000 (not including appropriations for debt charges),

and six of those were in excess of $200,000. Although the Tokyo classification is open to the minor criticisms given below it is based on general principles which are fundamentally sound.

Is there provision for executive control over the execution of the budget after its adoption; that is, is there careful scrutiny over spending officers to keep them within the limits of the act of appropriation? This question is to be answered in the affirmative. The function of control is vested in the city treasurer, an officer chosen by the mayor with the approval of the city council and prefect. In the treasurer's office there is a ledger showing the appropriations to each of the forty-seven titles above enumerated; the credits voted to each title in the budget are set forth in the ledger. On the debit side are set the amounts drawn by the departments spending money under each title and when the entire credit for specified purposes is exhausted, the treasurer refuses to authorise any additional expenditure for such purposes unless he deems it sufficiently urgent to be charged against the general emergency fund of the city. This control is checked up in the department itself, for each department has an accounting clerk who enters credits and debits in due form. Incidentally, it should be remarked that this clerk also prepares the draft of department estimates for the city budget.

Are there provisions for auditing or scrutinising accounts? Yes. Article 45 of the Municipal law provides that the mayor must review the condition of municipal revenues and expenditures at least every month, and also that twice every year there shall be an extraordinary review at which two aldermen must be present. In fact, these functions are discharged by the Inspection Department of the city government which was created by

Viscount Goto. This office combines in general the functions now vested in the Comptroller and Commissioner of Accounts in the City of New York. Furthermore, the city council, under Article 45 of the Municipal law, may inspect all work done by the administration and its accounts. The council exercises this power through the agency of a special committee. By law, the mayor or his appointees must be present at any such inquiry on the part of the city council.

Is there strict accounting for unused supplies at the end of the fiscal year to be credited to the revenue side of the budget for the succeeding year? This is a subject on which exact information was not forthcoming, and should be carefully studied by some accounting authority in the city government.

Is there provision for the change and transfer of items of appropriation during the fiscal year if found necessary? Yes. The mayor may change details but not Titles and Items.

Criticisms and Recommendations

Students of American appropriation practices on reviewing the above questions and answers will all agree that the budget system of Tokyo is, in its broad outlines, a model. It conforms in principle to the highest standards. In general it meets nearly all the requirements established by the New York Bureau of Municipal Research. Most cities in the United States could congratulate themselves if they had in operation all the principles and methods which have long been followed in the capital of Japan—in fact in all cities of Japan.[1] Nevertheless in some respects the Tokyo system is open to criticism.

[1] Outlines of budget system in Japanese cities are provided in municipal law and home office ordinances.

The first criticism is that the budget-making process occupies too long a time. The preparation of the estimates usually begins in August or September, that is, about seven months before the opening of the fiscal year to which the estimates refer. This practice compels the estimating officers to begin their plans for the new year too far in advance. As the date for the preparation of estimates is moved back, the danger of making errors in forecasts is increased. Hence it follows that the preparation of estimates should not begin until the latest possible moment before the opening of the fiscal year. There is no doubt that by careful management the budget making process of Tokyo could be shortened to a period not exceeding four months, especially if the details of the accounting procedure were perfected.

2. The form of the estimate sheets used by departmental heads in reporting their requirements for the coming year is open to criticism as to details. They do not present the exact information necessary to enable superior officers, especially the mayor, to make a sound judgment on the proposals of each spending officer. *The science of budget-making advances by making more and more precise the units of the human services and the material objects used to accomplish given results.* Therefore, the following recommendations are offered:

First, that, instead of one set of estimate sheets, there should be two: one of "Personal Service" and the other for "Supplies, Materials, etc."

Secondly, that the "Personal Service" sheet should give the following information:

(1) Group, grade, and title of officers and employés (*see* Personal Administration, below, Chapter VI).

(2) The amount requested for the coming fiscal year.
   a. Number of incumbents.
   b. Rate of salary or wages.
(3) Appropriation for current (present) year.
   a. Number of incumbents.
   b. Rate of salary or wages.
(4) Increases or decreases in amounts in general and in detail with explanations in foot-notes.
(5) Names of incumbents whose salaries or wages are increased. Date of last increase for such persons; term of service.
(6) Amount requested by section chief; increases or decreases made by the assistant mayor in charge, and mayor, with reasons.

Thirdly, that the estimate sheet for "Supplies, Materials, etc.," (*see* below, Chapter V) should disclose the following information:

(1) Item (as Supplies, food, or Supplies, fuel).
(2) Amount requested for next year.
   a. Number of units.
   b. Average price per unit.
(3) Appropriated for current (present) year.
   a. Number of units.
   b. Average price per unit.
(4) Increases or decreases explained in foot-notes.
(5) Amount requested by section chief; increases or decreases made by assistant mayor in charge and mayor.

The details under the head of "(1) Item," however, can only be perfected in connection with the development of the work of purchasing (Chapter V); that involves (a) a scientific analysis and classification of all the mate-

rial objects used by the city administration and (b) the establishment of standard specifications for each Class, Group, etc., of objects, in relation to the purposes to which it is put. If this were done, a given "Item" would be something precise. All items bearing the same name would mean the same thing.

It is also important that increases and decreases in Items should be explained in the estimates and budget. In themselves they mean nothing. For example an increase in the cost of materials may be due to a rise in prices, new work undertaken, inefficiency in operation, etc.

Number (5) in the above list is inserted as a protection to the departmental head or section chief. He is in actual contact with the requirements of his section and ought to know intimately what his needs are. If his estimates are changed by some superior officer, the facts should be recorded and the section chief should be heard in defence of his own programme by the mayor and if desired by the city council.

3. The budget presented to the city council should contain more detailed information as to proposed expenditures and reasons therefor. The budget is now presented to the council in the form of certain summary tables and in the act of appropriation with the comparative figures for the previous year. The council cannot make an intelligent judgment as to the soundness of a proposed budget unless it has also the details indicated above. It is therefore suggested that the budget laid before the council should include the following elements:

(a) A summary statement of all estimated expenditures and revenues with comparative figures for the previous year.

(b) A consolidated statement of proposed expenditures for the coming year, classified according to principles

indicated below, itemised in great detail as indicated above, and giving explanations of increases and decreases in items as compared with previous fiscal year.

(c) The ordinance of appropriation authorising expenditures for the coming year on the basis of the above estimates as finally adopted. This ordinance should be divided as at present into Ordinary or Current Expenditures and Extraordinary Expenditures or Capital Outlays.

(d) The revenue ordinance to meet expenditures authorised.

The form of organising the "Consolidated Statement of Proposed Expenditures" should be the subject of careful inquiry in relation to (a) the purchase of supplies, (b) personnel administration, and (c) the preparation of estimates on the basis of (a) and (b). This phase of budget-making has been the subject of long and careful inquiry by the New York Bureau of Municipal Research and the problems involved in it, with proposed solutions, are carefully set forth in published and unpublished reports prepared by the Bureau.

As the subject is highly technical and closely related to the entire accounting system of the city it cannot be treated fully in this preliminary sketch. If analysis of the problems is taken up in Tokyo, the publications of the New York Bureau will be found helpful.

4. The arrangement of the appropriations under forty-seven general heads or titles (as set forth above), deserves special consideration. It makes neither a departmental nor a functional budget. That is, the forty-seven appropriations are not made to department chiefs or to the account of forty-seven important functions performed by the city administration. In other words they do not tell us how much each section chief receives for the year; neither do they give a complete picture of the

amounts spent for the great services of the city, such as education, public health, public works, social welfare, etc. For example, titles V-XIV are for educational purposes. The citizens or councillors who wish to get a complete record of the educational expenses of the city must run through the various titles and make a computation for himself. On the other hand, if a citizen wishes to know about the functions and expenditures of any departmental or section chief, he will find no answer in the budget of the city.

On the points in question, students of budget practices in America have long been divided into two schools. One favours a classification of appropriations according to the *functions* of the city; another according to the *departments* of the city government. The former say, with justification, that citizens wish to know what work is undertaken by the municipal administration and what the work costs. Appropriations to department heads, they urge, are meaningless to the average citizen, who does not know what functions are entrusted to each department head in the city government. On the other hand, the advocates of the departmental budget urge that, in final analysis, each appropriation go to some department, that accounts be kept by departments, and that department heads be held responsible for preparing their work programmes and spending the funds allotted to them.

The truth is that this old dispute is really unnecessary. It is due to the fact that there is a confusion in the minds of the disputants as to terms. They do not always distinguish between a budget and an act of appropriation. The act of appropriation is merely one element in a budget. The budget itself should contain a great deal of information which ought not to appear in the appropriation bill.

No doubt it is useful for the citizens to know what functions are undertaken by the city government and what is the cost of each. These functions and the support given to them indicate the spirit, character, and ideals of the community. Such a functional analysis of past and proposed expenditures can readily be included among the papers of a budget for the purpose of giving general information as to the city's work programme.

But the act of appropriation itself should be a departmental act; that is each Title of appropriations should be made to a specific department or division of the city government. This facilitates bookkeeping and makes department chiefs responsible for the proper expenditure of the money voted to them.

The act of appropriation, if departmentalised, can readily be spread upon the ledgers of the treasury and spending officers can be easily held accountable. As the New York Bureau of Municipal Research stated in its survey of Newark, New Jersey: "Unless every dollar appropriated is appropriated to an organisation unit, and unless some division head is clearly shown in the act of appropriation to be definitely responsible for every appropriation, responsibility will be confused."

However, it should be borne in mind that there is a close relation between the structure of a city government and the system of itemisation by general Titles in the act of appropriation. If a city administration is properly organised, each major function (such as police, fire, health, etc.), will be assigned to a department of the city administration. The departmental organisation will be functional and the act of appropriation, being divided into titles or main heads by departments will be automatically functional. Thus the problem will be solved in an ideal way.

5. In order to secure the faithful execution of the budget, both the legislative and executive branches of the city government should be better equipped with accounting and investigating forces. The scrutinising committee of the council and the inspection department of the administration should each be furnished with a staff of expert accountants and investigators.

6. When the closed accounts of a fiscal year are published, they should be accompanied by the original budget arranged in such a form as to indicate exactly (a) the changes made in that budget, (b) failures to execute its provisions, and (c) illegal or unfaithful use of money.

7. In reviewing the budget procedure of Tokyo we find omitted one step which forms a prominent feature of the New York City process, namely, public hearings on the tentative budget before the council passes the act of appropriation. While the utility of such hearings in developing information for the city government may readily be exaggerated, their importance in arousing public interest is undoubted. Tokyo, as noted below, is lacking in public interest in municipal affairs. Hearings on the proposed budget are therefore recommended as one means of quickening that interest. Accordingly it is suggested:

First, that as soon as the mayor completes his scrutiny of the tentative budget, he should make public a budget letter giving general information on important increases and the nature of new work to be undertaken by the city during the coming year. This should be given to the press in concise form.

Secondly, that, on certain days to be fixed, the mayor and assistant mayors appear in the council chamber to hear and answer objections to the proposed budget or any items therein, which may be made by citizens, citizens' organisations, councilmen, and city officials.

8. The above statement of facts and criticism relate mainly to the *principles* of the Tokyo budget system. A searching examination into the *practice* of budget making in all its ramifications could not be made during the short period allowed for the preparation of this report, but an inquiry into practice at two or three points seemed to indicate that the actual process of budget-making (to some extent at least) does not measure up to the high standards contemplated by the terms of the law.

For example, every year the city administration calls for, and the city council appropriates, a far larger sum than is actually needed or expended. The following table shows the percentage of the total amount appropriated which remained unexpended at the close of each of the fiscal years indicated:

Fiscal year.	Percentage of appropriation unexpended.
1917-18	23
1918-19	28
1919-20	35
1920-21	32
1921-22	41

These figures indicate bad management on the part of the city administration and the city council, but only an extensive inquiry could determine a just distribution of the blame. It is evident that the city administration is careless in making up its estimates or is inefficient in carrying out the work for which money is appropriated. At the same time, the city council, when it approves the budget, has before it the closed accounts of the previous years and can readily ascertain the amount of the surpluses for the previous years and find out what the departments or sections are responsible for the major part of the unexpended balances.

Another illustration of this practice is afforded by the appropriations for road improvements. For the fiscal years 1921-22 and 1922-23, the sum of Y11,182,000 was appropriated for pavements and during that period only about one-half the amount was actually spent. When called upon by the Road Council to explain this state of affairs, the city authorities said that the causes of delay were threefold: (1) a constant change in the personnel of city officers which made for inefficiency; (2) the inadequacy of the supply of materials in the market; and (3) lack of unity in controlling the conduits belonging to the departments of the Imperial Government, private companies, and the city. If the city administration cannot secure the personnel to build its pavements by direct methods, then it should let the construction to competent contractors under bond. If paving materials could not be secured during the period in question, there was something wrong with the purchasing division of the city government. The third fact cited by the city authorities in their defence must have been well known to them before they called for appropriations larger than they could use. In short the defence of the city authorities was inadequate, but the city council cannot escape altogether without blame, for it appropriated a large sum for 1922-23 at a time when it must have known or could have known the state of the construction work for which it had provided the year before. So the conclusion must be that the budget practice of Tokyo does not measure up to the theory of the law. Whether the city administration or the council is mainly to blame for this unbusinesslike management, the taxpayers must suffer. Every year they are called upon to pay into the city treasury more money than the municipal government needs or spends. This fact carries with it a condemnation that calls for no

comment. This is a matter that should receive immediate attention.

II. Taxation

The significant facts relative to taxation in Tokyo are as follows:

1. The city does not possess a general independent taxing power. Except for certain special taxes which it may lay, it must rely on surtaxes laid upon national and prefectural taxes.

2. Of the total estimated revenue from taxation for the current fiscal year, amounting to Y21,354,834, almost all, to be exact, Y18,073,834, was derived from surtaxes imposed on national and prefectural taxes laid in the city. The remainder Y3,281,000 was derived from special taxes laid on the purchase of real estate, the construction of new buildings, persons occupying official dwellings, amusements, etc.

3. Land yields only about one-twentieth of the tax income of the city government, as shown by the following table giving the estimated revenues for the fiscal year, 1923.

Surtaxes on national taxes.	
Land tax	Y 732,552
Business tax	5,170,000
Income tax	2,730,000
Mining tax	1,000
Tax on medicine mfrs.	1,510
Stock and grain exchange tax	66,250
Surtax on prefectural taxes.	
Tax on houses	3,000,198
Business tax	1,034,559
Miscellaneous (restaurants, vehicles, etc.)	2,762,026
Special surtaxes for city planning (supplementary).	

Land tax	297,200
Business tax (national)	1,650,000
Business tax (prefectural)	191,585
Miscellaneous (prefectural)	436,954
Special taxes laid by the city.	
Tax on the purchase of real property and construction of new buildings	900,000
Tax on persons living in official dwellings	15,000
Tax on those who engage Geisha and prostitutes	2,366,000
Total	Y21,354,834

4. The total estimated tax revenue from real estate as such in Tokyo for the fiscal year 1922-23 was Y4,029,950, a figure obtained by combining the land tax and the house tax. This figure excludes the sum of Y900,000 derived from the tax on the purchase of real estate and construction of new buildings.

5. There is no scientific or equitable assessment of lands and buildings. The last assessment of land was made in 1910 by Imperial authorities working in conjunction with committees of land owners. The total area of the city, 23,968,092 tsubo, was divided into two parts, taxable and non-taxable, the latter being land held by the Imperial Government, the Imperial Household, the city government, and other tax exempt persons and bodies. The taxable area (1921), namely, 13,073,222 tsubo, is divided into seven classes: house lots, paddy-fields, fields, forests, ponds and marshes, and miscellaneous.

From the statistical table presented on the following page it will be seen that the six groups of land classified as paddy-fields, fields, forests, plains, ponds and marshes, and miscellaneous embrace 360,983 tsubo and are valued

at Y14,396.25. Some of the area thus specially classified embraces gardens of private gentlemen; but it is assessed at a merely nominal rate as compared with the area classified as house lots. As this land is really within the city and most of it really available for building lots, it is evident that the assessment of 1910 such as it was, bears within its structure the grossest inequalities—inequalities which call for no comment here.

Class	*(Area)*	*(Assessed Value)*
House lots	12,712,239	Y95,269,191.50
Paddy-fields	59,015	8,794.21
Fields	99,826	4,618.60
Forests	59,339	600.73
Plains	11,397	101.60
Ponds-Marshes	126,906	243.27
Miscellaneous	4,500	37.84
Total	13,073,222	Y95,283,587.75

What can be said of the relation of the assessed value of the taxable land to the actual value of the taxable land? In the absence of a scientific assessment of that land on the basis of market value, we can only resort to estimates. What are the data for such estimates? First, the business tax bears a relation to the rental of the places in which businesses are conducted; hence there is a mass of data on the rental value of business places. There is a tax on the sale of real estate; hence there is a mass of data showing the reported values of property actually sold. The city government in 1920 estimated the average rental value per tsubo [1] at 0.485 per month or Y5.82 per tsubo per year. It arrived at this figure by an analysis of all the sales of land that year, namely 1,377 cases. This rental value was based upon the reported selling value.

[1] A tsubo is 3.95 sq. yds.

If we capitalise this rent at the rate of 8 per cent, the normal rate of interest in Tokyo for secure investments, and apply it to the land of Tokyo we have the following results in terms of real value:

Total area (23,968,092 tsubo) .. Y1,743,678,693.00
Taxed area (13,073,222 tsubo) .. 951,076,900.50

A Japanese student of finance, Professor Kobayashi, estimates the selling value of the taxed land in Tokyo at Y1,888,741,200. Real estate specialists place the average value at about Y200 per tsubo. Using a conservative figure, namely Y100 per tsubo, would give a total value of Y1,307,322,200 or approximately twice the above estimate based on averages derived from 1,377 sales.

A study of the sales of real estate shows that land often sells at five, ten, or even twenty times its assessed value for taxation. *The Annual Statistics of the City of Tokyo* for 1922, (p. 105) reports one plot of land assessed at Y17.41 per tsubo, which sold for Y350 per tsubo; another plot assessed at Y1.76 per tsubo sold for Y62.00 per tsubo. In only one case did land sell at a figure slightly under the assessed valuation. It must be remembered however that the figures given as the selling values are not necessarily as high as the values were in fact, because they are merely the values *reported* for taxation purposes. There are also cases where land is sold by father to son for a nominal sum. An analysis of sales would seem to show that the market value of the taxable land of Tokyo is anywhere from five to fifty times its assessed value. At all events it is undeniable that gross inequalities of assessments exist. There is discrimination in the classification of lands. There is discrimination in the valuation of lands classified as house lands.

As to the value of taxable buildings and structures on the taxed land of Tokyo, the available figures are not conclusive. Fairly satisfactory data for a portion of the structures are obtained from returns of the business tax which bears a relation to the rental value as ascertained by inquiry. There is also a house tax based on the general character of the structures taxed which yields certain data. On the basis of such partial figures, a specialist of the Institute for Municipal Research, Dr. Kobayashi, estimated the value of the taxable buildings in Tokyo at Y2,421,377,360.

If one takes the lowest estimate of the taxed land given above (p. 84) and the estimated value of buildings, one has the following results:

Land	Y 951,076,900
Buildings	2,421,377,360
Total taxable real estate	Y3,372,454,260

6. The taxing power of the city is materially limited on account of the fact that a large portion of the land within its borders is owned by the Imperial Government, the Imperial Household, and other tax exempt authorities and persons and is therefore not subject to taxation by the city.

7. Street improvements and sewers have hitherto been paid for out of Imperial subsidies, bond issues, and general taxes. However the Imperial Road Law which went into force on April 1, 1920, provided that the mayor, with the assent of the Home Office, might impose a part of the cost of road improvements on the property benefited. On October 7, 1922, the municipal decree applying this principle to Tokyo went into force. Steps were taken to collect a certain sum under this decree during the fiscal

year 1922-23. Under the Imperial City Planning Law which went into force on January 1, 1920, provision was made for applying special assessment in the execution of city planning projects, and steps are being taken to make this provision generally effective.

8. Like all other important cities in the world, Tokyo shows a steady increase in the amount of taxes collected per capita. The following table gives the per capita taxes for city, ward, and city planning purpose during the past ten years:

1913	Y2.496
1914	2.253
1915	2.094
1916	1.827
1917	1.944
1918	2.346
1919	2.974
1920	3.989
1921	6.737
1922	9.254

9. There are however other facts relative to the future, which must be taken into the reckoning. In order to meet the requirements of a modern city, the municipal government has projected for the coming ten years new bond issues for water works, sewers, river improvements, tramway extensions, etc., to the amount of Y354,920,000. Of this sum Y200,800,000 has already been authorised and the remainder is for projects already made. Of this grand amount of Y354,920,000, Y195,300,000 is for water works and electric undertakings which will pay their own interest and redemption charges. That leaves a total of Y159,620,000 for non-revenue improvements to be paid for in part at least out of taxes of some kind. This increase in the capital debt will add a large amount to the annual tax burden of the city.

10. The city of Tokyo, in common with other Japanese cities, relies to some extent upon subsidies from the Imperial treasury to aid it in meeting expenditures, current and capital, and it has large expectations for the future. For the fiscal year, 1922-23, the city estimated in the budget subsidies to the amount of Y3,209,937 as follows:

Miscellaneous	Y 20,161
Industrial education	300
Road pavement	1,101,059
Sewer improvements	1,445,817
Employment exchange	33,377
Tuberculosis hospital	114,223
Water works	495,000

These subsidies, as pointed out below, are not based upon scientific principles, but upon the theories and generous impulses of the Imperial Government.

Such are the outstanding facts in the Tokyo system of municipal taxation.

What are the criteria for judgment? It must be admitted that the subject of taxation is controversial but there is a general consensus of opinion among economists in Japan as well as in America on the following points:

In the imposition of taxes the burden should not be made too heavy and there should be a certain relation between taxation and ability to pay.

A tax on land or at least real property should be the basic and most important element in local taxation, and land especially benefited by municipal improvements should pay in special assessments in proportion to benefits received.

Taxes which are difficult and expensive to collect, easily evaded, and yield small revenue should be abolished.

Simplicity, ease of collection, and administrative costs

should be taken into account in the imposition of local taxes.

Discussion and Recommendations

In applying the first of the above criteria, two questions arise. Are the per capita taxes of Tokyo heavy or light as compared with the taxes in other cities of the same character? Are the taxes in Tokyo heavy or light in comparison with ability to pay?

The following table answers the first question, on the basis of American experience, by comparing the per capita taxes of Tokyo for the fiscal year 1921-22 with the per capita revenue receipts (excepting the earnings of public service enterprises) of three leading American cities for the fiscal year 1919:

Tokyo, 1922	$ 4.62
New York City	43.22
Chicago	32.28
Philadelphia	33.06

However, the student of finance will not take such a table too seriously. It is interesting but not conclusive in any relation. The fact that the per capita rate in New York is approximately ten times that in Tokyo by no means indicates that the citizens of Tokyo could carry a burden ten times greater than they are carrying at present. The above table discloses no information on ability to pay.

A somewhat exact basis for comparison as to ability to pay would be afforded by statistics of the total income of all the citizens of Tokyo as compared with the total income of all the citizens in each of the three cities mentioned above.

However, the statistics for such a comparison are not

available; owing to the exemptions allowed in the case of income taxes, to incomplete returns and to differences in administration, the incomes of the major portion of the citizens of each of the four cities are not a matter of record.

Next to the incomes of citizens, the market value of the taxable real property within the city affords the best criterion of ability to pay; but unfortunately, as pointed out above, there is available no exact valuation of the land or houses of Tokyo. If however we take the estimated value of the real estate given above, namely, Y3,370,000,000 in round numbers, and apply a flat annual tax rate of two per cent, we should have an annual return of approximately Y54,730,000 from a conservative real property tax in Tokyo.[1]

It seems reasonable therefore to assume, even if the above estimates are too high, that the amount raised by taxation in Tokyo is not excessive, but very low as compared with American cities on the basis of ability to pay. This conclusion of course has nothing to do with the question as to whether the existing taxes in their present form are excessive or not; it is based on the estimated value of taxable real property taken as a criterion of the ability of the community as a whole to bear the existing burdens of government.

If the four principles laid down above are sound, and it is not probable that many economists will dissent from any of them, then the system of local taxation in Tokyo is open to severe criticism. Indeed it has received criticism from the hands of several able Japanese scholars. The system is exceedingly complicated and cumbersome to administer, owing to the number and variety of accounts

[1] A land tax serves to depreciate the value of land to the extent of the capitalized value of the tax. With a 2 per cent tax rate the value of real estate in Tokyo would be reduced to Y 2,736,300,000 capitalizing on an 8 per cent basis.

which must be kept. Land, as pointed out, practically escapes taxation for municipal purposes and the existing valuation is antiquated and unfair in every respect. Moreover land owners, while practically escaping taxes for municipal purposes, reap large unearned benefits from municipal improvements such as pavements, sewers, and water works extensions. Such a condition cannot be too strongly condemned. It is safe to say that the progress of Tokyo in modern improvements will be seriously hindered as long as the present system of land taxation is continued.

Finally, the largest single source of municipal revenue is the business tax, a tax on persons who sell goods or engage in business of any kind. This is a tax on enterprise and on consumption, and is obviously unfair, while land owners, who are not heavily taxed for municipal purposes, are permitted to reap large benefits from municipal improvements.

On the basis of the above data and principles the following suggestions are offered:

1. There should be a new assessment of land and houses in Tokyo in accordance with the system evolved in the most progressive American cities like New York and Cleveland. Such a system includes an assessment of the land apart from the structures upon it and the valuation of the land at its full market price. In order to carry out this assessment effectively accurate block and lot maps should be prepared showing the location, size, shape, and value of every plot of land in Tokyo. At the same time the antiquated method of describing the location of streets and houses should be abandoned in favour of the modern method of naming streets and numbering houses consecutively.

2. The chief source of revenue for Tokyo should be

a simple, direct tax upon real property—land and houses—on the basis of valuation. This tax is simple in character. It is relatively easy to impose and collect. It does not involve the keeping of millions of petty accounts. It cannot be evaded, for land and houses are visible to all. It falls upon all persons in the city, for all persons live in houses on the land or work or do business in factories and shops. No one, rich or poor, can escape making some contribution to the support of the city no matter whether he owns or merely rents his dwelling place.

Perhaps it might be found feasible to supplement the straight real property tax by a tax on unearned increment in land, but such a tax calls for extraordinary administrative measures to determine land values and increments. It is not a reliable source of revenue in years of business depression and it has been found disappointing in England as a major source of income. Attempts to collect it are characterised by a friendly critic, Mr. J. A. Hobson, the eminent English economist, as "clumsy, expensive, and unsatisfactory." At all events, if adopted in Tokyo, it should come after, not before, experience in making scientific assessments of land values and the imposition of a straight real property tax.

3. The principle of special assessments upon property directly benefited should be extended to include sewers, subways, and all kinds of municipal improvements which confer a benefit upon the owners of adjoining property.

4. The power of excess condemnation should be conferred upon the city authorities. The existing methods of condemning land for public purposes should be carefully surveyed and reconstructed in the light of the best Western practice.

5. The medicine tax, the mining tax, and the business taxes should be abolished for local purposes. If the real

property tax above mentioned fails to yield sufficient revenue for municipal purposes, it should be supplemented by a surtax on the national income tax.

6. The taxes on motor cars, especially trucks, should be materially reduced with a view to developing more economical modes of transportation in the city.

7. Taxes on theatres, restaurants, (except as real estate) etc., should be abolished or reduced to the position of licence taxes levied for the purpose of establishing public control over such places in the interest of health and safety. It is not necessary to emphasise here the fact that throughout the Anglo-Saxon world neither the licensing nor taxing prostitution is authorised by law. Neither is it necessary to add that the custom of licensing and taxing prostitution has called forth severe criticism of Japan in England and America, even from friends and admirers of the Japanese people.

The system of taxation recommended above would greatly simplify the tax structure of Tokyo. It would eliminate thousands of petty tax accounts. It would make possible a material reduction in the tax collecting force. It would relieve business enterprise—the chief source of the city's wealth. It would yield a steady and abundant revenue for a modern city.

It would also work in the direction of separating the sources of local and Imperial revenues. This is desirable although no very great emphasis should be put upon it. There has been a marked tendency in certain American states toward such separation. Where separation has been attempted, the state government derives its income from corporation, inheritance, and similar sources while leaving the local governments free to tax land and houses for local purposes. For many years this was an ideal which many tax experts advocated, but recently less em-

phasis has been placed upon the so-called separation of state and local taxation. Still there is a strong argument in favour of using real estate as the basis of local taxes, for the real estate values of a city bear a close relation to the industrial and business activities of the city, and hence to the local needs for water works, sewers, streets, and other improvements.

8. Finally, the question of subsidies from the Imperial treasury calls for special treatment. No branch of national finance is more difficult to manage fairly than national subsidies in aid of local work. What criterion should be adopted to determine the total amount of money to be voted from the national treasury for such a purpose? How should the total amount so voted be divided between urban improvements and rural improvements? How should the amount be apportioned among the localities—cities, towns, villages, and country districts?

In American politics these matters have been very vexatious. The National Government has long been in the habit of undertaking directly the construction of local river and harbour works and federal post offices and other official buildings in the leading cities. Such enterprises are carried out by federal authorities and paid for by appropriations from the federal treasury. The results in many cases have been deplorable. Members of Congress devote a great deal of time to working for appropriations for their own districts; they concert with others interested in the same designs; and they subordinate national interests to local ambitions. Thus ensues a scramble for money, a rush on the national treasury. Representative government is vitiated. Representatives are often mere agents for their districts bent on grabbing as much money as possible from the national treasury for the localities from which they come. Consequently the

most successful representative is not the man of wide national interest, but the energetic man who gets the most out of the national treasury. A great outcry has therefore gone up in America against indiscriminate appropriations for local improvements, but the evils have hardly been diminished as a result of the protests against them.

Men experienced in national finance are trying to work out certain principles to control national appropriations for local improvements. For example, when the Federal Government began to make direct appropriations of money in aid of education, in 1917, it provided that the amount must be apportioned among the states approximately on the basis of population; that it must be spent for specific purposes; that certain standards of educational work must be maintained by the states; and that each state must appropriate for the same purposes a sum equal in amount to that allotted by the Federal Government. Similar principles were applied whenever federal aid was granted to the states to assist them in road building.

It should be said in this connection however that the city of Washington, the capital of the United States, stands in a very special relation to the National Government. In the first place, it is a creature of the National Government. It was planned under national auspices, and is now governed by the Congress of the United States and by a commission of three men appointed by the President. The expenses of the city are met in part by appropriations made by Congress.[1] Under the act of 1878, the Government of the United States assumed one half the *principal* expenditures of the city, and in prac-

[1] At one time Washington enjoyed self-government to a limited degree but autonomy was abolished in 1874 by act of Congress. The chief reasons were controversies over negro suffrage and corruption in the government.

tice the appropriations made by Congress usually amount approximately to three-sevenths of the total revenues of the city. For example, in 1919, the total revenue receipts of the city were $19,410,589. Of this sum, the subvention provided by Congress was $8,011,340, or 41.3 per cent of the total. A large portion of this amount, namely, $3,491,340, was devoted specifically to education: and the remainder was used for general purposes. In addition to subventions from Congress and general taxes, the city of Washington derives certain revenues from special assessments levied on property benefited by local improvements.

Broadly speaking, cities, towns, and villages in the United States must pay for their local improvements and their own government without direct aid from the national treasury. Sometimes however funds are appropriated by state legislatures to localities, in aid of road building and other objects. Except for education such appropriations are relatively small. For instance, all the cities of 30,000 inhabitants and over (excluding Washington, D. C.) received from the legislatures of their respective states in 1919 less than $2,000,000 for purposes other than educational. Moreover when subventions are granted by the state legislatures to localities they are not often voted indiscriminately, but according to certain principles. For example, sometimes state aid to education is distributed to the cities and counties on the basis of their respective populations. This makes it impossible for the state government to show favouritism to local districts. There can be no fighting or quarrelling among the cities and counties since all are treated equally according to mathematical rules. It is useless for mayors or county officials to appeal to the state government for special aid, because the amount which each community

receives from the state treasury is not determined by the whim of the state government officers.

Again, in a few instances, funds are transferred from a state treasury to local governments on the basis of the amount of some specific tax paid by each. In New York state, for example, there is a state income tax which is assessed and collected by the state authorities. After the tax has been collected, a fixed proportion of it is transferred to the treasuries of the communities of the state on the basis of the assessed value of real estate in the respective districts. In this method also there can be no favouritism as the amount which each locality receives is not fixed by state officials or the state legislature, but by the local assessment rolls.

In general, it should be said that American experience with indefinite subsidies from national and state treasuries to local works has been exceedingly unhappy. Where possible the practice should be avoided. Whenever it is necessary (and it is often necessary, especially in the case of capital cities), then certain definite principles should be established to control the distribution of such subsidies. These principles should be fixed in the form of general rules which apply equally to all localities according to definite plans. If, for example, a subsidy is granted to localities in aid of roads it may be provided that the total amount shall be distributed among communities only on condition that each locality benefited shall appropriate an equal or larger portion for the same purpose.

There are of course exceptions in case of a national capital, like Tokyo. A great nation naturally wishes to have its capital reflect its power and magnificence, and therefore it may, and usually does, make special grants in aid of improvements in the capital. But even in this

matter there are certain controlling principles which can very well be applied. A few examples will illustrate.

In the first place, the national government always has large grounds and buildings in the capital and sometimes in other cities. When street pavements are made, water mains are laid, or other local improvements are carried out, the national government can pay its full share on the same principles as other citizens. If, for example, it is provided that abutting property owners shall pay according to frontage or area or valuation, then the national government can be treated like any private land owner. As to the justice of this rule, there surely can be no difference of opinion. If this rule were fairly applied in Tokyo, then the subsidies from the national treasury would be large and they would come automatically according to fixed principles.

In the second place, it could be provided that whenever any new street is laid out and cut through private property in order to make a special approach to a national building, the national government should pay the entire cost of such a street.

In the third place, it could be established as a principle that whenever a new street is made especially wider in order to serve the purposes of the capital, the national government, besides bearing its share of the special assessment for the normal width of the street, should pay the entire cost of the additional width required for its own purposes.

In the fourth place, it could readily be agreed that, when an existing street is to be paved, the national government should pay its special assessment as above described, and the entire cost of any extra width due to the requirement of the national capital.

In addition to these principles applicable to the national

capital as such, the capital should also enjoy, on the same terms as other cities, the benefits of general subsidies in aid of local improvements.

In the case of rivers and harbours useful to general navigation and national defence, of course, it is impossible to apply general principles.

III. Debt and Borrowing Policy

The first question which an American specialist in municipal finance asks, when he examines the debt and borrowing policy of a city, is this: "What are the limitations on the purposes of indebtedness and amount of bonds which a city can issue?" In older days American cities often issued long term bonds to pay current bills or to buy objects which lasted only a few years. Sometimes they issued short term notes to meet current expenses and then later funded the notes into long term bonds. It frequently happened that cities, with a reckless disregard for consequences, piled up huge debts to pay for improvements which should have been assessed against property owners benefited and thus placed staggering burdens on the shoulders of future generations, weakening their power to meet new obligations. Hence arose in America the practice of placing strict limits on the purpose and amount of the indebtedness which cities might incur.

With regard to the question stated above we may say that the borrowing policy of Tokyo and all Japanese cities is sound. The city may issue short term securities to meet regular appropriations, already made, for which funds are not available, but such notes must be redeemed during the fiscal year in which they are issued. There is no possibility of merging these notes into the funded

debt and thus transferring to future generations the burden of paying for current expenditures.

As to long term bonds, the purposes are strictly limited by Imperial law. Cities may issue such bonds for three purposes only (1) to redeem old debts, (2) to finance permanent improvements, and (3) to provide for emergencies such as fires and floods. Thus it is apparent that Tokyo cannot borrow money recklessly to pay current bills or to pay for objects and improvements which are short-lived.

Are there any limits on the amount of debt which Tokyo can incur? It is now a common practice in the United States to provide that cities may not become indebted in any manner or for any purpose to an amount exceeding a certain percentage of the assessed valuation of the real estate appearing on the assessment rolls. Exceptions to this rule are sometimes provided by excluding from the regular indebtedness all amounts invested in certain public improvements, such as docks or water works, which yield revenue.

Tokyo is not subject to any such limitations. The amount of its indebtedness is not fixed by the municipal law. But no municipal loan (except short term notes for current purposes) can be made without the approval of the Imperial Minister of Finance and the Minister of Home Affairs. The following is the procedure. Whenever a new long term loan is contemplated, the mayor lays the plan before the city council including a statement of the amount, purpose, rate of interest, method of issue, and provision for redemption. The approval of the city council is necessary in every case. At the same time the proposed loan is closely scrutinised as to amount and purpose by the Home Office and Finance Ministry of the Imperial Government. In practice

the issue of municipal bonds is entirely controlled by considerations of national and foreign policy. No municipal competition with national loans is permitted. Heavy borrowings abroad are permitted or required only in relation to the execution of foreign policies or with a view to controlling rates of exchange and the currency. Owing to the heavy indebtedness of the Imperial Government, it is not probable that the cities of Japan will be allowed to expand their indebtedness either rapidly or recklessly. On the contrary they are more likely to be limited in making local improvements by the sharp competition of the Imperial Government. As to the amount and purpose of indebtedness possible, therefore, the financial policy of Tokyo is and promises to be extremely conservative.

The ardent advocate of municipal improvements is likely to rebel against the severe restrictions now imposed by the Imperial Government on municipal borrowing. From a purely municipal point of view, there is much to commend the American practice of permitting the city to borrow freely within fixed limits without requiring the approval of any superior administrative authorities. It is possible that in the long run such a policy would be best for Japan, on account of the impetus which it would give to local initiative. Perhaps the judgment of bankers who know the state of the money market would be better than the judgment of Imperial officials, but such a suggestion is at present academic. In undertaking large improvements through heavy borrowing, Japanese cities have no autonomy; they are closely restricted by superior authorities. As the Imperial Government is almost constantly in the money market for loans, it is not likely to raise up formidable competitors in the cities.

Is the city of Tokyo, as regards its debt, in a sound financial condition? Some writers in attempting to answer such a question employ the comparative method; they compare the total per capita debt of the city under inquiry with the total per capita debt of similar cities in other countries. That method as applied to Tokyo (1922) in comparison with leading American cities (1921) produces the following result:

Per Capita Gross Debts

Tokyo	Y 80.25
New York City	602.86
Chicago (1919)	111.56
Boston	331.96
Philadelphia	218.72

Such tables, though interesting, are not conclusive. It by no means follows that Tokyo can carry a per capita debt of Y602.86 merely because New York City does. Moreover the use of the *total* debt in such a calculation is misleading, because a portion of the debt of each city is incurred for revenue producing enterprises which pay their own way and constitute no burden on the taxpayer. For example, of the total outstanding bonds of all American cities of 30,000 population or over, in 1919, 30.2 per cent had been issued for public service (or revenue producing enterprises) and 69.8 per cent for non-revenue producing undertakings.

About seventy per cent of the bonded debt of American cities of 30,000 inhabitants and over represents investments which return no revenue; only about fifteen per cent of the debt of Tokyo is for non-revenue producing enterprises.

If one compares the gross debt of Tokyo (1922) with

the gross debts of New York City, Philadelphia and Boston (1921), one gets the following results:

Gross Debts Classified

	Total Debt.	For Revenue Producing Enterprises. Amount.	Per Cent of Total.
Tokyo	Y174,307,132	Y148,025,360	84.9
New York City.	3,414,563,224	1,228,365,228	35.9
Philadelphia ...	405,991,302	114,216,242	28.4
Boston	249,561,136	74,661,908	29.9

What is the relation of this total net debt for non-revenue-producing purposes to the taxable wealth of the city or the capacity of the citizens to pay? This question like that on taxation raised above (p. 88) cannot be answered exactly in mathematical terms. If however we take the lowest estimate of the actual value of the taxable real property in Tokyo given above, namely Y3,372,454,260, and apply to it the New York rule of ten per cent in determining the debt creating power of the city, we have for Tokyo a "debt limit" of Y337,245,426.

If we become extremely conservative and cut that estimate by fifty per cent we still have a debt limit of about Y169,000,000. If we then exempt from the debt limit, as in New York, all except the debt for non-revenue producing purposes we have the following figures for Tokyo:

Debt limit.....	Y169,000,000
Net debt.....	26,281,742
Borrowing power.....	Y142,718,258

Thus as measured by extremely conservative standards, the borrowing capacity of Tokyo for non-revenue pro-

ducing purposes (in relation to ability to pay) is somewhere between Y100,000,000 and Y200,000,000.

Are ample provisions made for the redemption of each loan on or before the date of maturity? There is no uniform practice prescribed by Imperial law such as that required in New York, for instance, but in fact a method of redemption is established with each loan and written into the term of the loan. As a general rule the amount of bonds to be redeemed annually may be drawn by lot or purchased in the market. All the bonds so far redeemed have been purchased or paid on maturity.

Are standard methods used to secure favourable terms for the city when a new loan is floated? The answer to this question depends upon factors difficult to determine. In New York it is the practice for the comptroller of the city to advertise issues of bonds in the newspapers and to sell the bonds to the highest bidders. In Tokyo, on the contrary, it is the practice of the city to place the flotation of each new loan in the hands of a syndicate of six banks: Mitsui, Mitsubishi, First National, Third National, Fifteenth National, and Japan Industrial Bank, the last serving as the agent of the group. The interest rate and the price of the bonds are fixed by negotiations between the city and the syndicate. A certain commission is paid to the syndicate for handling the business. If the public does not buy all the bonds of an issue the syndicate must bear the responsibility.

Suggestions

1. That consideration be given to the New York plan of permitting the city to incur debts freely for specified purposes within the limits of a fixed percentage of the valuation of the real property in the city and subject to

mathematical rules as to the amortization of each bond issue.

2. That consideration be given to the practice of issuing separate ten or fifteen year serial bonds for sewers and street improvements in amounts corresponding to the special benefits conferred upon abutting property and redeemable through the collection of special assessments.

3. That the measure proposed by the present city administration authorising the city to borrow in foreign as well as domestic money markets be approved by the Home Office and the Finance Minister.

4. That in case foreign loans are floated, they be guaranteed by the Imperial Government with a view to securing for municipal loans terms as favourable as those obtained for Imperial loans. If this is not feasible, then consideration might be given to the practice adopted by the cities of Denmark in floating a combined or consolidated loan in the foreign money market.

5. That if it is found necessary to continue in general the present practice of floating loans through the syndicate, bids be secured at least occasionally from other local bankers and from foreign bankers with a view to discovering the advantages or disadvantages arising from the relations with the syndicate.

CHAPTER V

THE PURCHASE OF MATERIAL GOODS

In the discharge of its functions the city government must buy immense quantities of material goods—commodities, equipment, machines, etc., widely varying in kind and quality. If the materials are carefully bought, with the skill of a good merchant, economies may be effected. If they are bought according to exact scientific standards, the material work done by the city administration, assuming intelligence on the part of the personnel, will be efficient. Thus both economy and efficiency depend to a considerable extent upon the purchasing methods followed by the city administration.

During the past twenty-five years this subject has been a matter of close scientific inquiry by private business corporations and by public agencies. The broad outlines of a science of purchasing have already been constructed. The importance of purchasing has been recognised, therefore, although many governmental and private agencies in America have not yet adopted the most approved methods.

In making a survey of the purchasing methods of a city, the New York Bureau of Municipal Research applies the following fundamental tests:

Is the purchasing power of the city centralised in one department or does each department or agency buy on its own terms and conditions and at its own prices?

Are the supplies, materials, and equipment standardised,

each group being characterised by definite specifications prepared scientifically with reference to the exact ends to be attained by the use of the material objects?

Is it the practice of the city to buy in large quantities with a view to securing lower costs?

Is there open bidding, giving all competitors an equal chance?

Are the methods used in buying well adapted to securing the largest number of bidders?

Are deliveries of goods inspected and tested according to standard specifications?

Are testing and inspection centralised?

Does the city pay promptly with a minimum inconvenience to the dealers who sell goods?

Are the storage and distribution of goods efficient?

Is there exact accounting control over the reception, storage, and distribution of goods?

Measured by these standards what can be said of the purchasing methods of the city of Tokyo?

Purchasing is to a certain extent centralised; that is to say, there is a central purchasing section which buys for all sections or departments of the city government except the bureaus headed by commissioners.

As a result of leaving the two municipal commissioners out of the range of central purchasing, the power of the city to secure lower prices by buying in larger quantities is reduced, and great diversity in prices for the same articles often appears. For example one of the bureaus of the city a few years ago paid Y1.50 for stone at the same time that one of the city departments was buying the same stone from the same contractor at Y1.00. This is partly due to the methods of testing employed and also to delay of payment.

Are the supplies which are purchased through the cen-

tral purchasing section standardised in accordance with scientific methods of specifications? Strictly speaking, they are not. There are of course certain groupings and classifications; for example, coal is classified by districts of origin and by grades, but this has been done only in a general way by rule-of-thumb methods, not by heat units.

In fact each section of the administration fixes its own specifications, subject to modification under pressure brought by the purchasing agent. Sometimes the section chief insists on enforcing his own specifications. In practice the purchasing agent collects the specifications and quantity requirements from the section chiefs and when he finds similar requirements he purchases in quantity lots. The city has no experts in standards and specifications.

As to purchasing in large quantities, it may be said that, within the area of purchasing now centralised, this is done to a considerable extent. Nevertheless there is a great deal of buying in small lots. It is the practice to require no bidding for purchases under Y1,000 in value. This is a necessary rule, but unless the most careful scrutiny is maintained, unless the quantities and qualities purchased under that rule are rigidly inspected by superior authorities, there will be violations of the principle. It sometimes happens that the purchasing section buys the same articles at different prices at the same time. Just how far this is carried can only be determined by a detailed examination of accounts and vouchers.

The principle of open bidding in the purchase of materials is established by municipal law, but there are exceptions. It is not applied in cases of "emergency" or to the purchase of goods in amounts of less than Y1,000 in value or to patented articles owned by one person or

corporation. These exceptions are of course based upon reason and experience. They are necessary, but they are open to serious abuses. Indeed it was under the "emergency" rule that certain members of the city council in 1919 became involved in a scandal in connection with the street paving and the purchase of sand and pebbles. Nothing but the closest accounting and administrative control can prevent violations of the exception clause.

What are the methods adopted to secure the largest possible number of bidders—effective competition, in other words? In practice, the city purchasing agent, when he is ready to buy a given lot of goods, places advertisements in the City Record and in the newspapers. These advertisements do not appear on specific days of the week or in specific places. Consequently dealers who are desirous of selling goods to the city must look through the papers daily and incur the risk of missing any particular advertisement. In calling for bids the agent relies mainly upon local merchants. He has no extensive list of potential bidders, domestic and foreign, for each great group of supplies which he must buy.

As to the inspection and testing of goods bought, the facts in the case are few and simple. Ordinarily a representative from the purchasing section and a representative from the section using a particular commodity which has been bought meet, inspect the goods delivered, and decide whether specifications have been met. There is no central testing laboratory to aid in maintaining scientific scrutiny over all purchases. Some operating departments, however, such as the Water Section, have their own testing laboratories and testing methods.

The distribution and storage of purchases have not been made the subject of scientific inquiry in Tokyo, and the data are not forthcoming to serve as a basis of judg-

ment. Goods are delivered in required quantities to the offices of the respective sections according to their orders, or to places designated by the said section. The city maintains no central store house, except for cement and pebbles and sand. Of the divisions of the city administration, only the bureau of electricity has a central storage system.

In making its payments for purchases, is the city treasury prompt and direct in its methods? The process of payment is as follows:

Delivery of goods
Inspection and approval
Voucher approved by purchasing agent
Voucher approved the section concerned
Approval by an assistant mayor
Payment

The time taken in ordinary cases to complete the process of collection naturally varies, but a number of examples illustrating dilatory methods of payment on the part of the city were discovered on inquiry. In some cases merchants and contractors have not been paid until three or four months after the delivery of goods and services. Such methods are contrary to good merchandising principles. Prompt payment invites more bidders, secures lower bids, and sometimes makes possible large discounts. In view of the fact that the payments of taxes into the city treasury are so distributed throughout the year as to keep the treasury well supplied continuously, there is no necessity for delays on account of cash shortage.

Finally, the storage and custody of commodities purchased are decentralised, and it is not a matter of surprise to learn that the system of accounting and control for stores is in a rudimentary stage. The city purchas-

ing agent has in his office only a partial record of stores. When he makes purchases of a given article for one or more sections, he has no way of knowing whether other sections have a large surplus of that article on hand.

In each section the storage record system is also rudimentary in form. At the close of the fiscal year there is no exact storage accounting for surplus stocks on hand which really should be known because it is one of the means available for financing the activities of the next year.

Recommendations

1. A further centralisation of purchasing by bringing the commissioners' purchases within the sphere of the purchasing section. Now, it is not necessary to carry the principle of centralisation to logical perfection as demanded by some experts in this field. If a health department requires one new X-ray machine every five or ten years, it is obviously ridiculous to call upon the purchasing section to prepare specifications and make the purchase. The degree of centralisation which works for efficiency depends upon the quantities of the same or similar goods required by two or more departments. On this principle further centralisation of purchasing in Tokyo would work economies.

2. A new classification of the leading material objects based upon scientific specifications as to composition and quality. Especially should this be done in respect to such fundamental supplies as hardware, cleaning supplies, oil and grease, coal, medical supplies, soap and laundry supplies, furniture, paper, ink, printing, stationery, household supplies, food stuffs, etc. For instance, coal should not be bought by rule-of-thumb grading as at present, but according to specifications relative to heat units, ash, mois-

ture, etc. These specifications should be enforced by placing a penalty upon inferior coal (below specifications) and by paying a bonus for coal superior in heat units to the specifications.

Such specifications should be worked out by the chief of the purchasing section in close and friendly co-operation with all section chiefs using the same materials. The success of the whole enterprise depends upon this co-operation. The purchasing chief should not attempt to force requirements on the operating chiefs, and they should be led to see the economy to be obtained by co-operation in buying.

3. Before the opening of each new fiscal year, the several sections should file with the purchasing agent a list of their requirements of the different classes and grades of goods to be bought centrally. This list should be based upon the normal requirements of previous years and the estimates contained in the budget for the new year. In this connection the close relation between purchasing and budget-making should be noted again. If section chiefs, in preparing their budget estimates, go into the requisite details as to material requirements (as they should; see above p. 107), then exact information as to quantities of goods to be bought will be furnished by the budget estimate sheets.

At the same time that the requirements of the sections are being compiled, the purchasing agent should ascertain the dates at which particular goods will be needed, so that he may distribute his purchasing, instead of congesting it at the opening of the fiscal year.

4. There should be a reduction in small lot purchasing. The adoption of the above methods would help. It could be expedited by requiring the purchasing agent to report to the mayor and council all purchases of less

than Y1,000, the class and quality of goods bought, the section making such purchases, and the names of the dealers from whom they are made. Such reports will show one of three things, namely, (1) that there is collusion in buying to avoid competition or, (2) that section chiefs are careless in preparing their annual requirements list, or (3) that the purchases are in good faith, in other words, purchases of goods which are not used in large lots.

5. The purchasing section should be transformed from a passive agent of the other sections into an active merchandising agency. A constant study of the potential supplies of all principal goods used by the city should be maintained. Lists of merchants, manufacturers and dealers in all parts of the world should be kept up-to-date.

Constant efforts should be made to supply the sections adequately with the best possible goods, equipment, machines, etc., of the class and grades required. It should be the business of the purchasing agent to please the section chiefs just as a good business man pleases his customers, by efficient service.

6. Wherever possible purchases should be made directly from mines and manufacturers.

7. Advertising for bidders should be on fixed days of the week and in certain places in the newspapers, so that dealers may know exactly where to look for notices. Such advertising should be supplemented by direct official notices to dealers of high standing in special articles. Trade journals should be used for advertising for particular articles. Bidding should be invited from all quarters by judicious advertising methods.

8. A standard testing laboratory should be established under the purchasing agent's jurisdiction. Perhaps this could be done in connection with the testing laboratory

of the water works. The business of such a laboratory would be (1) to maintain a scientific study of the material goods used by the city in large quantities, (2) to help section chiefs in preparing their specifications, and (3) to aid in inspecting and testing goods bought and delivered. In this relation the working methods of the Central Testing Laboratory in New York City and the Bureau of Standards in Washington might well be studied.

9. The testing laboratory should co-operate with the purchasing agent and section chiefs in inspecting and testing goods bought, delivered, and used. A closer inspection over purchases would thus be established to protect the interests of the city.

10. The whole problem of the storage and distribution of goods should be carefully studied with a view to discovering whether some system of central storage is not desirable in connection with larger purchases. The solution of this problem can only be effected by an examination of the distribution and use of material goods in time and geographically.

11. A system of stores ledger cards should be established in each section (or the central store house if it is created). Such cards should show the receipt and issue of goods. Goods should be issued only upon requisitions duly reviewed and certified by the section chief or official immediately in charge of the work for which the said goods are used. Periodical inventories should be taken to see whether stocks agree with records. A general ledger should show the state of all important supplies continuously and especially at the close of the fiscal year.

12. No doubt the process of payment could be simplified and expedited. In the case of merchants or companies in good standing with which the city has long been

dealing, prepayments might be made on invoices before the final acceptance and approval of the goods, if such prepayments would secure substantial discounts for the city. Although American cities usually withhold all payments until invoices have been checked and the deliveries tested, many American companies, in making continuous purchases from reliable dealers, pay promptly on delivery and allow the invoices and the testing to follow at the earliest convenient date. It is suggested therefore that Tokyo might adopt this custom in dealing with reliable concerns which are making periodical deliveries under contract. Indeed adequate safeguards could be written into the purchasing contract indemnifying the city in case goods paid for promptly were found to be not according to order. Such a practice could be limited to business concerns which allow the city substantial discounts for prompt payment. Invoices of goods subject to such discount could be stamped with a large red stamp to indicate the nature of the transaction and to expedite payment in the treasurer's office.

At all events the control over payments should be centralised in the treasurer's office. To require the approval of higher officers who could not possibly investigate the correctness of the vouchers which they sign does not add precautionary control. It dissipates responsibility and delays payments.

CHAPTER VI.

PERSONNEL ADMINISTRATION

ASSUMING that the city has the money and material goods necessary for its activities, the next problem is that of securing able and loyal officers and employés who know how to do their work and have the will to do it. In fact the efficiency and the achievements of a city as a going concern are mainly determined by the apparently small activities of hundreds of persons who never appear in public and receive scant honour for the services rendered. The health, safety, and comfort of the millions in Tokyo depend in a large measure upon the skill and devotion of a long list of employés—men and women—ranging in their abilities from the most highly skilled engineers to the simplest day labourers.

In a small town, as in a small individual industry, the employment problem is relatively simple. The mayor or responsible officer, like the proprietor of a small factory, knows what work is to be done, interviews applicants, appoints and discharges employés, and supervises their work. With the growth of large corporations, public and private, the simple methods, once quite adequate, become wholly inadequate. The complexity of the work to be done multiplies, the number of professional, scientific, and skilled occupations increases, and the number of employés mounts into the thousands. The mayor or proprietor can no longer assume personal responsibility for making appointments and supervising work; he must delegate his

powers to various subordinates. Then favoritism and partisan politics enter if they have not already done so. Persons are often employed for reasons not at all connected with their ability to do well some specific work; they are employed or discharged because they have rendered personal or political favors. New positions are created not from necessity, but to make room for some politician or friend. Then the working force of the city or business is perverted from its true purpose. Then inefficiency sets in and the morale of the force sinks. These simple statements can be amply illustrated from the history of public and private business all over the United States.

Under the casual methods of personnel administration that prevailed as American industrial cities began to grow rapidly, many evils sprang up which had a deadening effect upon the character of the municipal employés and the efficiency of their work. Among the evils experienced in America the following may be noted:

Persons were appointed to office because they were closely associated with political groups or were friends of mayors and councillors rather than on account of their demonstrated abilities.

Competent city officers and laborers were often discharged merely to make room for politicians and political workers.

Men of about the same age, of similar training and experience, and engaged in doing the same work were paid salaries quite different in amount. For example, the New York Bureau of Municipal Research reported in 1919 that the salary range of clerical workers in the water bureau of a neighbouring city was from $1,212 to $1,800 and in the department of parks and public property from $1,100 to $2,100.

Unnecessary places were created to make room for political friends, and fictitious titles were given to employments for the purpose of concealing their true character. For example, an office of assistant engineer might be established to make room for a politician who knew nothing about engineering.

Men doing work of widely different character were often paid the same salary; that is, a clerk in one department might be paid as much as a highly trained and responsible engineer merely because his chief officer liked him and thought he was "a good fellow."

Where grades and salaries were left to the will of a chief officer, pressure was brought upon him by city councillors to increase the pay of favourites without any reference to merit, term of service, experience, or any other element of value in terms of efficiency. The chief officer could not fall back upon the rules of the service and defend himself, but must obey the dictates of the political leader or councilman.

Where the nature of the duties to be performed by each officer is not fixed, it is difficult for educators engaged in training youth and for applicants to discover the requirements of the public service.

If there are no salary and work standards running throughout all departments of the city government, it is impossible to make up a scientific budget based upon actual work requirements. For example, the term "clerk" in one department will not mean the same thing in another department, if there are no standards and if each chief is allowed to determine work requirements, salaries, and grades within his own department.

During the last thirty or forty years, however, there has been growing up in America a new science of employment or personnel administration. It is associated

with various phases, such as civil service reform, job analysis, the Taylor system, salary standardisation, &c., but broadly speaking the following principles or generalities of a science have been evolved:

In a political organisation, only policy-determining officers, such as department heads, should change with a change of administration; all other officers and employés should hold office or position permanently, subject to good behaviour and efficient performance of duties.

There should be a non-partisan commission or agency charged with the duty of (a) establishing rules for entrance and promotion in the permanent service, and (b) conducting examinations to test the fitness of such persons admitted or promoted.

The duties, titles, and rate of compensation for each job or employment should be clearly defined, and terms should mean the same in all departments.

All the positions in the city government should be simply and logically classified on the basis of the duties performed by the holders of each job or employment.

There should be clearly established principles governing: (a) appointment, (b) salary increases, and (c) promotion to work of a higher character.

The standard factors of education, experience, and ability necessary to the efficient performance of the duties of each position should be established and made the basis of examinations, appointments, and promotions.

The political, civil, and religious rights of persons in the public employment should be clearly defined.

Adequate information concerning opportunities in the municipal service should be furnished publicly to educational institutions and to prospective employés.

Pension systems, where established, should be based upon a sound actuarial and financial basis.

As an illustration of American methods of classification, the following outline of a proposed classification in the City of New York may be taken as representing careful conclusions based upon a long and painstaking investigation.

In the first place, all the employments of the city, except legislative and judicial, were grouped into the following *Services:*

Professional (such as engineering, law, medicine)
Sub-professional (law clerk, laboratory assistant, etc.)
Investigational
Educational
Clerical
Inspectional
Custodial
Institutional
Police
Fire
Street cleaning
Skilled trades
Unskilled and miscellaneous

In the second place, each *Service* was divided into special *Groups.* For example, the professional service was divided into the accountant group, the engineering group, &c.

In the third place, each group was divided into *Grades.* For example, the engineering group in the professional service was divided into grades A, B, C, &c., according to the character of the work done by engineers in charge of different functions.

In the fourth place, under each *Grade,* the employés were classified by *Title,* such as assistant engineer, junior civil engineer, junior mechanical engineer, &c.

To present the matter in schematic form, a service

classified according to the above system would fall into the following lines:

1. Professional *service*
    1. Engineering *group*
        Grade A (highest class of talents required)
            Title. Assistant engineer
        Grade B.
            Title. Junior engineer (civil)
                Junior engineer (mechanical)
        Grade C. &c.

This scheme is not presented as ideal or as wholly applicable to Tokyo, but as illustrating a method of approaching a scientific classification of the employments of the city.

Fact statement as to Tokyo.

1. The employés of the city of Tokyo are classified into two general classes:

Officials, regular and temporary
Laborers, regular and temporary

The officials of the city (excepting ward officials) are divided into twenty-five classes as follows:

Mayor
Assistant mayors (3)
Chief treasurer
Assistant treasurers
Commissioners
Directors
Managers
Engineers and architects
Assistant engineers
School inspectors
Clerks

Physicians
Instructors
Ferry boat captains
Ferry boat engineers
Ferry boat mates
Pharmacists
Inspectors of water supply
Chief nurses
Experts, especially appointed
Chief overseer for street cleaning
Overseers for street cleaning
Patrolmen for street cleaning
Temporary employees and others
Lecturer for training school

Within several of the classes there are *grades* based on *salaries*. For example there are seventeen grades of assistant engineers ranging from Y30 a month to Y200; and there are eighteen grades of engineers ranging from Y1,400 a year to Y12,000.

2. The grades within the official service are *salary* grades, not *work* grades, but they are based roughly upon term of service and ability, as determined by the mayor, and assistant mayors and section heads.

3. No survey of the existing grades and salaries has ever been made, and the data are not available for a minute analysis of the results of the present practices.

4. According to the terms of the Municipal Law, Article 85, the mayor can appoint all common officials; in practice, it is the department or section chiefs who select the subordinates. The assistant mayors, treasurer and assistant-treasurer are selected by the mayor and approved by the city council. Commissioners are elected by the city council.

5. The methods of appointment are very simple. If there are no applications on file when a vacancy occurs,

advertisements are inserted in the newspapers. If, however, there are applications on file, the department head looks over them, invites applicants to call, interviews them, and selects one according to his own judgment. He sets up his own standard requirements as to training, experience, and fitness for the particular position. It is true that there are civil service rules to the effect that officers must have a minimum education, but those rules are very general in character and do not control the appointing officer as to details. It is true, also, that in May, 1922, the mayor made a rule that all applicants must be passed upon by a "Committee of Investigation" composed of the assistant mayors, the paid commissioners, the treasurer, and the director of roads; but in practice this committee does not meet.

When an appointment is made, a clerk takes the documents in the case to the members individually for their examination and approval. Only two groups of city officers are subject to special examination before appointment; namely, water inspectors and street cleaning supervisors. They are examined by a commission created for that purpose.

6. The practice followed in discharging employees and officers is likewise very simple. The powers of the mayor in this respect are almost absolute; he may dismiss any city official at will, except the assistant mayors, treasurers, assistant-treasurers and commissioners. Curiously enough the assistant mayor may, if he insists, cling to his position, in spite of the desire of a new mayor to get rid of him; but in practice he does not usually oppose the wishes of the mayor. Although the powers of the mayor are extensive in practice, he is generally restrained in the exercise of them. He feels free to discharge at will his immediate subordinates, but the supervision and

discharge of minor officers and laborers are left in the hands of department heads.

7. Ordinarily, a new mayor on coming to power does not discharge many officers and employés. Occasionally, however, there is a general "house cleaning."

8. It does not appear that the spoils system, namely, wholesale discharges and appointments for political reasons, has got a grip upon the administration of Tokyo. Nevertheless, many, if not a majority of the councilmen, are watchful for vacancies and ready to recommend certain of their constituents and friends for appointment. Their pressure upon the administration cannot be ignored even by the strongest mayor. Thus it happens that many petty officers and laborers, especially in the wards or boroughs, are in fact political appointees. Sometimes promotions are also political in character.

9. Tokyo has a pension system for its permanent city and borough officers but not for temporary officers and laborers. In practice these officials make a contribution of one per cent of their salary per month to a pension fund. The number of officials receiving pensions is rather large. On December 31, 1922, there were 2,795 (including ward officers) regular officers, in the employ of the city and there were 552 on the pension list. For this fiscal year (1922-23) the estimated contributions from the employés of the city amount to Y42,000, while the estimated outlay for pensions and payments to the families of deceased employés is Y261,060. No attempt has ever been made to place the pension system on an actuarial basis.

10. In recognition of the importance of special preparation for municipal service, Tokyo established in 1921 a Training School for Municipal Service under the direction of the Assistant Mayor, Mr. Ikeda. The courses of

study embrace law, economics, finance, accounting, social welfare, and related subjects. They are open to the employés of the city and candidates for admission to municipal service. The instruction is given by professors from the universities and experienced officers in the city government. In taking this step, Tokyo has set a splendid example to American cities. All advocates of municipal improvement will wish the new school for public service the support which it deserves.

Discussion and Recommendation

If the plans for Greater Tokyo are realised and the new improvements now designed are carried out, the number of employés of the municipality will increase. The completion of the water works, the establishment of the sewage system, the construction of miles of pavement, and other new enterprises will add to the number of employés, even though the plans for consolidating the suburban areas are not realised. It is evident, therefore, that the simple and direct methods of appointment, promotion, and dismissal now in effect will break down because it will be impossible for the department heads and the mayor to give sufficient personal attention to each appointment. As a result, if it is not already doing so, the city will be appointing men to office without an adequate scrutiny of their qualifications, training, and ability. Furthermore, the pressure of councilmen upon the appointing officers will become greater as the number of vacancies multiplies. If Tokyo then escapes the gross evils of the American spoils system, human nature is not the same in Japan as in the United States.

Therefore the following suggestions are brought to the attention of the Tokyo authorities:

1. That a careful study be made of the new science of personnel administration which is growing up in the United States.

2. That a careful survey be made of all the official positions and jobs in the city and the nature of the work performed by each person or group of persons.

3. That all related employments be grouped under the same *service* (i.e. as professional, inspectional, clerical, &c.) and that within each *service* distinct *groups* (i.e., engineering, medical, legal, &c.) be established; and that within each group *grades* and titles be created. In this way the title of every position or job would mean the same thing throughout the entire administration. For example a "junior clerk" or "junior engineer" would mean the same thing in each department that employs a junior clerk or engineer.

4. That standard requirements as to age, experience, and training be established for each class of positions or jobs as a guide to examining officers, appointing officers, educators and prospective applicants.

5. That the entire city service, that is, all employments, be divided into two groups: exempt and examined. The first group would include all officers and employés who may be appointed by the mayor or his subordinates without examination. The second group would include all those officers and labourers who can be appointed only after an examination to ascertain their mental and physical fitness for the work to be assigned to them.

6. That a civil service commission of three members be created to classify the employments of the city, to determine the examination appropriate to each class of employments, to conduct examinations, and to certify to appointing officers the eligibles fitted for each vacancy.

Of course these steps should not be taken without a careful inquiry into the civil service methods now applied in Europe, England, and the United States, and the problem of adapting these methods to the special conditions of Tokyo.

7. That a careful survey be made of the pension system of Tokyo—the extent of the present obligations, the state of the funds, and the liabilities of the future based upon actuarial calculations. By granting pensions in a haphazard fashion some American cities have accumulated huge obligations to their employés—obligations which they are sometimes compelled to scale down owing to the great expense involved. It looks as if Tokyo may by inadvertence become involved in large commitments. Now is the time to put the pension system on a definite scientific basis as to (a) the exact conditions under which pensions shall be granted, (b) the amount of the contribution to be made by all employés, (c) the amount of the pension in each case: and (d) total estimated cost to the city in the future.

CHAPTER VII

MUNICIPAL UTILITIES

WHAT principles, derived from experience, should form the basis of judgment as to organisation, management and control in the case of public utilities such as water, gas, and electric works, and transportation systems? A volume would be required to state them all in detail, but fundamental among them are the following:

Public utilities bear a vital relation to city planning, and hence must be treated as a unitary problem. This is true as to water, gas, and electric services in a limited sense, because the extension of these services is connected with the growth of the city. In a very especial sense, transportation facilities are an integral part of city planning in all its phases. The reduction of congestion, the promotion of housing, and the orderly expansion of the city can be realised effectively, only in close relation to transportation facilities. Hence it follows that the public utilities of the city should either be owned and operated by the city government with reference to the needs of the whole urban community or they should be controlled and co-ordinated by one municipal agency with reference with such needs. Public utilities are in general monopolistic in character and competition can not be relied upon to guarantee reasonable rates and services. Hence when they are in private hands, they must be controlled by a public agency in the public interest.

Long experience with public utilities owned by private

companies has shown that every franchise or charter granting the right to operate a utility in a city should contain certain safeguards as to (1) the term of years or life of the privileges granted, (2) the precise condition of purchase by the city in the future, (3) standards of services, (4) publicity of accounts, (5) capitalisation, (6) profits, and (7) extensions (see Wilcox, *Municipal Franchises;* 2 Vols.).

Modern science has made it possible to fix positive standards for measuring the services furnished by public utilities. For example, the quality and quantity of gas delivered by a gas plant can be determined exactly in terms of light and heat units.

Powerful private companies which own and operate utilities subject to regulation by political agencies are usually more or less involved, through choice or necessity, in politics and elections.

The construction and extension of utilities bear a close relation to the rise in land values. Therefore, it is taking money out of the pockets of certain citizens and putting it into the hands of landlords, if a city pays for utility construction and extension through bond issues, the charges for which fall upon the general tax payer.

As to transportation systems, experience in all great cities has demonstrated the utter inadequacy of surface tramways to furnish the necessary facilities. The automobile has added to traffic congestion with the result that street car movement in business streets is continually diminishing. While some cities like New York, Chicago and Berlin have attempted partial solutions of the transportation problem by elevated railways, their experiments have not been altogether successful. An elevated railway darkens the streets along which it runs and depreciates the value of some property. The noise of the elevated

trains is a public nuisance. The subway, on the other hand, does not interfere with street traffic, and adds to all realty values. In short, the drift of western experience is all against the surface tramway and the elevated and in favour of the subway in the heart of great cities.

The Situation in Tokyo

What are the essential facts in the public utility situation in Tokyo?

1. The city of Tokyo owns and operates its water works system, the street railways, and an electric lighting system for lighting streets and for the sale of light and power to private persons and concerns. The city, however, does not own an electric power plant; it buys its power from private sources.

2. There are three private utilities in Tokyo: An Electric Company (which competes with the city), a Gas Company, and a Bus Company. These concerns are now in operation. In addition, four subway companies have been chartered, and a futile attempt has been made to combine them. No construction work has been begun.

3. The above companies were not chartered by the city. The Gas Company came into existence under the general corporation law of the empire; it purchased the gas plant formally owned and operated by the Tokyo Prefecture; and it entered into contractual relations with the city—the city in this instance acting as an ordinary corporation. The Electric Light Company holds its franchise from the department of communications, the Bus Company from the Police Commissioner (who regulates automobile licenses) and the subway companies from the Imperial Department of Railways.

The term of years of the Gas Company and the Elec-

tric Company is not fixed. The city, however, acting as a corporation, has entered into contractual relations with both companies. These relations are very general in character and do not contain detailed provisions in the public interest similar to those found in the most recent franchises issued in America. The city's contract with the Gas Company, made in 1911, runs for a period of thirty years, namely, until 1941. The contract with the Electric Company, made in 1912, runs for twenty years, namely, until 1932, unless otherwise altered by negotiations after the expiration of fifteen years. In the case of the Gas Company, the contract provides certain conditions to govern the valuation of the Company's property if the city wishes to buy the property either before or after the expiration of the contract. If the city and the Company cannot agree, the matter is to be settled by arbitration as stipulated in the contract.

4. The city government has no direct and express power to regulate and control in a continuous fashion the rates, services, and extensions of these private companies. There is no public utility commission, either local or central. It is true that the city as a legal person may enter into relation with utility companies and exercise a certain control over the use of the streets. It has, in fact, as pointed out above, entered into relation with the Electric Company and fixed conditions as to the delimitations of districts and rates. It has also entered into relation with the Gas Company arranging a sliding scale system as to rates and dividends. The standard dividend of the Company was fixed at nine per cent, and it was provided that if the profits exceeded that figure there should be a reduction for gas the following year on the basis of a sliding scale. If the profit is not sufficient to meet the dividend charge of nine per cent, then the Company, with the con-

sent of the City Council, may raise its rates. Acting in conformity with this last provision, the Company, in 1919 secured the consent of the council to an increase in its charges from Y1.75 per thousand feet to Y2.25. The transaction was accompanied by a scandal which culminated in the indictment of several members of the City Council and certain officials of the Gas Company.

Under this arrangement the Company was able immediately to raise the rate of dividend from seven to nine per cent, at which figure it has stood since 1920. Although the cost of producing gas has been materially reduced, the Company has not reduced its rates to the citizens of Tokyo.

As the following table of gross figures shows, the Gas Company's cost must be falling:

	Feet produced.	Expenditure gross.
1921 (first six months) . .	2,957,671,000	Y7,664,216
1922 (last six months) . .	3,085,282,000	6,472,925

In other words, the Company produced 127,611,000 more feet of gas during the last six months of 1922 than during the first six months of 1921, and at a cost lower by Y1,191,291 than in the first period. The price of coal has been materially reduced since 1919. In 1919 the net profit of the Gas Company was Y3,013,222 and in 1922 it was Y5,133,839. During this period the Company has not made extensions of its pipes commensurate with the needs of the growing city.

Since there is no public service commission in Tokyo and no department of the city government has plenary powers over the affairs and operations of the Gas Company, the data do not exist for determining just how far the Company has failed to extend its mains to meet the

requirements of the city. From time to time complaints are heard from private citizens to the effect that the Company does not make special efforts to supply new customers by rapid extensions of mains and pipes. There is no agency in the city to hear the complaints of citizens and to compel the Company to make quick extensions of pipes to meet new demands. There is nothing in the contract of 1911 with the city about the subject of extensions. In other words, the city of Tokyo has a poor contract with the Gas Company. In effect, the contract does nothing but guarantee the Company nine per cent on its capital; it leaves the city utterly without power continuously to protect the interests of the citizens, maintain standards of service, or to compel the performance of any specific obligations.

5. There is no municipal agency empowered to compel the enforcement of standards as to quality of services rendered by any utility company in Tokyo. The Imperial Department of Communications examines electric light metres before installation, but it does not make any effective inspection of them after installation. The Department of Agriculture and Commerce inspects gas metres before installation; it makes no periodical inspection afterwards. There is no official control over quality of service. There is no constant official testing of quality. If the quality of the gas becomes bad in winter when the capacity of the Company's plant is taxed, the only resort of the citizens is complaint to the Company and newspaper publicity. Neither of these methods is scientific or effective. The quality of gas is a matter of exact science which can only be determined by tests. Tokyo has no testing laboratory. It has no agency for protecting the interests of the citizens in this respect. It makes agreements as to rates and profits according to a rule-of-

thumb system which contains no guarantees as to the heat and light units delivered at a given price to customers. The same is true of the electric light furnished by the private company (as well as by the city).

6. A large part of the electricity sold by the city and the private company is not metred, but is supplied to large and small consumers at a fixed rate based on certain general principles. As a result there is a great waste of current all over the city. Thousands of people leave their lights burning all night even in their bed rooms. Thus the careful and economical citizen is penalised to pay the bills of the wasteful citizen. Of course it may be said that metres and periodical metre reading, as well as billing on the basis of current consumed, are expensive; but certainly a very careful inquiry should be made into the present practice to see whether or not the compulsory use of metres would not be economical in the long run as well as more just to the careful consumer.

7. It will be seen, therefore, that there is no unified treatment of the public utility problem of Tokyo in relation to intelligent city planning. At least six distinct agencies have a part in chartering and regulating utility concerns; the prefectural government, the Department of Railways, the Department of Communications, the police commissioner, and, rather incidentally, the city government. The last one, the most vitally interested, has the least power over the granting of franchises.

Recommendations

1. The consolidation of all power to grant franchises to private utility companies within the city in the hands of the city government. Each franchise should be prepared by the Utility Department of the city government,

mentioned below, approved by the mayor, and sanctioned by the city council, subject also to the approval of the Home Office. Failure of the Home Office to act within three months should be construed as approval.

2. The creation of a Public Utility Department in the city government, composed of three men—a chief and two assistants—appointed by the mayor. This department should be composed of experts in the field of utilities. It should have the power to regulate the rates and services of utility companies operating within the city (subject to the terms of the franchises), to compel the publicity of accounts, to establish and enforce certain standards of service, and hear the complaints made by citizens and the city against the companies for non-performance of duty.

3. The adoption of standard provisions of law to be incorporated in all franchises to protect the public interests in the matter of rates, terms, and ultimate rights of purchase on fixed conditions. A general statement of such conditions is to be found in the "Model Franchise" published by the National Municipal League.

4. There should be a precise definition of the terms under which extensions of the Gas Company's mains and pipe lines must be made, taking into account the requirements of consumers and practical limits upon the Company's power to obtain new capital. In the United States the following principles have been applied in various cities with a view to compelling gas companies to extend their pipes to serve new customers.

a. Extension compulsory if it can be shown that the new business will yield eight per cent on new capital invested.

b. Extension compulsory if the new customers petitioning for extension agree to buy stock in the

company equal in amount to the cost of the said extension.

c. Extension compulsory if a certain number of customers using a certain amount of gas per annum is guaranteed for each 100 feet of extension.

d. Extension compulsory on order of the city council on condition that, in the opinion of the council, the new consumption of gas warrants the said extension.

e. Extension compulsory on order of a judicial court acting on a petition signed by citizens who desire said extension and agree to use gas to a certain amount each year.

5. Revision of the contract with the Gas Company when the present contract expires in 1941—such revision to embody modern principles as to standards, capitalisation, profits, extensions, purchase by the city, &c.[1]

6. Inasmuch as subway companies have already been chartered and the finances of the city at present will not permit it to construct anything but short experimental lines, consideration should be given to the experience of New York where the finances of the city would not permit of municipal construction and operation. The partnership entered into by the various transit companies and the City of New York offers certain principles for the guidance of Tokyo, but additional safeguards in the public interest should be made. Such a partnership involves among others, the following elements:

a. Vesting the title to the subways and equipment in the city.

b. The city to furnish one half or more of the money necessary to pay the construction costs.

c. The company to operate the system in accordance with a detailed agreement with the city for a period of fifty years.

[1] On this point *see* Wilcox, *Municipal Franchises.*

d. A division of earnings between the city and the company according to fixed rules.

e. A requirement that the company should set aside each year a fixed sum sufficient to amortise its outstanding debt at the expiration of a term of fifty years.

f. The laying out of lines according to a comprehensive plan integrated with the city plans in general.

g. The adoption of the principle of special assessments on property benefited by the subways. Such assessments should meet the entire indebtedness incurred by the city for subway purposes.

It is of fundamental importance that the principle of special assessments should be applied in subway construction. If New York experience is any criterion, then Tokyo could expect to raise a large part, if not all, of the cost of its subway by this process. It is estimated that in case of "one of the subway extensions in New York City the aggregate increase in land value of a district extending about half a mile on either side of the subway, due to the building of the subway and in excess of the normal rise of $13,500,000, was about $31,300,000 within a period of ten years. The cost of the line was about $5,700,000. Had the property which was benefited borne this expense through the form of an assessment, there would still have remained an aggregate profit of $25,600,000 in excess of the normal rise in value."

CHAPTER VIII

THE SPIRIT AND PRACTICE OF SELF-GOVERNMENT IN TOKYO

In speaking of administrative organisation, budgets, taxation, purchasing, and technical matters we are discussing the machinery by which the work of a city may be done effectively. Moreover we are speaking of matters capable of a more or less precise definition—matters on which there is a large body of accepted scientific opinion. It is therefore relatively easy in this sphere to lay down principles which, if not scientifically exact in all cases, rest on solid foundations of experience.

On the other hand, when we consider the use which is made of this machinery, we confront an entirely different set of data and problems. When we inquire why a city does or does not rapidly introduce all the comforts and conveniences of modern science, we encounter very complex social forces—forces difficult to define, to locate, and to understand. As a Tokyo journalist recently remarked, no one has yet explained why thousands of Tokyo citizens will sit enraptured for three hours at a lecture by Dr. Einstein, and then be wholly content to wade home through mud, ankle-deep, in unpaved streets, with open drains on each side. It may be answered that it is nobler in mind to cultivate things of the spirit than the comforts of the flesh, but it might be added that Dr. Einstein evolved his theories in a city which does possess the conveniences of modern civilisation. The two are not incompatible.

If we look at the history of monumental city improvements we find that, broadly speaking, they spring from two sources. Many a great city has been constructed and many a city has been re-constructed by a despotic ruler of genius and vision. The work of Pericles in Athens, of Augustus in Rome, and Napoleon III in Paris are striking examples of grand designs springing from the ambitions of individual rulers. On the other hand, vast municipal improvements have been undertaken in American cities as a result of the powerful and determined effort of citizens. In other words, we can trace most municipal enterprises, either to benevolent despotism or to ideals, desires, and ambitions of citizens. When, however, we make an analysis of the operations of western democracy we do not find "the whole people" of any city bent upon introducing modern improvements. Indeed, it is tragic to see the amount of filth, disease, and overcrowding which millions in Berlin, Paris, London and New York accept without complaining.

What we find in the actual operations of American municipal democracy is *groups* of citizens, not the whole body of citizens. Sometimes these are philanthropic in purpose. For example, the attack made upon the filthy tenement conditions existing in New York City at the opening of the twentieth century was led by a spirited number of men and women conversant with the facts and bent on reforming them. Sometimes, on the other hand, such groups are selfish in nature, but manage in their operations to accomplish public purposes incidentally and collaterally. Many an American city, for instance, owes a splendid park system to the activities of a few political leaders and real estate speculators who profited from the unearned increment in land values which arose from the improvement. Sometimes school buildings

are erected with as much thought for the resultant profits of "political" contractors as for the needs of the school children.

Now Japan seems to be midway between the ancient days when a wise emperor, like Kwammu, could plan, lay out, and construct a beautiful capital on his own motion and the modern days when public improvements must spring, in part at least, from popular desires and interests. The affairs of the city of Tokyo, for example, are no longer directed by the Shogun or solely by Imperial officers. At the very time when staggering problems of municipal administration were thrown upon the city, the power of plan and act was divided between the Imperial Government and a certain portion of the male citizens in Tokyo to whom the suffrage was granted. As in Western countries, industrial cities grew up so rapidly in Japan that a wholly new type of urban civilisation was created before the people became aware of the problems involved in the revolutionary changes. There is no single Imperial officer who can now control all the factors in the situation and bring immediate order out of the chaos. The mass of the people here as elsewhere, even the voters who have the power, are not yet alive to all the needs of an efficient community life and the modern ways of meeting those needs.

In attempting to get at the inner forces which now control the course of municipal development in Tokyo it is therefore necessary to inquire into the nature of the self-government which has been established. What are the main-springs of municipal action? On what principles is the right to vote determined? How many people vote? How do they vote? What kind of men do they elect to office? What agencies exist for informing the voters on municipal affairs? How are municipal programmes for-

mulated for consideration at elections? These raise some controversial questions but they cannot be avoided.

When the system of self-government was established in Tokyo in 1889, the city council was modelled on Prussian lines. The members of the council, distributed among the wards or boroughs of the city, were elected in accordance with the three-class system. The total amount of direct municipal taxes collected in the city was divided into three parts. All those highest tax payers (including corporations and women) who paid the first third of the taxes formed the first class; those (including corporations and women) who paid the second third of the taxes formed the second class; and the remainder of the taxpayers, the third class. Each of these three classes of voters elected one third of the members of the municipal assembly. Under this system, there were 51,134 eligible voters in the three classes combined, according to the figures of 1920.

On April 1, 1922, the three-class system was abolished and a new method was put into effect by act of Parliament. Under the new law every male person twenty-five years old who pays a direct municipal tax, for two years or more, no matter how small, and is a resident of two years standing is a voter. The voters, however, are divided into two classes by the following process. The total amount of direct municipal taxes paid is divided by the number of voters, and thus an "average" amount is ascertained. All voters who pay the average amount or more are put into the first class and empowered to elect one-half of the municipal councillors. The remainder of the voters who pay less than the average tax are put into the second class and elect one-half of the councilmen. Under the new law, there were, in 1922, 28,523 eligible electors in the first class and 133,135 electors in the

second class. In other words the number of potential voters was multipled threefold.

The election procedure in Tokyo is characterised by the following features. The lists of voters are made up for each ward by the ward master from the tax returns, not less than sixty days before the date of the election. For at least one week the list of electors is open to the public and anyone who desires to know whether or not he is on the list can find out by visiting the ward master's office and making a personal inquiry. Any person who claims to be an elector in either of the classes but finds himself omitted from the list may appeal through the ward master to the mayor. Such appeals are heard in the first instance by the city council. There is a further appeal to the prefectural board of aldermen and finally to an Imperial administrative court. There is no personal registration—nothing to notify the elector of his approaching responsibilities and his rights at the coming election.

There are no legal provisions for nominating candidates for election to the city council. Any eligible man can stand for election, and groups, partisan or independent, may announce the names of candidates. Theoretically, the national parties do not participate as such in municipal elections, but in fact they do so participate. Still it must be said that there is in Tokyo nothing like the American party system under which each political party puts forward its list of candidates and a platform of principles. There is no concentration of political opinion and effort in two or more powerful political groups. Candidates generally represent the small mercantile or propertied interests of their particular ward. As there are no formal or legal nominations of candidates, so there are no names on the ballot at the election. The

voter must remember the name of his candidate and write it on the ballot.

For election purposes the ward (borough) is the unit. There are fifteen wards in the city and the total number of members of each class to be elected from each ward is distributed among the wards. There is only one polling place in each ward, that is, one for each of 15 groups of population ranging in number from 62,000 to 256,000 as compared with one polling place for every group of approximately 2,500 inhabitants in New York City. In order to exercise his franchise, the elector must go to the polling place personally. There are two election days, the first for the second class voters and the second for the first class voters. Election day is not a holiday. The polling place is open usually from 7 o'clock A.M. until 6 o'clock P.M. as fixed by the mayor.

In casting his vote the elector writes on the ballot the name of one man for whom he desires to vote. The two, three or four (as the case may be) men standing highest on the poll of each class in each ward are declared elected, providing that the vote which each man receives is equal to one-seventh the quotient obtained by dividing the total number of electors of each class by the number of councillors of the class to be elected in the district. For example, if there are four men of the first class to be elected in Ward X and there are four hundred eligible first class electors in that ward, then the quotient is 100, and the number of votes necessary to election must equal one-seventh of 100, or 14. The same rule applies to the second class. This single voting system is established with a view to breaking party lines and establishing a kind of proportional representation, but obviously the principle of proportional representation is not carried to its logical conclusion.

Such is the mechanism of elections for the municipal council. How widespread is the public interest in the operation of the mechanism as measured by the number who take the trouble to vote? At the last election held under the old three-class system, sixty-four per cent of the electors entitled to vote exercised the right. At the first election under the new two-class system, in July, 1922, the percentage of electors who exercised their rights rose to seventy-five as follows:

	Electors	*Voters*	*Percentage*
First class....	28,223	24,252	89.5
Second class...	129,744	94,269	72.6
Total	157,967	118,521	75.0

These figures are significant, especially in comparison with similar figures of municipal elections in other countries and previous elections in Japan. The fact that seventy-five per cent of the eligible voters actually take part in elections is evidence of a lively interest on the part of the public. As compared with American experience, this percentage is high even for elections somewhat exciting in character. It would be extremely difficult to get seventy-five per cent of the voters of any great American city out to an election of city councillors under the district system prevailing in Tokyo. In the early days of the American Republic it often happened that not more than one-fifth or one-sixth of those entitled to vote exercised their rights in the elections. Considering the newness of self-government in Tokyo, the election figures of Tokyo for 1922 give evidence of a wide interest among the people in municipal elections.

There is another point worthy of note. As compared with previous years, the figures indicate an increasing

participation of the voters of Tokyo in self-government. In 1905 there were 43,100 voters on the voters' list; in 1922 there were 157,967. Still more important is the fact that, according to the figures of Dr. W. W. McLaren, only 18.8 per cent of the eligible voters went to the polls in 1905, whereas 75 per cent of them exercised their rights in 1922. This would seem to show that popular interest in municipal affairs is growing in Tokyo and that with the extension of the suffrage that interest increases.

Does the class system of suffrage produce any noteworthy differences in the calibre of the councilmen elected by the two classes? The answer is in the negative. In attainments, intelligence, and civic spirit there does not seem to be any striking difference between the councillors elected by the two classes of voters. Disinterested students of Tokyo politics state that the petty political bosses operate more effectively among the first class on account of the small number of its members. Twenty-eight thousand voters elect one-half of the councillors. It is easy for shrewd manipulators to organise and control such a small and compact body of electors. Among the second class of voters, the orator is more influential. The most effective appeal made by him is not based, however, on a constructive program of municipal reform but on the well-known plea: "Turn the rascals out." When certain members of the city council were recently indicted, on the charge of corrupt relations with the Tokyo Gas Company, it was found that they were almost equally divided between the two classes.

In actual operation the electoral system of Tokyo results in the choice of men who are past the middle period of life. According to the figures for 1923 there were 88 councilman, and of that number only 13 were under

forty years of age; 44 were over fifty. The law furnishes more councilmen than any other occupations. Classified by occupation the council is divided as follows:

Business men	19
Merchants	26
Doctors	3
Lawyers	29
Journalists	5
Miscellaneous	6

It is evident from the foregoing facts that Tokyo has possessed a certain degree of self-government for more than thirty years and that there is an increasing interest in civic affairs among the people. One is moved to ask, therefore, why it is that the city is so backward in many things like sewers, paved streets, and transportation. Thousands of citizens have long enjoyed the right to vote. Why have they not used that right to compel a transformation of material aspects of the city? Tokyo has had many able and enlightened mayors. Why have they accomplished so little in the course of a quarter of a century? How is this state of affairs to be explained?

In this connection controversial points are unavoidably raised and we pass from the realm of exact science into the realm of conjecture. Nevertheless, some light may be thrown upon the problem by an examination of the body politic of Tokyo. An analysis of the government, the social composition and the intellectual life of Tokyo reveals the following elements:

First of all, it must be remembered that the mayor of Tokyo, as pointed out above, has very slight powers. He is controlled on one side by the city council and on the other by prefectural and Imperial officers. If he has grand plans for modernising the capital he must seek

popular support on the one hand and the approval of Imperial officers on the other.

The people of Tokyo have just emerged from a feudal order. Under that system the masses were accustomed for centuries to accept things as they were without questioning, comparison, and criticism. They were used to obedience, not to self-assertion and self-government.

The mechanical industries and scientific ideas of the Western world have suddenly been thrust upon the citizens of Tokyo by intruders from without and by Japanese intellectual leaders who have visited the West and have become acquainted with these new devices and ideas in another setting. It is not surprising that the body of the people who have not visited the West are somewhat bewildered by the revolutionary transition which is taking place before their very eyes.

There are in Tokyo only a few great and enterprising merchants or capitalists who take a deep and active interest in the improvement of the city, or who realise the significance of modern municipal improvements in relation to efficient production and business enterprise.

The most striking element in the social composition of the city is the thousands of petty shopkeepers and handicraftsmen who keep small establishments, work long hours, and are consumed in the narrow routine of a struggle for existence. Indeed Tokyo, unlike Osaka, "the Manchester of Japan," is mainly a collection of villages with a metropolitan centre. The great mass of the Tokyo population is composed of villagers—small merchants and shopkeepers—brought together in a large social aggregation by the natural growth of population which has filled out the original interstices between the old villages.

While there is a considerable body of industrial workers (still more or less entangled in handicrafts), it is not

compactly organised and is not a dynamic force as in Europe—and in America, to a less degree. In the West, organised labor has been for many years a factor in forcing the improvement of the conditions of municipal life. Labor parties have developed complete municipal programmes and even where they have been in the minority they have profoundly influenced municipal policy. In Tokyo, however, the working classes, broadly speaking, cannot vote, are not organised, and have no municipal interest or programme.

Such elements of self-government as the men of Japan in general and Tokyo in particular enjoy have never been secured as the result of any great national awakening or agitation comparable to that in England between 1642 and 1688 or in France between 1789 and 1815. Democracy in Japan has not sprung up spontaneously from below but has been nurtured by far-seeing leaders at the top.

There is in Tokyo a bureaucracy composed of thousands of city, prefectural, and Imperial officers who, like officers in other countries, are eager to extend their respective spheres of power. They are often ardent advocates of enlightened policies, but they are not as a rule zealous to promote the rapid growth of a public sentiment which might endanger their prerogatives.

Young men, if they aspire to independent political careers, are held down on account of a lack of popular support below as against the official element above. Under the existing electoral system, there is no *point d'appui* for a young leader who would dare to do battle for municipal improvement against the immobility of the established official forces.

The women of Tokyo, unlike the women of America who were among the leaders in municipal affairs even before they won the vote, have no organisations interested

in municipal affairs as distinct from private charities. They have only recently acquired the right to attend political meetings, and they are not awake to the direct relation of municipal administration to the health, comfort, and safety of the domestic establishment which they regard as their particular domain.

The system of suffrage, nominations, and elections does not encourage the concentration of public interest on any main issues such as roads, sewers, sanitation, transportation, congestion, or public health.

There is no career in municipal government as compared with the Imperial service. Long and devoted services in the capital or in provincial cities bring no rewards, titles, or public recognition, while some relatively insignificant service in the Imperial sphere may bring honours of the highest order.

There is a great neglect of education in municipal administration beginning with the primary schools and ending with the universities. In the Imperial Universities of Tokyo and Kyoto there are no special courses, fellowships, and prizes in municipal government. Instruction in civic affairs in the schools is in the most rudimentary form and instruction in municipal government is almost entirely neglected, except for certain special work inaugurated under the mayor, Viscount Goto.

And, finally, the great cost of modern urban improvements not only gives pause to the leaders but tends also to array in opposition those shortsighted, taxpaying groups who expect to pay the cost.

Suggestions

There are many things in the above enumeration which will be changed in the course of time by the progress of

events. A wider knowledge of the genuine benefits which modern science can confer in municipal government will come about naturally and inevitably with the growth of magazines, books, and travel, the rising standard of living, and increasing discussion of Western civilisation. The pressure of industrial competition will force the introduction of more and more machine industries with their inevitable effect upon the social composition of the population. The introduction of Western buildings and mechanical conveniences is proceeding at a rapid rate which will doubtless be constantly accelerated. The pressure of competition will compel the wider use of the truck and the automobile as cheaper means of transportation and thus the pressure for better roads will increase. Better roads will multiply motor vehicles and the two will exert a reciprocally increasing influence. All this will come about without much concerted effort, and gradually the psychology of the people will be adjusted to the new facts of economic life. In other words, similar economic conditions tend to produce similar social and intellectual conditions.

Nevertheless the interest of the citizens in municipal improvement could undoubtedly be accelerated and made more intelligent by various measures which have been tested in different parts of the world. One of these measures is the promotion of civic education. This is not spectacular and does not produce striking results at once, but it is fundamental. Hence it is here recommended that colleges and the universities establish special courses in municipal administration, laying emphasis not upon the law but especially upon the economic and social features of municipal life. At the same time thorough courses in civic and municipal affairs should be opened in the normal schools, with a view to training teachers

for work in the middle and lower schools. The preparation of advanced and elementary text-books in modern city government should be begun at once. Efforts should be made to bring out well-written and handsomely illustrated books showing every phase of city government and its relation to the well-being of the citizens.

Prizes could be established in colleges, universities, and schools for the best essays on municipal improvements, and worthy essays printed for wide distribution in the schools.

At least one day in the year could be set apart in the schools for the discussion of municipal affairs. On this occasion illustrated lectures could be given by experts in the various fields of municipal service.

In the next place the citizens of Toyko might organise a permanent Association for Municipal Improvement. It should be open to all citizens willing to pay a small fee. Its functions should be (1) to hold weekly or monthly discussions of city problems, (2) to prepare a programme of municipal betterment for each municipal election, (3) to invite candidates for the council to declare their views on the items in that programme, (4) to publish to the voters a statement of the position taken by each candidate, and (5) finally to examine the actual conduct of the city administration with a view to reporting to its members and to the public on the achievements and failures of the city government. Such an organisation, even though its initial membership might be small, would help to arouse and concentrate public opinion in municipal affairs. Generally speaking, the fundamental items in the programme of this society for the present should be the consolidation of the metropolitan area, the re-organisation of the city administration, a drastic reform in taxation, the advancement of public health and social work, and the

speedy execution of the public works projects already prepared.

A third group of suggestions relate to political organisation and practices. One matter under this head which deserves consideration is the reduction of the term of the city councillors from four years to two for the purpose of securing more frequent elections and a more continuous interest in municipal affairs. In connection with such a change it might be well to reduce the number of city councillors from 88 to a far smaller figure—perhaps 44 or even 30, for larger districts usually chose abler men than smaller districts.

At the same time there should be established a genuine system of proportional representation, which would make it possible for small but active groups interested in municipal improvements to secure representation according to their numerical importance.

The age limit for voters should be reduced from twenty-five to twenty-one and any elector should be eligible for the city council.

A system of personal registration of voters should be introduced. For registration and voting the wards should be subdivided into several sections or districts and notices of both registration and election should be published in the newspapers and posted on the walls of the city.

A system of nomination by petition should be devised, which will allow any candidate who secures a minimum number of signatures to his nomination paper to have his name printed on the ballot.

A Japanese student of municipal politics has also proposed that the mayor should be elected by popular vote instead of by the council as at present, and the point no doubt deserves respectful examination. In support of this proposition it may be argued that popular election

would concentrate public interest in municipal affairs, introduce a novel feature into Japanese municipal life, produce strenuous political discussions, develop the habit of making a popular appeal for popular support for municipal improvement, and invite energetic young leaders into the municipal sphere. It cannot be said, however, that opinion on this matter is definitely settled even in the West. Popular election is an American rather than a European practice, and in America there is a marked drift toward election by the council in smaller cities, where the "city manager" plan has been adopted. Moreover it cannot be said that popular election has produced altogether satisfactory results in the larger cities, or rather should it be said that popular election has not automatically solved the problem of how to secure an able and energetic municipal head.

Undoubtedly many of the great municipal achievements in America are to be associated with notable mayors chosen by popular vote on definite programmes of reform. A mayor elected by popular vote has a powerful position as against petty politics in the city council on the one hand and the red tape of the central government on the other hand. At all events, the proposition should be seriously discussed by those interested in securing a more active and informed public opinion in Tokyo.

One of the inevitable outcomes of the modern transformation in municipal life is a demand for the establishment of universal suffrage. In fact, it is difficult to conceive of any argument, practical or theoretical, in favour of the existing municipal suffrage in Tokyo. If the system is intended to confine influence in the government to a substantial propertied class, then the object is not attained, because at present the male owner of a jinrikisha or bicycle who pays a small tax on it can vote, as well

as the owner of land, houses, stocks, and bonds. If it was intended to exclude the less intelligent portion of the population, then it has failed in this respect, for an ignorant payer of a bicycle tax may vote while a well educated school teacher who owns no bicycle and whose income is below the line of exemption cannot vote.

To speak frankly the present suffrage law is a compound of caution, compromise, and uncertainty. It shows no generous confidence in democracy and it has none of the safeguards associated with a rational protection of property. Moreover, it does not appear that the members of the higher tax-paying group have any better concept of civic obligation than those of the lower tax-paying group. The councilmen involved in the recent sand and gas scandals were not all representatives of the small taxpayers.

It is sometimes supposed that the suffrage is a matter involving general political theories and sentiments and not a subject to be treated scientifically. It is generally assumed that one's opinion in this field is determined by his political training or bias. To some extent this is true, but there are certain facts which should be considered in connection with a suffrage policy. First is the fact that, in all modern industrial countries which have universal education, a free press, and the open discussion of public questions the movement toward political democracy is a reality no less tangible and actual than a natural phenomenon. England, Germany, and the United States have not only adopted manhood suffrage: they have made the suffrage universal by including women. In the second place, it is generally accepted now by most statesmen that the question of suffrage is one of "natural maturity"; in other words, that it will come when the people are "ready for it." In the third place, Western

experience has shown that if a ruling class waits too long to recognise the maturity of the disfranchised, it courts the danger of a revolution. In the fourth place, during the past hundred years England has steadily extended the suffrage without waiting for a social upheaval. In the fifth place, no very accurate or positive criteria can be agreed upon to measure the political "maturity" of a people. Viewing the subject of the suffrage pragmatically, therefore, we may say that the only question is whether to exercise a cautious generosity or to incur the risk of accumulating political discontent. That is a matter of judgment for the statesman.

There is of course nothing automatic about the results of universal suffrage. It is in itself not good or bad, and it does not in itself produce wise or efficient government. It simply seems to be one of the inevitable concomitants of modern industry, universal liability to military duty, public schools, and the printing press.

Where universal suffrage has been adopted, indeed where even a small measure of self-government has been granted, ideal ends can no longer be attained by the will of any one person or authority; there must be a meeting of many minds—the formation of a positive public opinion on definite matters through public discussion. Thus we are inevitably led into a consideration of the processes by which opinion is created and controlled.

In taking up the subject of control in connection with Tokyo we come into contact, not with the government of the city which has no power in the matter, but with the police commissioner, an Imperial officer, under the immediate supervision of the Home Office. The police commissioner of Tokyo is a national political officer. London has had only six or seven police commissioners in nearly a hundred years; Tokyo has had more than

twenty during the last forty years. The Tokyo commissioner is regarded as adjunct of the political group in power in the cabinet and his appointment and dismissal are closely related to changes in national politics as the table on pages 156 and 157 shows:

The police commissioner of Tokyo is not only a political officer in the sense that his fortunes depend upon the vicissitude of national politics. He is a political officer in the sense that, in addition to his functions connected with criminal matters, building supervision, fire prevention, fire extinguishment, etc., he has large and sweeping powers over the expression of opinion and the discussion of social and economic theories. In the office of the commissioner there are two important Sections called "The Higher Police" and "The Special Higher Police." These two sections have the following functions:

1. Relative to meetings, social movements, demonstrations, associations, and religious and political affairs.
2. Relative to social agitation, such as socialistic and labour movements.
3. Relative to industrial disputes and industrial affairs in general.
4. Relative to the censorship of the press, periodicals, and books.

In actual practice these powers are frequently, extensively, and drastically exercised.

Now if the achievements of a modern city government depend upon enlightened public opinion and if that opinion is to be secured by the discussion of political and economic matters, it follows that the powers and methods of the police force are matters of fundamental moment. The questions involved therein are not mere theories of government, but spring directly out of the nature of the

THE LENGTH OF SERVICE OF THE HEAD OF THE METROPOLITAN POLICE OFFICE.

Prime Minister	*Date of Appointment*	*Length of Service*	*No.*	*Head of the Metropolitan Police Office*	*Date of Appointment and Dismissal*	*Length of Service*
		Y. M. D.				Y. M. D.
Matsukata	May 6, 1891	1, 3, 3	8	Sonoda	Apr. 2, 1891–Sept. 28, 1896	5, 4, 26
Ito	Aug. 8, 1892	4, 1, 13				
Matsukata	Sept. 18, 1896	1, 4, 10	9	Yamada	Sept. 28, 1896–Jan. 12, 1898	1, 4, 10
Ito	Jan. 12, 1898	5, 18	10	Sonoda	Jan. 12, 1898–July 16, 1898	6, 4
Okuma	June 30, 1898	4, 9	11	Nishiyama	July 16, 1898–Nov. 9, 1898	3, 24
Yamagata	Nov. 8, 1898	1, 11, 11	12	Oura	Nov. 9, 1898–Oct. 19, 1900	1, 11, 11
Ito	Oct. 19, 1900	7, 13	13	Anraku	Oct. 19, 1900–June 2, 1901	7, 13
Katsura	June 2, 1901	4, 6, 27	14	Oura	June 2, 1901–Sept. 22, 1903	2, 3, 2
"			15	Adachi	Sept. 22, 1903–Sept. 10, 1905	1, 11, 18
"			16	Seki	Sept. 10, 1905–Jan. 17, 1906	4, 7
Saionji	Jan. 7, 1906	2, 6, 11	17	Anraku	Jan. 17, 1906–July 20, 1908	2, 6, 4
Katsura	July 18, 1908	3, 1, 12	18	Kamei	July 20, 1908–Sept. 4, 1911	3, 1, 14

Saionji	Aug. 30, 1911	1, 3, 21	19	Anraku	Sept. 4, 1911–	
					Dec. 21, 1912	1, 3, 17
Katsura	Dec. 21, 1912	2, 1	20	Kawakami	Dec. 21, 1912–	
					Feb. 21, 1913	2, 1
Yamamoto	Feb. 20, 1913	1, 0, 23	21	Anraku	Feb. 21, 1913–	
					Mar. 16, 1914	1, 0, 23
Okuma	Apr. 4, 1914	2, 6, 24	22	Izawa	Mar. 16, 1914–	
					Aug. 13, 1915	1, 4, 27
"			23	Nishikubo	Aug. 12, 1915–	
					Oct. 9, 1916	1, 1, 27
Terauchi	Oct. 9, 1916	1, 11, 20	24	Okada	Oct. 9, 1916–	
					Sept. 30, 1918	1, 11, 21
Hara	Sept. 29, 1918	3, 1, 5	25	Oka	Sept. 30, 1918–	
					June 12, 1922	3, 7, 12
Takahashi	Nov. 4, 1921	6, 7				
"			26	Hotta	June 12, 1922–	
					Oct. 24, 1922	4, 12
Kato	June 12, 1922		27	Akaike	Oct. 24, 1922–	

society in which the police force operates and the conceptions formed by the ruling class concerning its functions, privileges, and future. If a ruling class regards itself as an established body whose permanence can be secured through police control over the populace, then it will naturally desire to keep the police force well in hand. It will seek to suppress opinions as well as acts conceived to be inimical to its supremacy. How long it can do this depends, however, upon circumstances. Owing to the obvious mutability of social relations, it is evident that it is always a question as to how rigid and intense the police control should really be in the interests of the safety of the ruling class itself.

If a ruling class is bent upon maintaining intact its prëeminence, privileges, and rights, at all costs it readily comes to view the army and the police force as the chief instruments of control. If, however, it is disposed to reckon with the mutability of human affairs, it may entertain some doubts as to the enduring efficacy of the instruments on which it relies. In fact, in the present state of intellectual foment, most Western ruling classes have come to entertain some scepticism as to the permanence of their present prëeminence, privileges, and rights. Many of them seek to save some by the surrender of part.

In fact there has grown up, in the so-called liberal sections of England and America, a school of social thinkers who believe that policemen instead of being friends of ruling classes are likely to become their most dangerous foe by awakening unnecessary resentment among the masses. These thinkers are of the opinion that men charged with the arrest of criminals are usually poorly prepared by nature and education to deal with persons accused of harboring social and economic opinions which appear strange and unacceptable. They believe

that, when a police officer attempts to suppress ideas, he generally stirs up more ill-will against the existing order than he allays. Policemen when dealing with ideas are a danger to social stability and orderly progress, while freedom of speech and press offers a safety valve for the escape of noxious and dangerous vapors!

Spokesmen of the liberal school also ask with some effect: "What is the use of having popular education, newspapers, libraries, and scientific societies, if citizens are not to develop new ideas, new plans, and new movements?" Indeed, they take the ground that there is an inherent contradiction between even a small degree of self-government and the censorship of the public opinion which is inevitably connected with such government. As it was sometimes said in the United States by the opponents of woman suffrage, "The fatal error was made when the women were taught to read and write." The same reasoning might be applied equally well to attempts to restrain the expression of opinion by the methods of violence.

For a long time this "liberal" view of freedom of opinion obtained in England and the United States. It was the basis of Anglo-Saxon law. There was no censorship except during war time. People were free to hold meetings, express their opinions, criticise the government, attack the existing social order, and publish their views without previous notice to the police, subject to responsibility for violation of the law of slander and libel. In cases of alleged violation, a person accused was accorded an ordinary jury trial and his guilt or innocence was a matter to be determined by a jury of twelve citizens. Speakers and printers were free to publish their opinions without liability so long as they did not actually and directly counsel armed insurrection against the govern-

ment or commit slander or libel against any private individual.

During the World War, however, both England and the United States enacted drastic "sedition" legislation designed to control the expression of radical opinions and the police were let loose upon the populace to break up meetings, arrest speakers and printers, and imprison at will. In other words, continental practices were adopted throughout the English-speaking world and were followed for about four years. Then the tide of reaction began to come in, and there are signs of a return to the older view that the censorship and suppression of opinion are dangerous and unwise and that the police should be confined in their activities to the suppression of ordinary crime, the control of traffic, and similar matters which call for no delicacy of discrimination as to the soundness of social and economic opinion.

Of course it may be said that the social conditions in Japan are different from those in England and the United States and that other police procedure is necessary in Tokyo. That may be true. I therefore do not make any recommendations on this point. I merely suggest that the whole subject should be examined in the spirit of natural science rather than in the spirit of theory and sentiment. Such an examination would naturally lead to an inquiry into the experience of other industrial nations as well as the ancient history of Japan.

In making such a scientific examination of the matter the following questions would be pertinent:

Are police agents usually men of sufficient judgment to be entrusted with the delicate task of estimating the degree and quality of danger contained in any spoken or printed words?

Are displays of arbitrary police power, except in cases

of imminent danger to public order, likely to arouse affection or hatred among the populace?

What has been the history of government censorship and suppression of opinion in other countries?

Have the police of other countries been successful in suppressing opinion inimical to the existing orders? If not, why not?

Should the police ever be used to influence elections?

Is censorship in advance safer and more effective than prosecution for violation of the law after the fact?

CHAPTER IX

A SUMMARY WORK PROGRAMME FOR THE GOVERNMENT AND CITIZENS OF TOKYO

In a narrow sense an administrative survey may be regarded as complete when an examination has been made into the organisation and methods employed by a city government in discharging the functions already vested in it. It is conceivable that the administrative system of a city might be technically correct, even though it were charged with only a small number of the functions usually undertaken by the government of a modern community. For example, a city administration which did not supply water, light, or sewerage to its citizens might perform with great skill any duties actually devolved upon it, such as police control, fire fighting, and the removal of garbage. Indeed, some specialists in municipal administration claim that it is not their business to decide what functions a city government ought to assume, but merely to devise scientific methods of performing the functions which are already assigned to it.

In fact, however, it is not easy always to draw a line between existing functions and functions which ought to be undertaken, because it is sometimes necessary to assume new functions in order to perform existing duties efficiently. Indeed, the word *function* itself is not an exclusive term. Any particular function, if followed to the limits of its ramifications, is capable of indefinite extensions. Transportation, for instance, involves hous-

ing, health, productive efficiency, taxation, etc. Public health involves housing, transportation, taxation, etc. Thus the line between a mere study of what *is* attempted by a city government and what *ought* to be attempted breaks down utterly when tested by fact. It is impossible for the coldest "efficiency expert" in administration to stop with a study of "what is." He must inevitably ask: "what ought to be." His own science compels him to do this—if he is scientific.

But what are the criteria for determining what a city government ought to do? Is it necessary for it to have paved streets and sewers and playgrounds? Not all cities do. Why should any particular city have these things? What are the ends of a city government? Who or what determines them? What are the standards of excellence?

Some of those standards are undoubtedly moral and æsthetic. Others are more practical and spring from the desire to safeguard life and limb. Others are born of fear—the fear of a governing class that neglect of certain functions may produce dangerous discontent within the city.

Others are imposed by the necessity of circumstances; for, as pointed out in Chapter I, modern civilisation, in spite of ourselves, is industrial. The industries are in the cities. The government of the city bears a vital relation to the efficiency of the community viewed as a productive organism. Certain functions are imposed upon it by that very relation. For example, the productive efficiency of industrial workers has an inescapable connection with housing, transportation, recreation, markets, &c. Again the cost of production to the merchant and manufacturer is raised or lowered by the cost of transportation within the city, the conditions of the streets,

traffic regulation, and other factors. Hence a study of the administrative and governmental system of Tokyo leads inevitably to the formulation of some kind of a work programme in the larger sense. We are led to ask: "What are the great tasks before the people and the government of the city? Upon what matters should the attention of the community be fixed in the immediate future?"

In an attempt to answer these questions the following general work programme is presented here. It is of course a mere outline, the details of which could only be filled in by competent specialists in many lines. It is not intended for the mayor and his assistants, who already have extensive plans of their own, but as an independent summary for the citizens of Tokyo, giving them a bird's-eye view of the problems and difficulties before the municipal administration.

Taking this programme up in logical order we should first deal with the perfection of the mechanism of city government and administration. Under this head it is merely necessary to make a brief résumé of the general recommendations contained in the above chapters as follows:

1. A consolidation of the metropolitan areas under one municipal government directly in contact with the Imperial Government and a reorganisation of the city administration along functional lines. (Chapters II and III.)

2. A reform of taxation in such a way as to place the main burden of taxation on real estate, especially land, with the application of special assessments to sewers and subways as well as pavements. A new assessment of real property in accordance with scientific methods of valuation and recording. Improvement of the details of the budget system. (Chapter IV.)

3. Improvement of purchasing methods and personnel administration. (Chapter V and VI.)

4. Promotion of public interest in municipal affairs. (Chapter VIII.)

Coming now to the second part of the summary, we have to deal with *services* or *functions,* performed by the mechanism of the municipal administration.

I. *Completion of the Sewerage System.* First of all is the necessity for the rapid extension of the sewer system. This is imperative for three reasons. The new extension of the water works system is nearing completion and by the summer of 1924 the new reservoirs at Murayama will be ready for duty and will supply all the people within the limits of the present city with approximately 40 gallons per capita per day. Moreover, plans are now under way for the enlargement of that supply in case the boundaries of the city are extended and new mains made necessary. The present method of disposing of the night soil is not only a nuisance, but a danger to health. It is becoming economically burdensome on account of the long hauls required to reach the open country districts where it is used for fertiliser. In considering the cost of the proposed sewer extensions, the current costs of disposing of night soil should be capitalised. Sewerage is absolutely essential to the execution of a modern municipal health programme.

The municipal engineers have made complete plans for sewerage for present and Greater Tokyo, and a commission of engineers has been appointed to visit the West with a view to discovering the latest ideas in sewer construction and sewage disposal. In one large district, namely Asakusa and Shitaya, the system is complete and a disposal station, modelled after that in Manchester, England, has been put into operation at Mikawashima.

For another section a sewer system has been authorised and financial resources provided, and the work is well under way. For the two remaining sections of the city, for which plans are already made, the financial resources are not yet provided; but, if they were provided, it would require more than ten years to complete it at the present rate of construction.

The methods of construction now employed are open to criticism from the standpoint of modern engineering practice. Excavations are made, piles are driven, and fills made by antiquated hand methods which were discarded in the West half a century ago. It is true that many streets of the city are so narrow that these are the only methods which may be applied. On the other hand there are miles of streets wide enough to admit of modern mechanical excavation, pile driving, and filling. By the introduction of these modern methods the following fundamental things could be accomplished:

1. The period of construction could be shortened by several years.

2. The cost of construction of work under way and work planned could doubtless be reduced from the proposed figure of Y106,000,000 to approximately Y95,000,000. If the Imperial government would pay its share of the cost on the basis of the principles laid down in Chapter IV and if the principle of special assessment were applied, the financial problem involved could be quickly solved.

II. *Transportation.* It is not necessary to give here any facts to prove that the transportation system of Tokyo is utterly inadequate. The residents of the city all know it too well. The crowded street cars and the throngs waiting on the streets for cars are all matters of such common knowledge as to call for no mathematical

illustrations in this report. While some reductions might be made in the congestion by new re-routings, they would make little impression on the mass of congestion. As pointed out above, subways are the only hope of Tokyo.

The policy of chartering four subway companies as private concerns wholly independent of the city government should be strongly condemned for reasons given above in Chapter VII. If possible the charters should be cancelled and the transportation problem treated as a part of the city planning and housing programme of the city government. The principle of the special assessment should be strictly applied in the construction of all subways and the benefits should be reaped by the city as a whole.

If the city administration were strong enough financially, it might itself undertake the construction of the subways. Since it is not, then the best solution of the problem is that of a partnership between the city and private capital along lines already applied in New York City, as indicated above (Chapter VII).

III. *Street Cleaning.* In administrative methods and mechanical devices, the cleaning and watering of streets and the collection of solid wastes in Tokyo are in a primitive stage with the beginnings of modern enterprise just appearing. In the first place a geographical decentralisation of the work vests it in the hands of ward or borough officials and makes for inefficiency in general as well as great unevenness in the quality of the work done in various wards. No system of central inspection can overcome the inherent weakness of these methods.

The solution of the problem lies in the following procedure:

1. The creation of one consolidated, uniformed street cleaning force along the lines devised years ago by Col.

Waring in New York City. The distribution of the activities of this force among wards according to needs.

2. The adoption of rules to the effect that each householder must separate solid wastes into three groups: (a) ashes, (b) wood, paper, and other combustible matter, and (c) garbage. Fines to be imposed on householders who fail to comply with the rules after two months of education.

3. The provision of modern receptacles for ashes and garbage and modern vehicles for collection and haulage.

4. The wider use of mechanical sweepers for paved streets and the continuous use of sweepers to protect pavements as well as serve the citizens who walk or ride over them.

5. The wider use of motorised sprinklers for watering the streets. Less water at a time and more frequent sprinkling would immensely increase the comfort of the public.

6. Experiments with oil and calcium chloride as a dust layer.

7. The installation of rubbish cans on the corners of crowded thoroughfares to receive paper and other wastes which are ordinarily thrown into the streets by careless pedestrians.

8. The inauguration of a campaign of education in the methods of waste disposal, including a "clean-up week" at least once a year. During the "clean-up week" all citizens should unite in disposing of useless rubbish and the city should furnish carts to take it away. This would serve a double purpose. It would expedite the disposal of unsightly and inflammable materials, thus aiding in fire prevention as well as improving the appearance of the city. At the same time it would help to educate the citizens in methods of waste disposal.

9. The continuation of the present studies of waste disposal and experiments until an efficient system adapted to the requirements of Tokyo can be evolved.

IV. *Pavement Policies.* There is no subject on which the average person has more assurance and less com-

petence than that of street pavement. Anyone can see mud holes in an unpaved street and suggest a sheet of asphalt or concrete as an immediate cure. Moreover, the pressure for the quick application of the cure is likely to increase in Tokyo. Taking the Imperial, prefectural, and municipal roads one ken or more in width, there were on December 31, 1921, 613.2 miles with a total area of 2,730,476 tsubo. Of this mileage 4.3 miles are now paved, 2.8 miles mainly with wooden blocks and 1.5 with asphalt or concrete.

On rainy days the unpaved streets swim in thin mud which is sometimes ankle deep. Pedestrians, especially those familiar with the paved streets of the best Western cities, grumble and condemn the city administration. Owners of motor cars and trucks, steadily increasing in number, add their grievances to those of pedestrians. In bad weather the whole life of the city, business and social, is slowed down by mere mud. In dry weather the streets are deserts of dust or lines of mud puddles made by careless sprinkling. So the cry goes up daily for the rapid construction of modern pavements. The cry is natural and justifiable and the city engineers have made plans calling for the expenditure of millions of yen on road construction during the next ten years.

It will be well, however, if persons interested in the development or road improvements in Tokyo will take into account the following facts:

1. The city government is now hard pressed with the work of sewer construction. Only a small section of Tokyo is now supplied with sewerage. To lay down expensive pavements in the unsewered sections only to have them torn up within two or three years for sewer mains would be costly folly. In this connection it should be noted that the streets of the city are encumbered with electric, telephone, and telegraph wires and poles which

are unsightly and dangerous and impede traffic. Eventually these wires must go under ground. Obviously the time to do this is when the streets are open for sewer work and previous to the construction of pavements and sidewalks.

2. The topography, soil and subsoil of Tokyo present extraordinary difficulties for road builders—difficulties which can be appreciated only by one who has spent at least a winter in the city and made observations under various weather conditions. A part of the city is made up of filled land even now below the water level. The upland regions are rough and rolling in many places. In large sections the soil is composed of black muck, mixed with pebbles, pieces of broken tiles and bricks, and the accumulated debris of centuries. A thick coat of smooth pebbles an inch or more thick will sink down in the mud under the pressure of a few months' traffic. Water is reached in many sections at a depth varying from three to five feet—in other sections at even a less depth. Doubtless this condition will be changed radically by a suitable drainage system as in New Orleans.

3. The climate of Tokyo also presents troubles to the road maker. The atmosphere is humid. There is a great deal of rain and wet snow in the course of the year, and there are long hot and dry spells. The ground is not often frozen to any great depth, but still it is occasionally frozen deep enough to make difficulties for the construction engineer.

4. Tokyo has miles of streets under one ken (six feet) in width. How many miles no one knows for the figures are not available. There are many miles of streets not wide enough for a sidewalk even on one side of the roadway.

5. In addition to the problems presented by the topography, soil, climate, and layout of the city, there are economic problems of a serious character. Modern pavements are expensive and often the cost is prohibitive. Pavements enhance the value of abutting property and add to the rental value of that property. In many cities, both in England and America, city planners and improvers

have pressed ahead with expensive road construction only to find that the lower middle classes and working people could not afford to pay the rents made necessary along such streets by reason of the original cost of pavements and the cost of maintenance. Hence it is important that city authorities should proceed with expensive street improvements only after a careful study of local residential and business conditions.

In addition to the foregoing facts about Tokyo, it is well to recall the facts relative to the history of road-making in the West.

1. The first fact to remember is that no pavement has yet been invented in the West which is not open to serious objections on one or more grounds. In spite of the great advance in specifications and construction methods during the past few years, expensive pavements often prove to be failures and engineers still debate many controverted points. These are facts discovered by motoring and walking over thousands of miles of pavements in America and Europe and by reading a large number of the latest scientific treatises and articles on the respective merits and demerits of various kinds of pavements. Not long ago M. Tur, the eminent Paris engineer in charge of wood block pavement construction, confessed that "in practice it is impossible to forsee the circumstances under which any road will absorb water and expand." That is not the language of exact science.

2. Nevertheless long experience and extensive scientific experimentation in the field and in the laboratory have led to the formation of a body of sound knowledge relative to specifications, materials, and methods of construction. Many principles are firmly established and to neglect them is to court disaster.

3. The original construction of pavements is just the beginning of the expense, because, the cost of maintenance, even for the best pavements, is high under the most favorable circumstances. The same practical skill is required for maintenance that is required for construction.

On the basis of the foregoing facts, the following suggestions are respectfully laid before the authorities and citizens of Tokyo:

1. There should be an Imperial Road Testing Laboratory in Japan equipped with the latest devices for testing road materials, subsoils, and construction methods. Such a laboratory, built upon the achievements already gained in the Western world, would in the long run save the cities and the Empire an immense sum of money. It would assist in the development of scientific specifications adapted to Japanese conditions and bring the light of science to bear upon the construction of every square yard of pavement built. Such a laboratory is now being projected.

2. American cities adopt various devices in road construction. In some cases pavements are constructed by the city; in others by contractors. If the element of competition is introduced the improvement of construction methods is a result. It is therefore suggested here that while the city of Tokyo may continue its present methods of construction by direct employment, it would do well to call in the assistance of experienced Western contractors and put them in competition with the city's own engineers and construction forces. Indeed, this point is strongly urged upon the attention of the city authorities. Perhaps nothing is now more important to Tokyo than the use of experienced foreign road builders. The great city of Paris employed English contractors in the early days of modern pavement construction; Tokyo need not be more proud than the capital of France. If such contractors are employed, however, the utmost care must be taken in preparing specifications, supervising construction, and providing adequate guarantees against bad work.

Tokyo has had a great deal of trouble with the wooden block pavements on the Ginza and at other points, and it was found necessary to take up the curb to the cement road in front of Hibiya Park within a few weeks after it was put down. Only a scientific inquiry could determine the source of the difficulties, but it is probable that the

wooden blocks were not properly impregnated with oil, that there were defects in construction, and that the watering of the streets was not done with reference to the requirements of wooden pavements. Accordingly there is adequate reason for urging the above suggestions upon the attention of the city authorities and citizens interested in highway construction.

3. In some places in Tokyo the wooden block pavement and the intersecting streets are higher than the sidewalk. In some cases the sidewalk slopes toward the adjoining building. These conditions are due in part to the irregularities of construction in ancient times and to the slow adoption of scientific methods of surveying in modern times. The road department of the city is now endeavoring to correct them.

4. The chief material used for ordinary road surfacing and road repairing in Tokyo is a mixture of smooth round pebbles, sand, detritus, and dirt. This material is simply spread upon the road either in the form of a thick coat or patches for ruts and depressions.

All Western experience for two hundred years strongly condemns this material and this practice. Mr. Charles J. Bennett, the highway commissioner of Connecticut, says emphatically: "The nature and quality of rock used in the construction of waterbound broken stone roads is of prime importance. The rock used should excel in three properties: namely, hardness to resist the wear caused by the grinding action of vehicles, of steel shod animals, and of the stones against one another; toughness, to withstand the shocks or blows from traffic; and *cementing value* to bind the parts and particles together and thus cause the crust to be as near monolithic as possible. Trap, granite, and limestone are most commonly used." The American Society for Municipal Improvements has very precisely specified that "all broken stone used for roads shall be clean, rough surfaced, and sharp angled, of compact texture and uniform grain." The Canadian Society of Civil Engineers has prescribed in words that admit of no doubt that "crushed stone for roads shall be bedded rock or boulders which have been

broken by mechanical means into fragments of varying shapes and sizes. It shall not contain more than 10 per cent by weight of soft or friable material. Material the particles of which are coated with dirt *or have the edges worn off will not be accepted."*

It is a well established fact that the success of broken stone roads depends upon (a) foundation courses adapted to the nature of the soil; (b) crushed rock of correct quality, size, and shape; (c) the consolidation or compacting of the materials into a substantial crust by heavy rolling; (d) constant care in maintenance to keep the crust smooth and intact.

Since the above statements rest upon Western engineering experience it follows that the present practice in Tokyo of using pebbles, sand, and dirt for the roads cannot be too strongly condemned. It fails to produce a good road and it is wasteful in time and money. It should be stopped at once and Western practices should be adopted.

6. Pending the completion of sewer construction and the construction of modern pavements more attention should be given to the maintenance of the existing roads. Scarifying, grading, rolling, and the use of crushed stone and oil would make the present roads far better than they are. As some of the roads have about the consistency of the roads in the "black country" of Illinois, it is suggested that the Illinois method of "dragging" such roads when they are wet should be tried.

7. More attention should be given to the construction of sidewalks and the use of them by pedestrians. Sidewalks make possible a better handling of traffic; they help business they simplify street cleaning; they promote social intercourse. They make possible the use of baby carriages and relieve mothers' backs.

V. *Streets and Traffic Regulation.* In connection with the re-assessment of land for valuation there should be made a complete revision of the present system of naming streets and numbering residences and other buildings. It

is enough merely to point out that Tokyo in this respect is behind every city in the Western world and also behind Kyoto, the ancient capital, which was well planned eleven hundred years ago. The streets in Tokyo are not named at all; blocks (Cho) are named and a direction or address bears the name of the Cho. Buildings are not numbered according to any system, but in a haphazard fashion, so that there may be two or more houses bearing the identical number. Every day thousands of hours are wasted by the drivers of trucks, delivery carts, and wagons while they consult policemen, old residents, and shopkeepers as to the location of a particular residence, office, or store.

Anyone who has observed the traffic regulations of a Western city like New York will be struck by the utter anarchy reigning in the streets of Tokyo. Pedestrians walk all over the streets. While waiting for the street cars they often block many street corners from the car tracks to the curbs. Motor drivers plunge right into the midst of people getting on and off the street cars with something like reckless indifference. Builders engaged in erecting structures in the city blockade the sidewalks and streets with lumber, stone, cement, and other building materials as well as rubbish, apparently at their pleasure, to the annoyance and danger of pedestrians and drivers of vehicles. In short, except at a few densely crowded centres, Tokyo has the traffic control adapted to a country village, and to carts drawn by men and oxen.

With the increase in motor cars, these conditions will become extremely dangerous to life and limb. The sooner modern methods of traffic regulation are adopted and the sooner motor drivers and pedestrians are educated in the principles of traffic control the better it will be for the comfort and safety of the people as well as

rapidity of locomotion. Scientific traffic regulation is a vital part of the business efficiency of a city because, besides providing for greater safety, it expedites the transportation of freight and passengers.

For these reasons there should be made a special survey of traffic control in great Western cities. A system of traffic regulations adapted to local requirements should be put into force, after due notice to the public and after a campaign of education. Likewise support should be given to the Traffic-Regulation Society in its work of public education.

VI. *Building Regulation by an Art Commission.* While the police commissioner is making rapid strides in scientific fire prevention work and in the control of buildings in the interest of reducing fire hazards, there is no unified control over structures, public or private, in the interest of æsthetics.

In many sections, all kinds of hideous abnormalities, that are neither Western nor Eastern in form and spirit, are appearing to mar the beauty of the capital. The time has come to call a halt to this in the name of both the old and the new Japan. The problem is undoubtedly difficult to solve and cannot be solved to the satisfaction of every interest. New York experience shows that something can be done by the creation of an art commission to pass upon the plans and designs for monuments and other structures. There should be such a commission in Tokyo representing the interests of the Imperial government speaking for the Empire and representing also the interests of the city government speaking for the residents of the capital.

VII. *Social Welfare.* During Viscount Goto's administration the new Bureau of Social Welfare under the direction of Mr. Maeda, assistant mayor, has made rapid

strides in the introduction of the various features usually associated with an enlightened social policy. Employment exchanges have been developed, and model tenements and houses for the working-classes, day nurseries, a municipal lodging house, a new playground have been constructed. The system of district aid committees, modelled on the Elberfeld plan, has been extended; and many other features of social work indicate intelligence in planning and zeal in executing. A scheme for making small loans to needy municipal officers and thus combatting professional money lenders was instituted in 1923.

In the matter of parks, playgrounds, and housing, as the city authorities are well aware, there is great need for constructive measures. With respect to parks and playgrounds the following data and suggestions are submitted.

Of the total area of present Tokyo, 1.89 per cent is devoted to public parks. Three great parks, Shiba, Hibiya, and Ueno form by far the greater part of the area. Even in the congested sections of the city, Honjo-ku and Fukagawa-ku, where the death rate averages more than 25 per thousand—the highest in the city—only 0.39 per cent of the area is devoted to public parks. Honjo-ku, with a death rate of 26.55, has practically no public park space at all. Taking the city as a whole there is a striking lack of small parks, local breathing spaces, and playgrounds.

In attempting to solve the park problem two fundamental questions arise: First, what should be the proportion of the total area of a city devoted to public park space? Second, what should be the distribution of the space so devoted to parks?

Two American specialists, after a careful study of the first question in relation to a city plan, laid down the

principle that there should be a park within easy walking distance for every family. In practice, this means that from five to ten per cent of the total area of the city should be devoted to park or playground space and that there should be a park within one-quarter of a mile of every home.

The application of this principle in the congested sections of Tokyo would impose a heavy expense upon the city government. Nevertheless a start could be made by clearing small park areas in the regions which now have little or no breathing spaces. The importance of this work has already been recognised by the city administration and the Research Section is now engaged in an intensive study of the park problem.

This work should be closely related to the development of housing plans of the city. If there are any low or marshy spots which are now owned by the city or are owned by private parties, they could be filled and devoted to park spaces. There are some slum areas below the water level in certain sections of the city. In connection with plans already made for removing the residential population from those areas and devoting them to commercial purposes after filling them, the matter of park reservations should be carefully considered. Certainly some of the space on the river banks could be reserved and devoted to small parks.

In the development of the plans for Greater Tokyo careful attention should be given to the reservation of small park areas in the suburbs. Sections broken by hills and ravines should be carefully examined and platted. Since they are not valuable for building purposes, they could be reserved for park space at a relatively low cost. Moreover, from five to ten per cent of the new building lot additions made to the city should be dedicated to parks

and carefully distributed so as to afford a breathing space within easy walking distance of every family.

In connection with the park system, there should be constructed a large number of playgrounds especially in the congested sections of the city. It is not necessary to dwell upon the importance of healthful play for growing children. This side of child life is not properly appreciated in any of the world's great cities and Tokyo in this respect lags behind the most progressive municipalities.

As to the housing programme, the city has already built a few model tenements and houses, but it is well known these can meet only a small part of the need. Other plans, taking account of Western experience, are being formulated to destroy some of the worst slum areas, after provision has been made for the population deprived of housing.

Western experience, such as it is, does not offer very much substantial encouragement in this sphere. Tokyo is suffering from a housing shortage as are many cities of America and Europe. The municipal authorities, fully aware of the importance of land as an element in the situation, have asked the Imperial Government for the power to tax unearned increment. They are well aware also of the great expense connected with buying up land in congested areas and with making slum clearages. They fully appreciate the vital relation of transportation to the relief of congestion. While some of the slum conditions of Tokyo are so bad as to seem unendurable, it is certainly the better part of wisdom to proceed in the light of Western experience rather than to make a frontal attack in the form of expensive clearances which in the end will fail to strike at the root of the matter.

Here as in many other spheres of municipal improve-

ment, prevention by strict housing regulations is an important method of attacking the evils of congestion. In many sections on the outskirts of Tokyo, the compact building of houses along narrow streets and lanes proceeds rapidly, reproducing the evils prevalent in certain parts of the metropolis itself. This can be stopped now by the enforcement of standard city plans in the suburbs (above p. 26); but such an action hangs upon the fate of plans for making a consolidation of the metropolitan areas as indicated in Chapter II above.

Taxation and negative regulation, however, do not build houses. Actual construction calls for capital and energy, and an inquiry into the financial situation in Tokyo with reference to housing shows a lack of facilities for the small home builder, in the form of building and loan associations. As a collateral part of the attack on the housing problem, therefore, it is here suggested that an inquiry be made into ways and means of financing individual builders of homes and enabling them to escape the extortionate methods of the ordinary money lender. Perhaps this could be undertaken in connection with the above suggested programme of remedial loans.

On the side of administrative organisation, it is evident that if the general consolidation suggested in Chapter III takes place it will be necessary to effect a general re-organization of the Department of Social Welfare. Then certain fundamental questions will arise as to the desirability of combining under one branch of the city government the present work undertaken by the bureau of the almshouse, and all agencies which dispense charity or give remedial aid to citizens of small resources.

VIII. *Public Health Service.* This is a large technical field into which the layman will venture with great hesitation. There are, however, certain indisputable facts

which have a direct bearing upon the health conditions of Tokyo. They are as follows:

1. The death rate in Tokyo for the year 1920 was 21.81
   The death rate in Honjo ward (Tokyo) .. 25.51
   The death rate in Honjo ward 26.55
   The death rate in New York City in 1919. 12.39
   The death rate in Liverpool (1920) 16.4
2. In spite of all precautions Tokyo suffers from periodical visitations of cholera, the last being in October, 1922.
3. There is, as indicated above (Chapter III), a duplication of health functions in Tokyo, for the city government, the prefectural government, and the police commissioner carry on extensive activities relative to public health protection.

The reasons why the death rate of Tokyo is so much higher than that of Liverpool or New York involve technical questions of the highest order and can only be answered by experts in public health service. It is an established fact, however, as once remarked by a New York health commissioner, that "public health is purchasable and within natural limitations a community can determine its death rate." In fact, since the foundation of the New York Board of Health more than half a century ago, the death rate has been reduced from about 28 per thousand to an annual rate of approximately 13 or 14 per thousand. There is apparently no reason why the death rate of Tokyo cannot be reduced to that of the best administered Western cities by the development of the public health services.

However, the death rate is not the sole consideration in the public health problem. The reduction of the amount

of sickness, the elimination of certain diseases and the comfort and convenience of those who are treated for disease in their homes and in private hospitals—these are also considerations of prime importance. The natures of these problems, like that of the death rate in Tokyo, can be discovered, however, only by a close and scientific survey of the data in the case.

An inquiry develops the fact that several partial studies, many of them excellent in methods and results, have already been made by different governmental organs operating within the area of Tokyo. Nevertheless there has never been a scientific and exhaustive survey of the public health situation as a whole, and such a survey is herewith urgently recommended.

In anticipation of such a scientific study of the health problems of Greater Tokyo, it may not be amiss to indicate here some of the tendencies in American health services which may be of interest to Japanese not already familiar with them.

First and foremost should be emphasised the direction of energy to the *prevention* of disease. That is the outstanding characteristic of public health work in America to-day. The struggle to prevent disease leads inevitably into a study of the social and economic causes of disease and into the field of industrial hygiene, housing, and food control,—social service broadly conceived.

The second feature of American public health work is the emphasis on child hygiene and public nursing.

A third feature is the intense application of thought to the construction and administration of hospitals with a view to securing (a) the greatest possible convenience and comfort for patients, (b) strict control in the execution of physicians' orders, (c) the development of the technique of nursing to the highest point and (d) the most efficient

and economical management from a business standpoint.

Fourthly, the creation of powerful, consolidated health departments, organised with minute care as to administrative technique and adequately financed.

Fifthly, emphasis on public health education as a part of preventive work.

Sixthly, the constant improvement of health inspection work by the development of standard specifications to be applied by inspectors to buildings, materials, and conditions inspected with a view to reducing the factor of mere personal judgment to the lowest possible point.

Inasmuch as American public health agencies have been able materially to reduce the death rate in cities by active preventive measures, it seems reasonable to assume that the authorities in Tokyo, in attacking the high death rate of the city, may well profit from American as well as European experience.

The student of public health from the Western world will be surprised to learn that the departments of public health in Japan are usually headed by men of legal rather than medical training. An inquiry into the reason for this custom evoked the following response from an informed Japanese authority on administration: "Japanese doctors are usually specialists in medical research and practice. Few of them have any training in public health administration. As a rule they are not particularly interested in public health administration. Hence it has been found necessary to go outside of the ranks of the doctors of medicine to find trained administrators for public health departments."

While this reasoning may be valid enough in the present state of affairs, it is not conclusive. It needs no argument to show that public health administration calls for specialists who are well grounded in medicine as well as

administration. It may be true that Japanese doctors are at present principally engrossed in research and private practice, but the time has come in Japan (as elsewhere) for a new emphasis. Public health is a matter of high national and international concern, and Japan needs a school for the training of public health administrators. This is a matter which calls for immediate attention on the part of the Government and the schools of medicine.

In conclusion, it should be said once more that the above report and work programme contain nothing new to Japanese specialists in the several branches of municipal administration. Neither do they embrace the detailed specifications required for immediate action. If there is anything unique about the report it is the presentation in one document of a general survey of many important questions, so ordered that specialists in their own spheres and citizens interested in the welfare of the community can see the problems of municipal leadership and advance in Tokyo as a whole. It is hoped too that citizens who have hitherto taken little or no thought about city government or have felt that the subject is of little practical consequence will find in these pages proof that municipal administration does in fact come very close to their daily lives and is worthy of great and sustained interest.

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
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